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**ASSURANCE ACTIVITY REPORT FOR
CISCO CATALYST INDUSTRIAL
ETHERNET 3100 (IE3100) RUGGED
SERIES SWITCHES RUNNING IOS-XE 17.12**

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1. INTRODUCTION

This document presents evaluations results of the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 NDcPP22e evaluation. This document contains a description of the assurance activities and associated results as performed by the evaluators.

1.1 EQUIVALENCE

This section explains why the test subset was adequate to address all product installations.

1.1.1 EVALUATED PLATFORM EQUIVALENCE

The TOE is the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12. The TOE is comprised of the following hardware models.

3100 Series

- IE-3100-4T2S
- IE-3100-8T2C
- IE-3100 18T2C
- **IE-3100-8T4S**
- IE-3105-8T2C
- IE-3105-18T2C

The evaluator performed full testing on the following platform (**bolded** in the list above) and microarchitecture.

- IE-3100-8T4S (Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55))

It was sufficient to perform testing on one model because all claimed models in the evaluation from the IE3100 series include the exact same processor and microarchitecture and all use the exact same software image. All of the TOE devices in the IE 3100 series (including the tested model IE-3100-8T4S) run on the Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55) processor. Additionally, there is just one software image that is used across all of the TOE devices in the IE3100 model series. All Security Functionality is implemented in the one software image which leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M).

While there are different models, they differ primarily in physical form factor, number and types of connections and slots, and relative performance. These differing characteristics primarily affect only non-TSF relevant functionality (such as throughput, processing speed, number and type of network connections supported, number of concurrent connections supported, and amount of storage). All TOE security functions are implemented in software and the TOE security behavior is the same on all the devices for each of the SFRs defined by the Security Target. These SFRs are instantiated by the same version of the TOE software and in the same way on every platform.

1.1.2 CAVP EQUIVALENCE

The TOE provides the cryptography to support all security functions. With the exception of RSA key establishment and FFC schemes using safe-prime groups, all the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates running on the



processor specified in the table below. RSA key establishment and FFC schemes using safe-prime groups are verified using a known good implementation.

Hardware Model	Processor
Cisco Catalyst IE3100 Series	Marvell Prestera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55)

The TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a for SSH and CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) Cryptographic Implementation 7.2a for TLS as identified in the table below.

Algorithm	Description	Supported Mode	CAVP Cert. #	Module	SFR
IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a (for SSH)					
AES	Used for symmetric encryption/decryption	CBC (128 and 256 bits)	A1462	IC2M Rel5a	FCS_COP.1/ DataEncryption
SHS (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512)	Cryptographic hashing services	Byte Oriented	A1462	IC2M Rel5a	FCS_COP.1/Hash
HMAC (HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512)	Keyed hashing services and software integrity test	Byte Oriented	A1462	IC2M Rel5a	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
DRBG	Deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011	CTR_DRBG (AES 256)	A1462	IC2M Rel5a	FCS_RBG_EXT.1
RSA	RSA Key generation	FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.3. Key sizes: 2048 bit and 3072 bit.	A1462	IC2M Rel5a	FCS_CKM.1
	RSA Signature generation, RSA Signature verification.	FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Section 5.5. Key sizes: 2048 bit and 3072 bit.			FCS_COP.1/SigGen
CVL-KAS-ECC (P-256, P-384)	Key Agreement	NIST Special Publication 800-56A	A1462	IC2M Rel5a	FCS_CKM.2
ECDSA (P-256, P-384)	ECDSA Key generation, ECDSA Key verification	FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard	A1462	IC2M Rel5a	FCS_CKM.1



Algorithm	Description	Supported Mode	CAVP Cert. #	Module	SFR
		(DSS)			
RSA based key establishment schemes (2048, 3072 bits)	RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5	RFC 3447, Section 7.2	Verified by known good implementation	IC2M Rel5a	FCS_CKM.2
FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups (DH group 14)	Key Agreement	NIST Special Publication 800-56A, revision 3, groups listed in RFC 3526	Verified by known good implementation	IC2M Rel5a	FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.1
CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) Cryptographic Implementation 7.2a (for TLS)					
AES	Used for symmetric encryption/decryption	CBC and GCM (128 and 256 bits)	A1420	CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a	FCS_COP.1/ DataEncryption
SHS (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384)	Cryptographic hashing services	Byte Oriented	A1420	CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a	FCS_COP.1/Hash
HMAC (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384)	Keyed hashing services and software integrity test	Byte Oriented	A1420	CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
DRBG	Deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011	CTR_DRBG (AES 256)	A1420	CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a	FCS_RBG_EXT.1
RSA	RSA Key generation RSA Signature generation, RSA Signature verification.	FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.3. Key sizes: 2048 bit and 3072 bit. FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Section 5.5. Key sizes: 2048 bit and 3072 bit.	A1420	CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1/SigGen
CVL-KAS-ECC (P-256, P-384, and P-521)	Key Agreement	NIST Special Publication 800-56A	A1420	CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a	FCS_CKM.2
ECDSA (P-256, P-384 and P-521)	ECDSA Key generation, ECDSA Key verification	FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)	A1420	CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a	FCS_CKM.1

The evaluator performed full testing on the following platform and microarchitecture.

- IE-3100-8T4S (Marvell Pretera (ARMv8 Cortex-A55))



All TOE models have the same processor and microarchitecture; therefore, all microarchitectures were addressed as part of the evaluation testing. All other IE3100 series models are claimed by equivalence as they are the same processor, the same microarchitecture and they all use the same software image.

1.2 REFERENCES

The following evidence was used to complete the Assurance Activities:

- Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target, Version 0.5, 03 September, 2024 (**ST**)
- Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches IOS-XE 17.12 CC Configuration Guide, Version 0.4, August 12, 2024 (**Admin Guide**)



2. PROTECTION PROFILE SFR ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES

This section of the AAR identifies each of the assurance activities included in the claimed Protection Profiles and describes the findings in each case.

2.1 SECURITY AUDIT (FAU)

2.1.1 AUDIT DATA GENERATION (NDcPP22E:FAU_GEN.1)

2.1.1.1 NDcPP22E:FAU_GEN.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.1.1.2 NDcPP22E:FAU_GEN.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: For the administrative task of generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys as defined in FAU_GEN.1.1c, the TSS should identify what information is logged to identify the relevant key.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes which of the overall required auditable events defined in FAU_GEN.1.1 are generated and recorded by which TOE components. The evaluator shall ensure that this mapping of audit events to TOE components accounts for, and is consistent with, information provided in Table 1, as well as events in Tables 2, 4, and 5 (where applicable to the overall TOE). This includes that the evaluator shall confirm that all components defined as generating audit information for a particular SFR should also contribute to that SFR as defined in the mapping of SFRs to TOE components, and that the audit records generated by each component cover all the SFRs that it implements.

Section 6.1 (FAU_GEN.1) of the ST states each of the events specified in the audit record is in enough detail to identify the user for which the event is associated (e.g. user identity, MAC address, IP address), when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the outcome of the event, and the type of event that occurred such as generating keys, including the type of key and “key name” which is assigned to the “label” of the *crypto* command.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the guidance documentation and ensure that it provides an example of each auditable event required by FAU_GEN.1 (i.e. at least one instance of each



auditable event, comprising the mandatory, optional and selection-based SFR sections as applicable, shall be provided from the actual audit record).

The evaluator shall also make a determination of the administrative actions related to TSF data related to configuration changes. The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation and make a determination of which administrative commands, including subcommands, scripts, and configuration files, are related to the configuration (including enabling or disabling) of the mechanisms implemented in the TOE that are necessary to enforce the requirements specified in the cPP. The evaluator shall document the methodology or approach taken while determining which actions in the administrative guide are related to TSF data related to configuration changes. The evaluator may perform this activity as part of the activities associated with ensuring that the corresponding guidance documentation satisfies the requirements related to it.

Section 6 in the **Admin Guide** provides a table identifying all of the required audit events consistent with the ST along with a sample of each record for each SFR where applicable.

From a review of the ST, the Guidance and through testing the evaluator also determined that the guidance contains all of the administrative actions and their associated audit events that are relevant to the PP and to use of the TOE. These administrative actions are consistent with the security requirements implemented in the TOE and were found to have appropriate management capabilities identified in the guidance documentation.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall test the TOE's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records for the events listed in the table of audit events and administrative actions listed above. This should include all instances of an event: for instance, if there are several different I&A mechanisms for a system, the FIA_UIA_EXT.1 events must be generated for each mechanism. The evaluator shall test that audit records are generated for the establishment and termination of a channel for each of the cryptographic protocols contained in the ST. If HTTPS is implemented, the test demonstrating the establishment and termination of a TLS session can be combined with the test for an HTTPS session. When verifying the test results, the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the guidance documentation, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall perform tests on all TOE components according to the mapping of auditable events to TOE components in the Security Target. For all events involving more than one TOE component when an audit event is triggered, the evaluator has to check that the event has been audited on both sides (e.g. failure of building up a secure communication channel between the two components). This is not limited to error cases but includes also events about successful actions like successful build up/tear down of a secure communication channel between TOE components.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly.

The evaluator created a list of the required audit events. The evaluator then collected the audit events when running the other security functional tests described by the protection profiles. For example, the required event for FPT_STM.1 is discontinuous change to time. The evaluator collected audit records when modifying the clock using administrative commands. The evaluator then recorded the relevant audit events in the proprietary Detailed



Test Report (DTR). The security management events are handled in a similar manner. When the administrator was required to set a value for testing, the audit record associated with the administrator action was collected and recorded in the DTR.

2.1.2 USER IDENTITY ASSOCIATION (NDcPP22E:FAU_GEN.2)

2.1.2.1 NDcPP22E:FAU_GEN.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The TSS and Guidance Documentation requirements for FAU_GEN.2 are already covered by the TSS and Guidance Documentation requirements for FAU_GEN.1.

See NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The TSS and Guidance Documentation requirements for FAU_GEN.2 are already covered by the TSS and Guidance Documentation requirements for FAU_GEN.1.

See NDcPP22e:FAU_GEN.1.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: This activity should be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of FAU_GEN.1.1.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall verify that where auditable events are instigated by another component, the component that records the event associates the event with the identity of the instigator. The evaluator shall perform at least one test on one component where another component instigates an auditable event. The evaluator shall verify that the event is recorded by the component as expected and the event is associated with the instigating component. It is assumed that an event instigated by another component can at least be generated for building up a secure channel between two TOE components. If for some reason (could be e.g. TSS or Guidance Documentation) the evaluator would come to the conclusion that the overall TOE does not generate any events instigated by other components, then this requirement shall be omitted.

This activity is accomplished in conjunction with the testing of FAU_GEN.1.1.

The TOE is not distributed.

2.1.3 PROTECTED AUDIT EVENT STORAGE (NDcPP22E:FAU_STG_EXT.1)

2.1.3.1 NDcPP22E:FAU_STG_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined



Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.1.3.2 NDCPP22E:FAU_STG_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.1.3.3 NDCPP22E:FAU_STG_EXT.1.3

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes the means by which the audit data are transferred to the external audit server, and how the trusted channel is provided.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes the amount of audit data that are stored locally; what happens when the local audit data store is full; and how these records are protected against unauthorized access.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes whether the TOE is a standalone TOE that stores audit data locally or a distributed TOE that stores audit data locally on each TOE component or a distributed TOE that contains TOE components that cannot store audit data locally on themselves but need to transfer audit data to other TOE components that can store audit data locally. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that for distributed TOEs it contains a list of TOE components that store audit data locally. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that for distributed TOEs that contain components which do not store audit data locally but transmit their generated audit data to other components it contains a mapping between the transmitting and storing TOE components.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details the behavior of the TOE when the storage space for audit data is full. When the option 'overwrite previous audit record' is selected this description should include an outline of the rule for overwriting audit data. If 'other actions' are chosen such as sending the new audit data to an external IT entity, then the related behaviour of the TOE shall also be detailed in the TSS.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details whether the transmission of audit information to an external IT entity can be done in real-time or periodically. In case the TOE does not perform transmission in real-time the evaluator needs to verify that the TSS provides details about what event stimulates the transmission to be made as well as the possible acceptable frequency for the transfer of audit data.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes to which TOE components this SFR applies and how audit data transfer to the external audit server is implemented among the different TOE



components (e.g. every TOE components does its own transfer or the data is sent to another TOE component for central transfer of all audit events to the external audit server).

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes which TOE components are storing audit information locally and which components are buffering audit information and forwarding the information to another TOE component for local storage. For every component the TSS shall describe the behaviour when local storage space or buffer space is exhausted.

Section 6.1 (FAU_STG_EXT.1) of the ST states the TOE can optionally be configured to export syslog records to a specified, external syslog server. Once the configuration is complete, the audit records are automatically sent to the external syslog server at the same time as they are written to the logging buffer. The TOE protects communications with an external syslog server via TLS. If the TLS connection fails, the TOE will store audit records on the TOE when it discovers it can no longer communicate with its configured syslog server. When the connection is restored, the TOE will transmit the buffer contents to the syslog server.

The TOE is a standalone TOE that internally stores audit records in a circular log file where the TOE overwrites the oldest audit records when the audit trail becomes full. The size of the logging files on the TOE is configurable by the administrator with the minimum value being 4096 (default) to 67108864 bytes of available disk space. Only Authorized Administrators are able to clear the local logs, and local audit records are stored in a directory that does not allow administrators to modify the contents.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also examine the guidance documentation to ensure it describes how to establish the trusted channel to the audit server, as well as describe any requirements on the audit server (particular audit server protocol, version of the protocol required, etc.), as well as configuration of the TOE needed to communicate with the audit server.

The evaluator shall also examine the guidance documentation to determine that it describes the relationship between the local audit data and the audit data that are sent to the audit log server. For example, when an audit event is generated, is it simultaneously sent to the external server and the local store, or is the local store used as a buffer and 'cleared' periodically by sending the data to the audit server.

The evaluator shall also ensure that the guidance documentation describes all possible configuration options for FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 and the resulting behaviour of the TOE for each possible configuration. The description of possible configuration options and resulting behaviour shall correspond to those described in the TSS.

The following sections in the **Admin Guide** provide instructions on configuring the TOE to use TLS to securely transmit generated audit data to an external syslog server: "TLS – Syslog", "Create and Configure a Certificate Map", "Create, Configure, and Authenticate the Root Trustpoint", "Create, Configure, and Authenticate the Intermediate Trustpoint", "Configure a TLS Profile" and "Enable Remote Syslog Server". These instructions include configuring a root trustpoint, enabling a remote syslog server, creating a TLS profile for syslog, configuring TLSv1.2 and configuring the TLS ciphersuites supported by the TOE. The instructions conform to the description in the TSS.



Section “Enable Remote Syslog Server” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for using the “logging host” command to enable the TOE to transmit audit data to a specified external audit server. This section states that when an audit event is generated, it is simultaneously sent to the external server and the local store.

Section “Configure Local Logging Buffer Size” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for how to configure the size of the local logging buffer. This section states that if the local storage space for audit data is full the TOE will overwrite the oldest audit record to make room for the new audit record.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: Testing of the trusted channel mechanism for audit will be performed as specified in the associated assurance activities for the particular trusted channel mechanism. The evaluator shall perform the following additional test for this requirement:

a) Test 1: The evaluator shall establish a session between the TOE and the audit server according to the configuration guidance provided. The evaluator shall then examine the traffic that passes between the audit server and the TOE during several activities of the evaluator's choice designed to generate audit data to be transferred to the audit server. The evaluator shall observe that these data are not able to be viewed in the clear during this transfer, and that they are successfully received by the audit server. The evaluator shall record the particular software (name, version) used on the audit server during testing. The evaluator shall verify that the TOE is capable of transferring audit data to an external audit server automatically without administrator intervention.

b) Test 2: The evaluator shall perform operations that generate audit data and verify that this data is stored locally. The evaluator shall perform operations that generate audit data until the local storage space is exceeded and verifies that the TOE complies with the behaviour defined in FAU_STG_EXT.1.3. Depending on the configuration this means that the evaluator has to check the content of the audit data when the audit data is just filled to the maximum and then verifies that

1) The audit data remains unchanged with every new auditable event that should be tracked but that the audit data is recorded again after the local storage for audit data is cleared (for the option 'drop new audit data' in FAU_STG_EXT.1.3).

2) The existing audit data is overwritten with every new auditable event that should be tracked according to the specified rule (for the option 'overwrite previous audit records' in FAU_STG_EXT.1.3)

3) The TOE behaves as specified (for the option 'other action' in FAU_STG_EXT.1.3).

c) Test 3: If the TOE complies with FAU_STG_EXT.2/LocSpace the evaluator shall verify that the numbers provided by the TOE according to the selection for FAU_STG_EXT.2/LocSpace are correct when performing the tests for FAU_STG_EXT.1.3.

d) Test 4: For distributed TOEs, Test 1 defined above should be applicable to all TOE components that forward audit data to an external audit server. For the local storage according to FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 and FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 the Test 2 specified above shall be applied to all TOE components that store audit data locally. For all TOE components that store audit data locally and comply with FAU_STG_EXT.2/LocSpace Test 3 specified above shall be applied. The evaluator shall verify that the transfer of audit data to an external audit server is implemented.



Test 1: The successful establishment of the TLS syslog connection was demonstrated in FTP_ITC.1. The TOE initiated the connection without administrator intervention. The use of TLS ensured that no audits were viewed in cleartext. The audits collected as part of FAU_GEN.1 throughout testing were gathered from the remote syslog server running rsyslog version 8.16.0 thus demonstrating that audits were successfully received by the remote syslog server.

Test 2: The option “overwrite previous audit records” is selected in FAU_STG_EXT.1.3. The logs are stored in a local buffer which has a configurable size. The evaluator issued the “show logging” command and viewed the contents of the TOE’s log buffer which was at full capacity. The evaluator then performed other commands to generate audit activity and issued the “show logging” command again. The evaluator observed that the new audit records were generated and verified that the oldest audit records had been overwritten.

Test 3: Not applicable. The TOE does not claim support for FAU_STG_EXT.2/LocSpace.

Test 4: Not applicable. The TOE is not a distributed TOE.

2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT (FCS)

2.2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY GENERATION (NDcPP22E:FCS_CKM.1)

2.2.1.1 NDcPP22E:FCS_CKM.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS identifies the key sizes supported by the TOE. If the ST specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme.

Section 6.1 (FCS_CKM.1) in the ST states that the TOE uses RSA keys of size 2048 and 3072 bits in support of device authentication for SSH remote administration and for TLS sessions according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix B.3. The TOE employs RSA-based key establishment, RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 in cryptographic operations as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447 for SSH.

The TOE implements ECC key generation and establishment for TLS key exchanges according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix B.4 using NIST curves P-256, P-384 and P-521.

The TOE implements ECC key generation and establishment for SSH key exchanges according to FIPS PUB 186-4, Appendix B.4 using NIST curves P-256 and P-384.



The TOE generates asymmetric keys and performs key establishment in accordance with FFC Schemes using ‘safe prime’ groups that meet NIST SP800-56A Revision 3 and RFC 3526. The TOE implements Diffie-Hellman (DH) group 14 (2048) bit key establishment schemes in SSH. The DH key generation meets RFC3526, Section 3.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key generation scheme(s) and key size(s) for all cryptographic protocols defined in the Security Target.

Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for generating an RSA 2048 or 3072 bit key for SSH, configuring the SSH server key exchange algorithm, configuring the host key and user public key algorithms and configuring ssh rekey settings.

Section “Configure a TLS Profile” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for creating a TLS profile for Syslog including configuring TLSv1.2 and the supported list of TLS ciphersuites. Section “Enable Remote Syslog Server” states that RSA signature services using 2048 or 3072 key sizes are automatically configured when TLS is configured as instructed.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: Note: The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

Generation of long-term cryptographic keys (i.e. keys that are not ephemeral keys/session keys) might be performed automatically (e.g. during initial start-up). Testing of key generation must cover not only administrator invoked key generation but also automated key generation (if supported).

Key Generation for FIPS PUB 186-4 RSA Schemes

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of RSA Key Generation by the TOE using the Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the key components including the public verification exponent e , the private prime factors p and q , the public modulus n and the calculation of the private signature exponent d .

Key Pair generation specifies 5 ways (or methods) to generate the primes p and q . These include:

a) Random Primes:

- Provable primes
- Probable primes

b) Primes with Conditions:

- Primes p_1 , p_2 , q_1 , q_2 , p and q shall all be provable primes
- Primes p_1 , p_2 , q_1 , and q_2 shall be provable primes and p and q shall be probable primes
- Primes p_1 , p_2 , q_1 , q_2 , p and q shall all be probable primes



To test the key generation method for the Random Provable primes method and for all the Primes with Conditions methods, the evaluator must seed the TSF key generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the RSA key pair. This includes the random seed(s), the public exponent of the RSA key, and the desired key length. For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 key pairs. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated from a known good implementation.

Key Generation for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)

FIPS 186-4 ECC Key Generation Test

For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator shall require the implementation under test (IUT) to generate 10 private/public key pairs. The private key shall be generated using an approved random bit generator (RBG). To determine correctness, the evaluator shall submit the generated key pairs to the public key verification (PKV) function of a known good implementation.

FIPS 186-4 Public Key Verification (PKV) Test

For each supported NIST curve, i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521, the evaluator shall generate 10 private/public key pairs using the key generation function of a known good implementation and modify five of the public key values so that they are incorrect, leaving five values unchanged (i.e., correct). The evaluator shall obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values.

Key Generation for Finite-Field Cryptography (FFC)

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of the Parameters Generation and the Key Generation for FFC by the TOE using the Parameter Generation and Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the field prime p , the cryptographic prime q (dividing $p-1$), the cryptographic group generator g , and the calculation of the private key x and public key y .

The Parameter generation specifies 2 ways (or methods) to generate the cryptographic prime q and the field prime p :

- Primes q and p shall both be provable primes
- Primes q and field prime p shall both be probable primes

and two ways to generate the cryptographic group generator g :

- Generator g constructed through a verifiable process
- Generator g constructed through an unverifiable process.

The Key generation specifies 2 ways to generate the private key x :

- $\text{len}(q)$ bit output of RBG where $1 \leq x \leq q-1$



- $\text{len}(q) + 64$ bit output of RBG, followed by a mod $q-1$ operation and a $+1$ operation, where $1 \leq x \leq q-1$.

The security strength of the RBG must be at least that of the security offered by the FFC parameter set.

To test the cryptographic and field prime generation method for the provable primes method and/or the group generator g for a verifiable process, the evaluator must seed the TSF parameter generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the parameter set.

For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 parameter sets and key pairs. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated from a known good implementation. Verification must also confirm

- $g \neq 0,1$

- q divides $p-1$

- $g^q \bmod p = 1$

- $g^x \bmod p = y$

for each FFC parameter set and key pair.

FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups

Testing for FFC Schemes using safe-prime groups is done as part of testing in CKM.2.1.

(TD0580 applied)

The evaluator performed a CAVP certificate analysis and review which demonstrated that tests identified in this assurance activity for FCS_CKM.1 (with the exception of FFC schemes using safe prime groups) were successfully performed. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in Section 1.1.2 of this AAR. Testing for FFC schemes (DH group 14) was performed as part of testing for FCS_CKM.2.1 using a known good implementation. Please refer to NDCPP22E:FCS_CKM.2.1 below.

2.2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT (NDCPP22E:FCS_CKM.2)

2.2.2.1 NDCPP22E:FCS_CKM.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that the supported key establishment schemes correspond to the key generation schemes identified in FCS_CKM.1.1.1. If the ST specifies more than one scheme, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage for each scheme. It is sufficient to provide the scheme, SFR, and service in the TSS.



The intent of this activity is to be able to identify the scheme being used by each service. This would mean, for example, one way to document scheme usage could be:

Scheme	SFR	Service
RSA	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1	Administration
ECDH	FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	Audit Server
ECDH	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	Authentication Server

The information provided in the example above does not necessarily have to be included as a table but can be presented in other ways as long as the necessary data is available.

(TD0580 applied)

Section 6.1 (FCS_CKM.2) of the ST contains a table mapping the key establishment schemes to each service and the corresponding SFR. The supported key establishment schemes correspond to the key generation schemes identified in FCS_CKM.1. The usage for each scheme is further described in NDCPP22E:FCS_CKM.1.1.

Scheme	SFR	Service
RSA Key generation	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH Remote Administration
	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	Transmit generated audit data to an external IT entity
RSA Key establishment	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH Remote Administration
ECC Key generation Key establishment	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH Remote Administration
	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	Transmit generated audit data to an external IT entity
FFC Key generation Key establishment	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH Remote Administration

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key establishment scheme(s).



See FCS_CKM.1 where this activity has been performed.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: Key Establishment Schemes

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of the key establishment schemes of the supported by the TOE using the applicable tests below.

SP800-56A Key Establishment Schemes

The evaluator shall verify a TOE's implementation of SP800-56A key agreement schemes using the following Function and Validity tests. These validation tests for each key agreement scheme verify that a TOE has implemented the components of the key agreement scheme according to the specifications in the Recommendation. These components include the calculation of the DLC primitives (the shared secret value Z) and the calculation of the derived keying material (DKM) via the Key Derivation Function (KDF). If key confirmation is supported, the evaluator shall also verify that the components of key confirmation have been implemented correctly, using the test procedures described below. This includes the parsing of the DKM, the generation of MACdata and the calculation of MACtag.

Function Test

The Function test verifies the ability of the TOE to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each supported key agreement scheme-key agreement role combination, KDF type, and, if supported, key confirmation role- key confirmation type combination, the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. The data set consists of one set of domain parameter values (FFC) or the NIST approved curve (ECC) per 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.

The evaluator shall obtain the DKM, the corresponding TOE's public keys (static and/or ephemeral), the MAC tag(s), and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the Other Information field OI and TOE id fields.

If the TOE does not use a KDF defined in SP 800-56A, the evaluator shall obtain only the public keys and the hashed value of the shared secret.

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value, derive the keying material DKM, and compare hashes or MAC tags generated from these values.

If key confirmation is supported, the TSF shall perform the above for each implemented approved MAC algorithm.

Validity Test

The Validity test verifies the ability of the TOE to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results with or without key confirmation. To conduct this test, the evaluator shall obtain a list of the supporting cryptographic functions included in the SP800-56A key agreement implementation to determine which errors the TOE should be able to recognize. The evaluator generates a set of 24 (FFC) or 30 (ECC) test vectors consisting of



data sets including domain parameter values or NIST approved curves, the evaluator's public keys, the TOE's public/private key pairs, MACTag, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the other info and TOE id fields.

The evaluator shall inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the TOE recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value Z, the DKM, the other information field OI, the data to be MACed, or the generated MACTag. If the TOE contains the full or partial (only ECC) public key validation, the evaluator will also individually inject errors in both parties' static public keys, both parties' ephemeral public keys and the TOE's static private key to assure the TOE detects errors in the public key validation function and/or the partial key validation function (in ECC only). At least two of the test vectors shall remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).

The TOE shall use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator shall compare the TOE's results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the TOE detects these errors.

RSA-based key establishment

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_TRP.1/Admin, FTP_TRP.1/Join, FTP_ITC.1 and FPT_ITT.1 that uses RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5.

FFC Schemes using 'safe-prime' groups

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of safe-prime groups by using a known good implementation for each protocol selected in FTP_TRP.1/Admin, FTP_TRP.1/Join, FTP_ITC.1 and FPT_ITT.1 that uses safe-prime groups. This test must be performed for each safe-prime group that each protocol uses.

(TD0580 applied)

The evaluator performed a CAVP certificate analysis and review which demonstrated that tests identified in this assurance activity for FCS_CKM.2 (with the exception of FFC schemes using safe prime groups and RSA key establishment) were successfully performed. Refer to the KAS ECC CAVP certificate identified in Section 1.1.2.

For FFC schemes (DH group 14) key generation and key exchange and for RSA based key establishment schemes, Gossamer tested using Openssh client version 7.2p2, a known good implementation, to ensure correctness of the TOE's use of DH14 in SSH for key exchange and to verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 key for key establishment. This was tested in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7, test 2 and a number of other tests performed for the FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 test requirements.

2.2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY DESTRUCTION (NDcPP22E:FCS_CKM.4)

2.2.3.1 NDcPP22E:FCS_CKM.4.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined



Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator examines the TSS to ensure it lists all relevant keys (describing the origin and storage location of each), all relevant key destruction situations (e.g. factory reset or device wipe function, disconnection of trusted channels, key change as part of a secure channel protocol), and the destruction method used in each case. For the purpose of this Evaluation Activity the relevant keys are those keys that are relied upon to support any of the SFRs in the Security Target. The evaluator confirms that the description of keys and storage locations is consistent with the functions carried out by the TOE (e.g. that all keys for the TOE-specific secure channels and protocols, or that support FPT_APW.EXT.1 and FPT_SKP_EXT.1, are accounted for²). In particular, if a TOE claims not to store plaintext keys in non-volatile memory then the evaluator checks that this is consistent with the operation of the TOE.

The evaluator shall check to ensure the TSS identifies how the TOE destroys keys stored as plaintext in non-volatile memory, and that the description includes identification and description of the interfaces that the TOE uses to destroy keys (e.g., file system APIs, key store APIs).

Note that where selections involve 'destruction of reference' (for volatile memory) or 'invocation of an interface' (for non-volatile memory) then the relevant interface definition is examined by the evaluator to ensure that the interface supports the selection(s) and description in the TSS. In the case of non-volatile memory the evaluator includes in their examination the relevant interface description for each media type on which plaintext keys are stored. The presence of OS-level and storage device-level swap and cache files is not examined in the current version of the Evaluation Activity.

Where the TSS identifies keys that are stored in a non-plaintext form, the evaluator shall check that the TSS identifies the encryption method and the key-encrypting-key used, and that the key-encrypting-key is either itself stored in an encrypted form or that it is destroyed by a method included under FCS_CKM.4.

The evaluator shall check that the TSS identifies any configurations or circumstances that may not conform to the key destruction requirement (see further discussion in the Guidance Documentation section below). Note that reference may be made to the Guidance Documentation for description of the detail of such cases where destruction may be prevented or delayed.

Where the ST specifies the use of 'a value that does not contain any CSP' to overwrite keys, the evaluator examines the TSS to ensure that it describes how that pattern is obtained and used, and that this justifies the claim that the pattern does not contain any CSPs.

Section 6.1 (FCS_CKM.4) of the ST states the TOE meets all requirements as specified by the cryptographic key destruction method of the keys and the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) when no longer required for use.

Section 7.1 Key Zeroization of the ST provides a table that provides information on all of the secrets, keys and associated values, the description, and the method used to zeroize when no longer required for use.

In the event of an unexpected shutdown (e.g. crash or power loss), keys stored in volatile storage would be cleared from memory as a result of the loss of power/shutdown. For private keys in NVRAM (non-volatile storage), if an



unexpected shutdown occurs during administrator-initiated zeroization of a private key, the administrator should run the command again when the TOE is back in its operational state to ensure no residual portions of the private keys remain.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: A TOE may be subject to situations that could prevent or delay key destruction in some cases. The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation identifies configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement, and that this description is consistent with the relevant parts of the TSS (and any other supporting information used). The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation provides guidance on situations where key destruction may be delayed at the physical layer.

For example, when the TOE does not have full access to the physical memory, it is possible that the storage may be implementing wear-levelling and garbage collection. This may result in additional copies of the key that are logically inaccessible but persist physically. Where available, the TOE might then describe use of the TRIM command [Where TRIM is used then the TSS and/or guidance documentation is also expected to describe how the keys are stored such that they are not inaccessible to TRIM, (e.g. they would need not to be contained in a file less than 982 bytes which would be completely contained in the master file table)] and garbage collection to destroy these persistent copies upon their deletion (this would be explained in TSS and Operational Guidance).

Section “Zeroize Private Key” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for zeroizing private keys stored in NVRAM that are generated for SSH using the “crypto key zeroize” command. Other keys stored in SDRAM are zeroized when no longer in use, zeroized with a new value of the key, or zeroized on power-cycle. The Guide does not identify any configurations or circumstances that do not strictly conform to the key destruction requirements or any situation where key destruction may be delayed at the physical layer.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.2.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (AES DATA ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION) (NDcPP22E:FCS_COP.1/DATAENCRYPTION)

2.2.4.1 NDcPP22E:FCS_COP.1.1/DATAENCRYPTION

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it identifies the key size(s) and mode(s) supported by the TOE for data encryption/decryption.

Section 6.1 (FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption) of the ST states that the TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC mode and GCM mode (128, 256 bits) as described in ISO 18033-3, ISO 10116, and ISO 19772. AES is implemented in the following protocols: TLS and SSH. Through the implementation of



the cryptographic module, the TOE provides AES encryption and decryption in support of SSH and TLS for secure communications. The configuration and management of the cryptographic algorithms is provided through the CLI, to include the auditing of configuring the options by the Authorized Administrator. The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed in Section 1.1.2.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected mode(s) and key size(s) defined in the Security Target supported by the TOE for data encryption/decryption.

Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the supported encryption algorithms used in SSH: aes256-cbc and aes128-cbc.

Section “Configure a TLS Profile” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for creating a TLS profile for Syslog including configuring TLSv1.2 and the supported list of TLS ciphersuites. Section “Enable Remote Syslog Server” states that the supported cryptographic algorithms and key strengths are configured implicitly by defining the supported TLS ciphersuites.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: AES-CBC Known Answer Tests

There are four Known Answer Tests (KATs), described below. In all KATs, the plaintext, ciphertext, and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

KAT-1. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of 10 plaintext values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros. Five plaintext values shall be encrypted with a 128-bit all-zeros key, and the other five shall be encrypted with a 256-bit all-zeros key.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using 10 ciphertext values as input and AES-CBC decryption.

KAT-2. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of 10 key values and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. Five of the keys shall be 128-bit keys, and the other five shall be 256-bit keys.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using an all-zero ciphertext value as input and AES-CBC decryption.

KAT-3. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply the two sets of key values described below and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros. The first set of keys shall have 128 128-bit keys, and the second set shall have 256 256-bit keys. Key i in each set shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost $N-i$ bits be zeros, for i in $[1,N]$.



To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply the two sets of keys and ciphertext value pairs described below and obtain the plaintext value that results from AES-CBC decryption of the given ciphertext using the given key and an IV of all zeros. The first set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 128 128-bit key/ciphertext pairs, and the second set of key/ciphertext pairs shall have 256 256-bit key/ciphertext pairs. Key i in each set shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost $N-i$ bits be zeros, for i in $[1,N]$. The ciphertext value in each pair shall be the value that results in an all-zeros plaintext when decrypted with its corresponding key.

KAT-4. To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply the set of 128 plaintext values described below and obtain the two ciphertext values that result from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a 128-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros and using a 256-bit key value of all zeros with an IV of all zeros, respectively. Plaintext value i in each set shall have the leftmost i bits be ones and the rightmost $128-i$ bits be zeros, for i in $[1,128]$.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall perform the same test as for encrypt, using ciphertext values of the same form as the plaintext in the encrypt test as input and AES-CBC decryption.

AES-CBC Multi-Block Message Test

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality by encrypting an i -block message where $1 < i \leq 10$. The evaluator shall choose a key, an IV and plaintext message of length i blocks and encrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The ciphertext shall be compared to the result of encrypting the same plaintext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation.

The evaluator shall also test the decrypt functionality for each mode by decrypting an i -block message where $1 < i \leq 10$. The evaluator shall choose a key, an IV and a ciphertext message of length i blocks and decrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key and IV. The plaintext shall be compared to the result of decrypting the same ciphertext message with the same key and IV using a known good implementation.

AES-CBC Monte Carlo Tests

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality using a set of 200 plaintext, IV, and key 3-tuples. 100 of these shall use 128 bit keys, and 100 shall use 256 bit keys. The plaintext and IV values shall be 128-bit blocks. For each 3-tuple, 1000 iterations shall be run as follows:

Input: PT, IV, Key

for $i = 1$ to 1000:

if $i == 1$:

CT[1] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, IV, PT)

PT = IV

else:

CT[i] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key, PT)



PT = CT[i-1]

The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration (i.e., CT[1000]) is the result for that trial. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality using the same test as for encrypt, exchanging CT and PT and replacing AES-CBC-Encrypt with AES-CBC-Decrypt.

AES-GCM Test

The evaluator shall test the authenticated encrypt functionality of AES-GCM for each combination of the following input parameter lengths:

128 bit and 256 bit keys

- a) Two plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. The other plaintext length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.
- a) Three AAD lengths. One AAD length shall be 0, if supported. One AAD length shall be a non-zero integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported. One AAD length shall not be an integer multiple of 128 bits, if supported.
- b) Two IV lengths. If 96 bit IV is supported, 96 bits shall be one of the two IV lengths tested.

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, plaintext, AAD, and IV tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain the ciphertext value and tag that results from AES-GCM authenticated encrypt. Each supported tag length shall be tested at least once per set of 10. The IV value may be supplied by the evaluator or the implementation being tested, as long as it is known.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality using a set of 10 key, ciphertext, tag, AAD, and IV 5-tuples for each combination of parameter lengths above and obtain a Pass/Fail result on authentication and the decrypted plaintext if Pass. The set shall include five tuples that Pass and five that Fail.

The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

AES-CTR Known Answer Tests

The Counter (CTR) mode is a confidentiality mode that features the application of the forward cipher to a set of input blocks, called counters, to produce a sequence of output blocks that are exclusive-ORed with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext, and vice versa. Due to the fact that Counter Mode does not specify the counter that is used, it is not possible to implement an automated test for this mode. The generation and management of the counter is tested through FCS_SSH*_EXT.1.4. If CBC and/or GCM are selected in FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption, the test activities for those modes sufficiently demonstrate the correctness of the AES algorithm. If CTR is the only selection in FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption, the AES-CBC Known Answer Test, AES-GCM Known Answer Test, or the following test shall be performed (all of these tests demonstrate the correctness of the AES algorithm):



There are four Known Answer Tests (KATs) described below to test a basic AES encryption operation (AES-ECB mode). For all KATs, the plaintext, IV, and ciphertext values shall be 128-bit blocks. The results from each test may either be obtained by the validator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

KAT-1 To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator shall supply a set of 5 plaintext values for each selected keysize and obtain the ciphertext value that results from encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros.

KAT-2 To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator shall supply a set of 5 key values for each selected keysize and obtain the ciphertext value that results from encryption of an all zeros plaintext using the given key value.

KAT-3 To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator shall supply a set of key values for each selected keysize as described below and obtain the ciphertext values that result from AES encryption of an all zeros plaintext using the given key values. A set of 128 128-bit keys, a set of 192 192-bit keys, and/or a set of 256 256-bit keys. Key_i in each set shall have the leftmost *i* bits be ones and the rightmost *N-i* bits be zeros, for *i* in [1, *N*].

KAT-4 To test the encrypt functionality, the evaluator shall supply the set of 128 plaintext values described below and obtain the ciphertext values that result from encryption of the given plaintext using each selected keysize with a key value of all zeros (e.g. 256 ciphertext values will be generated if 128 bits and 256 bits are selected and 384 ciphertext values will be generated if all key sizes are selected). Plaintext value *i* in each set shall have the leftmost bits be ones and the rightmost 128-*i* bits be zeros, for *i* in [1, 128].

AES-CTR Multi-Block Message Test

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality by encrypting an *i*-block message where 1 less-than *i* less-than-or-equal to 10 (test shall be performed using AES-ECB mode). For each *i* the evaluator shall choose a key and plaintext message of length *i* blocks and encrypt the message, using the mode to be tested, with the chosen key. The ciphertext shall be compared to the result of encrypting the same plaintext message with the same key using a known good implementation. The evaluator shall perform this test using each selected keysize.

AES-CTR Monte-Carlo Test

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality using 100 plaintext/key pairs. The plaintext values shall be 128-bit blocks. For each pair, 1000 iterations shall be run as follows:

Input: PT, Key

for *i* = 1 to 1000:

CT[*i*] = AES-ECB-Encrypt(Key, PT) PT = CT[*i*]

The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration is the result for that trial. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation. The evaluator shall perform this test using each selected keysize.



There is no need to test the decryption engine.

The evaluator performed a CAVP certificate analysis and review which demonstrated that tests identified in this assurance activity for FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption were successfully performed. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in Section 1.1.2 of this AAR.

2.2.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (HASH ALGORITHM) (NDcPP22E:FCS_COP.1/HASH)

2.2.5.1 NDcPP22E:FCS_COP.1.1/HASH

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check that the association of the hash function with other TSF cryptographic functions (for example, the digital signature verification function) is documented in the TSS.

Section 6.1(FCS_COP.1/Hash) of the ST states that the TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA512 as specified in ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 (with key sizes and message digest sizes of 160, 256, 384 and 512 respectively).

The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-1 that operates on 512-bit blocks of data with key sizes and message digest sizes of 160 bits; HMAC-SHA-256 that operates on 512-bit blocks with key sizes and message digest sizes of 256 bits; HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512 operating on 1024-bit blocks of data, with key sizes and message digest sizes of 384 bits and 512 bits respectively as specified in ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.

For TLS hashing, administrators can select any SHA-256, and/or SHA-384 (with message digest sizes of 256, and 384 respectively) to be used with remote TLS endpoints.

SHA-512 hashing is used for verification of software image integrity. SHA-256 hashing is used by the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) for a software integrity self test, and SHA-1 hashing is used by the CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) for a software integrity self test.

For SSH remote administration, Administrators configure hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512 for MAC integrity.

Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) of the ST indicates that the TOE supports client based authentication with ssh-rsa and host key authentication using rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 public key algorithms. To ensure the integrity of the SSH session, the TOE supports hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512. The TSF's SSH key exchange



implementation supports the following key exchange algorithm: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384.

Section 6.1 (FPT_APW_EXT.1) indicates that all passwords are stored using a SHA-2 hash.

Section 6.1 (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) indicates that a SHA-512 published hash mechanism is used to verify the TOE software/firmware update files.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator checks the AGD documents to determine that any configuration that is required to configure the required hash sizes is present.

Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the supported key exchange algorithms: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384, the supported MAC algorithms: hmac-sha2-512, hmac-sha2-256, the supported host key algorithms: rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512 and the supported user/client public key algorithm: ssh-rsa.

Section “Configure a TLS Profile” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for creating a TLS profile for Syslog including configuring TLSv1.2 and the supported list of TLS ciphersuites. Section “Enable Remote Syslog Server” states that the supported cryptographic algorithms and key strengths are configured implicitly by defining the supported TLS ciphersuites.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The TSF hashing functions can be implemented in one of two modes. The first mode is the byte-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF only hashes messages that are an integral number of bytes in length; i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8. The second mode is the bit-oriented mode. In this mode the TSF hashes messages of arbitrary length. As there are different tests for each mode, an indication is given in the following sections for the bit-oriented vs. the byte-oriented testmacs.

The evaluator shall perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP.

Short Messages Test - Bit-oriented Mode

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of $m+1$ messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to m bits. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

Short Messages Test - Byte-oriented Mode

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of $m/8+1$ messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm. The length of the messages range sequentially from 0 to $m/8$ bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

Selected Long Messages Test - Bit-oriented Mode



The evaluators devise an input set consisting of m messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm (e.g. 512 bits for SHA-256). The length of the i th message is $m + 99*i$, where $1 \leq i \leq m$. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

Selected Long Messages Test - Byte-oriented Mode

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of $m/8$ messages, where m is the block length of the hash algorithm (e.g. 512 bits for SHA-256). The length of the i th message is $m + 8*99*i$, where $1 \leq i \leq m/8$. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

Pseudorandomly Generated Messages Test

This test is for byte-oriented implementations only. The evaluators randomly generate a seed that is n bits long, where n is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested. The evaluators then formulate a set of 100 messages and associated digests by following the algorithm provided in Figure 1 of [SHAVS]. The evaluators then ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

The evaluator performed a CAVP certificate analysis and review which demonstrated that tests identified in this assurance activity for FCS_COP.1/Hash were successfully performed. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in Section 1.1.2 of this AAR.

2.2.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (KEYED HASH ALGORITHM) (NDcPP22E:FCS_COP.1/KEYEDHASH)

2.2.6.1 NDcPP22E:FCS_COP.1.1/KEYEDHASH

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it specifies the following values used by the HMAC function: key length, hash function used, block size, and output MAC length used.

Section 6.1 (FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash) of the ST states that the TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services using HMAC-SHA-1 that operates on 512-bit blocks of data with key sizes of 160 bits; HMAC-SHA-256 that operates on 512-bit blocks with key sizes and message digest sizes of 256 bits; HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512 operating on 1024-bit blocks of data, with key sizes and message digest sizes of 384 bits and 512 bits respectively as specified in ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2".

For SSH remote administration, Administrators configure hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512 for MAC integrity.

Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) of the ST further confirms that the TOE supports the following MAC algorithms: hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512 to ensure the integrity of the session.



Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the values used by the HMAC function: key length, hash function used, block size, and output MAC length used defined in the Security Target supported by the TOE for keyed hash function.

Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the supported MAC algorithms: hmac-sha2-512, hmac-sha2-256.

Section “Configure a TLS Profile” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for creating a TLS profile for Syslog including configuring TLSv1.2 and the supported list of TLS ciphersuites. Section “Enable Remote Syslog Server” states that the supported cryptographic algorithms and key strengths are configured implicitly by defining the supported TLS ciphersuites.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: For each of the supported parameter sets, the evaluator shall compose 15 sets of test data. Each set shall consist of a key and message data. The evaluator shall have the TSF generate HMAC tags for these sets of test data. The resulting MAC tags shall be compared to the result of generating HMAC tags with the same key and message data using a known good implementation.

The evaluator performed a CAVP certificate analysis and review which demonstrated that tests identified in this assurance activity for FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash were successfully performed. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in Section 1.1.2 of this AAR.

2.2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (SIGNATURE GENERATION AND VERIFICATION) (NDcPP22E:FCS_COP.1/SIGGEN)

2.2.7.1 NDcPP22E:FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it specifies the cryptographic algorithm and key size supported by the TOE for signature services.

Section 6.1 (FCS_COP.1/SigGen) of the ST states the TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with key size of 2048 and greater as specified in ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3. The TOE also supports RSA key size of 3072-bit, and it is recommended to use the stronger key size.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected cryptographic algorithm and key size defined in the Security Target supported by the TOE for signature services.



Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for generating an RSA 2048 or 3072 bit key for use with SSH remote administration. RSA signature services using 2048 or 3072 key sizes are automatically configured when SSH is configured as instructed.

Section “Configure a TLS Profile” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for creating a TLS profile for Syslog including configuring TLSv1.2 and the supported list of TLS ciphersuites. Section “Enable Remote Syslog Server” states that RSA signature services using 2048 or 3072 key sizes are automatically configured when TLS is configured as instructed.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: ECDSA Algorithm Tests

ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation Test

For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator shall generate 10 1024-bit long messages and obtain for each message a public key and the resulting signature values R and S. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall use the signature verification function of a known good implementation.

ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification Test

For each supported NIST curve (i.e., P-256, P-384 and P-521) and SHA function pair, the evaluator shall generate a set of 10 1024-bit message, public key and signature tuples and modify one of the values (message, public key or signature) in five of the 10 tuples. The evaluator shall obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values.

RSA Signature Algorithm Tests

Signature Generation Test

The evaluator generates or obtains 10 messages for each modulus size/SHA combination supported by the TOE. The TOE generates and returns the corresponding signatures.

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TOE's signature using a trusted reference implementation of the signature verification algorithm and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

Signature Verification Test

For each modulus size/hash algorithm selected, the evaluator generates a modulus and three associated key pairs, (d, e). Each private key d is used to sign six pseudorandom messages each of 1024 bits using a trusted reference implementation of the signature generation algorithm. Some of the public keys, e, messages, or signatures are altered so that signature verification should fail. For both the set of original messages and the set of altered messages: the modulus, hash algorithm, public key e values, messages, and signatures are forwarded to the TOE, which then attempts to verify the signatures and returns the verification results.

The evaluator verifies that the TOE confirms correct signatures on the original messages and detects the errors introduced in the altered messages.



The evaluator performed a CAVP certificate analysis and review which demonstrated that tests identified in this assurance activity for FCS_COP.1/SigGen were successfully performed. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in Section 1.1.2 of this AAR.

2.2.8 RANDOM BIT GENERATION (NDcPP22E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)

2.2.8.1 NDcPP22E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.2.8.2 NDcPP22E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: Documentation shall be produced - and the evaluator shall perform the activities - in accordance with Appendix D of [NDcPP].

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it specifies the DRBG type, identifies the entropy source(s) seeding the DRBG, and state the assumed or calculated min-entropy supplied either separately by each source or the min-entropy contained in the combined seed value.

The Entropy description is provided in a separate (non-ST) document that has been delivered to NIAP for approval. Note that the entropy analysis has been accepted by NIAP/NSA.

Section 6.1 (FCS_RBG_EXT.1) of the ST states the TOE implements a NIST-approved AES-CTR DRBG, as specified in ISO/IEC 18031:2011 seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a TSF-platform based noise source. The DRBG is seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy, which is at least equal to the greatest security strength of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: Documentation shall be produced - and the evaluator shall perform the activities - in accordance with Appendix D of [NDcPP].

The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation contains appropriate instructions for configuring the RNG functionality.



The Entropy description is provided in a separate (non-ST) document that has been delivered to NIAP for approval. Note that the entropy analysis has been accepted by NIAP/NSA.

The CTR_DRBG (AES 256) algorithm has been CAVP certified as documented in the ST. Section “Excluded Functionality” in the **Admin Guide** indicates that the TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a and CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) Cryptographic Implementation 7.2a to provide cryptography in support of TOE security functionality. No other cryptographic engine or module has been evaluated or tested in the CC evaluation. The **Admin Guide** provides specific instructions for configuring the TOE into its evaluated configuration and enabling only the approved and claimed cryptographic algorithms and functions including the proper DRBG methods. There is no further configuration required for configuring RNG functionality.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform 15 trials for the RNG implementation. If the RNG is configurable, the evaluator shall perform 15 trials for each configuration.

If the RNG has prediction resistance enabled, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) generate a second block of random bits (4) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator shall generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 - 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The next two are additional input and entropy input for the first call to generate. The final two are additional input and entropy input for the second call to generate. These values are randomly generated. 'generate one block of random bits' means to generate random bits with number of returned bits equal to the Output Block Length (as defined in NIST SP800-90A).

If the RNG does not have prediction resistance, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) reseed, (4) generate a second block of random bits (5) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator shall generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 - 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The fifth value is additional input to the first call to generate. The sixth and seventh are additional input and entropy input to the call to reseed. The final value is additional input to the second generate call.

The following paragraphs contain more information on some of the input values to be generated/selected by the evaluator.

Entropy input: the length of the entropy input value must equal the seed length.

Nonce: If a nonce is supported (CTR_DRBG with no Derivation Function does not use a nonce), the nonce bit length is one-half the seed length.

Personalization string: The length of the personalization string must be \leq seed length. If the implementation only supports one personalization string length, then the same length can be used for both values. If more than one string length is support, the evaluator shall use personalization strings of two different lengths. If the implementation does not use a personalization string, no value needs to be supplied.



Additional input: the additional input bit lengths have the same defaults and restrictions as the personalization string lengths.

The evaluator performed a CAVP certificate analysis and review which demonstrated that tests identified in this assurance activity for FCS_RBG_EXT.1 were successfully performed. Refer to the CAVP certificates identified in Section 1.1.2 of this AAR.

2.2.9 SSH SERVER PROTOCOL (NDcPP22E:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1)

2.2.9.1 NDcPP22E:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.2.9.2 NDcPP22E:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS contains a list of supported public key algorithms that are accepted for client authentication and that this list is consistent with signature verification algorithms selected in FCS_COP.1/SigGen (e.g., accepting EC keys requires corresponding Elliptic Curve Digital Signature algorithm claims).

The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS includes the description of how the TOE establishes a user identity when an SSH client presents a public key or X.509v3 certificate. For example, the TOE could verify that the SSH client's presented public key matches one that is stored within the SSH server's authorized_keys file.

If password-based authentication method has been selected in the FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2, then the evaluator shall confirm its role in the authentication process is described in the TSS. (TD0631 applied)

Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) of the ST indicates that the TOE supports ssh-rsa for client authentication. This is consistent with FCS_COP.1/SigGen which specifies the RSA digital signature algorithm with RSA schemes. The TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports the following:

- The TOE uses RSA-SHA2-256 and RSA-SHA2-512 for host key authentication and uses SSH-RSA for client or user password-based authentication.
- Local password-based and public key authentication for administrative users accessing the TOE through SSHv2; The TOE provides a command that allows a user to upload a public key for SSHv2 public key authentication and to specify the user identity associated that key.

When the SSH client presents a public key, the TSF verifies it matches the one configured for the Administrator account. If the presented public key does not match the one configured for the Administrator account, access is denied.



Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: Test objective: The purpose of these tests is to verify server supports each claimed client authentication method.

Test 1: For each supported client public-key authentication algorithm, the evaluator shall configure a remote client to present a public key corresponding to that authentication method (e.g., 2048-bit RSA key when using ssh-rsa public key). The evaluator shall establish sufficient separate SSH connections with an appropriately configured remote non-TOE SSH client to demonstrate the use of all applicable public key algorithms. It is sufficient to observe the successful completion of the SSH Authentication Protocol to satisfy the intent of this test.

Test 2: The evaluator shall choose one client public key authentication algorithm supported by the TOE. The evaluator shall generate a new client key pair for that supported algorithm without configuring the TOE to recognize the associated public key for authentication. The evaluator shall use an SSH client to attempt to connect to the TOE with the new key pair and demonstrate that authentication fails.

Test 3: [Conditional] If password-based authentication method has been selected in the FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2, the evaluator shall configure the TOE to accept password-based authentication and demonstrate that user authentication succeeds when the correct password is provided by the connecting SSH client.

Test 4: [Conditional] If password-based authentication method has been selected in the FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2, the evaluator shall configure the TOE to accept password-based authentication and demonstrate that user authentication fails when the incorrect password is provided by the connecting SSH client.

(TD0631 applied)

Test 1: The TOE supports only ssh-rsa for client public key authentication. The evaluator generated an RSA 3072-bit key pair on the test server and then configured an admin user on the TOE with the public key. The evaluator then attempted to login to the TOE using this ssh-rsa public key and observed that the login was successful.

Test 2: The evaluator next demonstrated an unsuccessful login using an unrecognized public key. The TOE claims support for ssh-rsa public keys only.

Test 3: The evaluator attempted to connect to the TOE using a SSH client alternately using the correct and incorrect password. The evaluator found that only the correct password would yield a successful SSH session.

Test 4: This was performed as part of Test 3 above where the evaluator attempted to login with an incorrect password and observed that the attempt failed.

2.2.9.3 NDcPP22E:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check that the TSS describes how 'large packets' in terms of RFC 4253 are detected and handled.



Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) of the ST states that the TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports dropping packets greater than 33,038 bytes, as such packet would violate the IP packet size limitations. Large packets are detected by the SSHv2 implementation and dropped internal to the SSH process.

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall demonstrate that if the TOE receives a packet larger than that specified in this component, that packet is dropped.

The evaluator created and sent a packet to the TOE that was larger than the maximum packet size. The TOE rejected the packet and the connection was closed.

2.2.9.4 NDcPP22E:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that optional characteristics are specified, and the encryption algorithms supported are specified as well. The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that the encryption algorithms specified are identical to those listed for this component.

Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) of the ST states that the TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports enforcement to only allow the encryption algorithms AES-CBC-128, and AES-CBC-256 to ensure confidentiality of the session. This is consistent with the requirement.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that SSH conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of algorithms advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).

Section "SSH Remote Administration Protocol" in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the supported encryption algorithms used in SSH: aes256-cbc and aes128-cbc.

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator must ensure that only claimed ciphers and cryptographic primitives are used to establish an SSH connection. To verify this, the evaluator shall start session establishment for an SSH connection from a remote client (referred to as 'remote endpoint' below). The evaluator shall capture the traffic exchanged between the TOE and the remote endpoint during protocol negotiation (e.g. using a packet capture tool or information provided by the endpoint, respectively). The evaluator shall verify from the captured traffic that the TOE offers all the ciphers defined in the TSS for the TOE for SSH sessions, but no additional ones compared to the definition in the TSS. The evaluator shall perform one successful negotiation of an SSH session to verify that the TOE behaves as expected. It is sufficient to observe the successful negotiation of the session to satisfy the intent of the test. If the evaluator detects that not all ciphers defined in the TSS for SSH are supported by the TOE and/or the TOE supports one or more additional ciphers not defined in the TSS for SSH, the test shall be regarded as failed.

The evaluator connected to the TOE using an SSH client alternately using the claimed encryption algorithms. The evaluator confirmed that the supported algorithms resulted in successful connections. In each case the evaluator viewed the Server: Key Exchange Init packet and saw that no additional ciphers beyond those that were claimed were seen as supported.



2.2.9.5 NDcPP22E:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that the SSH server's host public key algorithms supported are specified and that they are identical to those listed for this component. (TD0631 applied)

Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) of the ST states the TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports the use of RSA-SHA2-256 and RSA-SHA2-512 for host key authentication. This is consistent with the requirement.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that SSH conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of algorithms advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).

Section "SSH Remote Administration Protocol" in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the supported host key algorithms: rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512 and the client public key authentication algorithm: ssh-rsa.

Testing Assurance Activities: Test objective: This test case is meant to validate that the TOE server will support host public keys of the claimed algorithm types.

Test 1: The evaluator shall configure (only if required by the TOE) the TOE to use each of the claimed host public key algorithms. The evaluator will then use an SSH client to confirm that the client can authenticate the TOE server public key using the claimed algorithm. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the intent of the test.

Has effectively been moved to FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2.

Test objective: This negative test case is meant to validate that the TOE server does not support host public key algorithms that are not claimed.

Test 2: The evaluator shall configure a non-TOE SSH client to only allow it to authenticate an SSH server host public key algorithm that is not included in the ST selection. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an SSH connection from the non-TOE SSH client to the TOE SSH server and observe that the connection is rejected.

(TD0631 applied)

Test 1: The evaluator established an SSH connection with the TOE using each claimed host key algorithm. The connection was successful.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to connect to the TOE using a host public key algorithm that is not included in the ST selection and observed that the connection failed.

2.2.9.6 NDcPP22E:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it lists the supported data integrity algorithms, and that that list corresponds to the list in this component.



Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) of the ST states that the TOE implementation of SSHv2 supports enforcement to only allow the hashing algorithms: hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512 to ensure the integrity of the session. This is consistent with the requirement.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions to the Security Administrator on how to ensure that only the allowed data integrity algorithms are used in SSH connections with the TOE (specifically, that the 'none' MAC algorithm is not allowed).

Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the supported MAC algorithms: hmac-sha2-512, hmac-sha2-256.

Testing Assurance Activities: Test 1 [conditional, if an HMAC or AEAD_AES*_GCM algorithm is selected in the ST]: The evaluator shall establish an SSH connection using each of the algorithms, except 'implicit', specified by the requirement. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the intent of the test.

Note: To ensure the observed algorithm is used, the evaluator shall ensure a non-aes*-gcm@openssh.com encryption algorithm is negotiated while performing this test.

Test 2 [conditional, if an HMAC or AEAD_AES*_GCM algorithm is selected in the ST]: The evaluator shall configure an SSH client to only allow a MAC algorithm that is not included the ST selection. The evaluator shall attempt to connect from the SSH client to the TOE and observe that the attempt fails.

Note: To ensure the proposed MAC algorithm is used, the evaluator shall ensure a non-aes*-gcm@openssh.com encryption algorithm is negotiated while performing this test.

Test 1: The evaluator established an SSH connection with the TOE using each of the claimed integrity algorithms. The evaluator observed a successful connection using each claimed integrity algorithm.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to establish an SSH connection with the TOE using the HMAC-MD5 algorithm. The connection attempt failed.

2.2.9.7 NDCPP22E:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it lists the supported key exchange algorithms, and that that list corresponds to the list in this component.

Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) of the ST indicates that the TOE implementation of SSHv2 can be configured to only allow the following key exchange algorithms: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384. This is consistent with the requirement.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions to the Security Administrator on how to ensure that only the allowed key exchange algorithms are used in SSH connections with the TOE.



Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the supported key exchange algorithms: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384.

Testing Assurance Activities: Test 1: The evaluator shall configure an SSH client to only allow the diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange. The evaluator shall attempt to connect from the SSH client to the TOE and observe that the attempt fails.

Test 2: For each allowed key exchange method, the evaluator shall configure an SSH client to only allow that method for key exchange, attempt to connect from the client to the TOE, and observe that the attempt succeeds.

Test 1: The evaluator attempted to establish an SSH connection with the TOE using an SSH client configured to only allow diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 key exchange. The connection attempt failed.

Test 2: The evaluator attempted to establish an SSH connection with the TOE using each allowed key exchange method: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384. The connections succeeded.

2.2.9.8 NDcPP22E:FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check that the TSS specifies the following:

- a) Both thresholds are checked by the TOE.
- b) Rekeying is performed upon reaching the threshold that is hit first.

Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) of the ST states the TSF’s SSH implementation will perform a rekey after no longer than one hour or no more than one gigabyte of data has been transmitted with the same session key. Both thresholds are checked. Rekeying is performed upon reaching whichever threshold is met first. The Administrator can configure lower rekey values if desired. The minimum time value is 10 minutes. The minimum volume value is 100 kilobytes.

Guidance Assurance Activities: If one or more thresholds that are checked by the TOE to fulfil the SFR are configurable, then the evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation describes how to configure those thresholds. Either the allowed values are specified in the guidance documentation and must not exceed the limits specified in the SFR (one hour of session time, one gigabyte of transmitted traffic) or the TOE must not accept values beyond the limits specified in the SFR. The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation describes that the TOE reacts to the first threshold reached.

Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring time-based and volume-based rekey values. SSH connections with the same session keys cannot be used longer than one hour, and with no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data. Values can be configured to be lower if desired. The minimum time value is 10 minutes. The minimum volume value is 100 kilobytes. The Guide warns that in order to ensure rekeying is performed before one hour expires, the Administrator should specify a rekey time of 59 minutes.

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator needs to perform testing that rekeying is performed according to the description in the TSS. The evaluator shall test both, the time-based threshold and the traffic-based threshold.



For testing of the time-based threshold the evaluator shall use an SSH client to connect to the TOE and keep the session open until the threshold is reached. The evaluator shall verify that the SSH session has been active longer than the threshold value and shall verify that the TOE initiated a rekey (the method of verification shall be reported by the evaluator).

Testing does not necessarily have to be performed with the threshold configured at the maximum allowed value of one hour of session time but the value used for testing shall not exceed one hour. The evaluator needs to ensure that the rekeying has been initiated by the TOE and not by the SSH client that is connected to the TOE.

For testing of the traffic-based threshold the evaluator shall use the TOE to connect to an SSH client and shall transmit data to and/or receive data from the TOE within the active SSH session until the threshold for data protected by either encryption key is reached. It is acceptable if the rekey occurs before the threshold is reached (e.g. because the traffic is counted according to one of the alternatives given in the Application Note for FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8).

The evaluator shall verify that more data has been transmitted within the SSH session than the threshold allows and shall verify that the TOE initiated a rekey (the method of verification shall be reported by the evaluator).

Testing does not necessarily have to be performed with the threshold configured at the maximum allowed value of one gigabyte of transferred traffic, but the value used for testing shall not exceed one gigabyte. The evaluator needs to ensure that the rekeying has been initiated by the TOE and not by the SSH client that is connected to the TOE.

If one or more thresholds that are checked by the TOE to fulfil the SFR are configurable, the evaluator needs to verify that the threshold(s) can be configured as described in the guidance documentation and the evaluator needs to test that modification of the thresholds is restricted to Security Administrators (as required by FMT_MOF.1(3)/Functions).

In cases where data transfer threshold could not be reached due to hardware limitations it is acceptable to omit testing of this (SSH rekeying based on data transfer threshold) threshold if both the following conditions are met:

- a) An argument is present in the TSS section describing this hardware-based limitation and
- b) All hardware components that are the basis of such argument are definitively identified in the ST. For example, if specific Ethernet Controller or WiFi radio chip is the root cause of such limitation, these chips must be identified.

The evaluator configured the rekey data limit to 100 KB. The evaluator attempted to connect to the TOE using a SSH client sending data and confirmed that a rekey happened when the configured data limit was reached. Next the evaluator configured the rekey time limit to 10 minutes. The evaluator attempted to connect to the TOE using an SSH client and confirmed that a rekey happened when the configured time limit was reached.

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined



2.2.10 TLS CLIENT PROTOCOL WITHOUT MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION (NDcPP22E:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)

2.2.10.1 NDcPP22E:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the TSS to ensure that the ciphersuites supported are specified. The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that the ciphersuites specified include those listed for this component.

Section 6.1 (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1) in the ST states that the TSF implements TLS 1.2 conformant to RFC 5246 to provide secure TLS communication between itself and a syslog server supporting the following ciphersuites:

- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

This list of ciphersuites is consistent with those specified in the requirements.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions on configuring the TOE so that TLS conforms to the description in the TSS.

The following sections in the **Admin Guide** provide instructions on configuring the TOE to use TLS to securely transmit generated audit data to an external syslog server: “TLS – Syslog”, “Create and Configure a Certificate Map”, “Create, Configure, and Authenticate the Root Trustpoint”, “Create, Configure, and Authenticate the Intermediate Trustpoint”, “Configure a TLS Profile” and “Enable Remote Syslog Server”. These instructions include configuring a root trustpoint, enabling a remote syslog server, creating a TLS profile for syslog, configuring TLSv1.2 and configuring the TLS ciphersuites supported by the TOE. The instructions conform to the description in the TSS.

Testing Assurance Activities: Test 1: The evaluator shall establish a TLS connection using each of the ciphersuites specified by the requirement. This connection may be established as part of the establishment of a higher-level protocol, e.g., as part of an HTTPS session. It is sufficient to observe the successful negotiation of a ciphersuite to satisfy the intent of the test; it is not necessary to examine the characteristics of the encrypted traffic to discern the ciphersuite being used (for example, that the cryptographic algorithm is 128-bit AES and not 256-bit AES).

Test 2: The evaluator shall attempt to establish the connection using a server with a server certificate that contains the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage extension and verify that a connection is established. The evaluator will then verify that the client rejects an otherwise valid server certificate that lacks the Server Authentication purpose in the extendedKeyUsage field, and a connection is not established. Ideally, the two certificates should be identical except for the extendedKeyUsage field.



Test 3: The evaluator shall send a server certificate in the TLS connection that does not match the server-selected ciphersuite (for example, send an ECDSA certificate while using the TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ciphersuite). The evaluator shall verify that the TOE disconnects after receiving the server's Certificate handshake message.

Test 4: The evaluator shall perform the following 'negative tests':

- a) The evaluator shall configure the server to select the TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL ciphersuite and verify that the client denies the connection.
- b) Modify the server's selected ciphersuite in the Server Hello handshake message to be a ciphersuite not presented in the Client Hello handshake message. The evaluator shall verify that the client rejects the connection after receiving the Server Hello.
- c) [conditional]: If the TOE presents the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension the evaluator shall configure the server to perform an ECDHE or DHE key exchange in the TLS connection using a non-supported curve/group (for example P-192) and shall verify that the TOE disconnects after receiving the server's Key Exchange handshake message.

Test 5: The evaluator shall perform the following modifications to the traffic:

- a) Change the TLS version selected by the server in the Server Hello to a non-supported TLS version and verify that the client rejects the connection.
- b) [conditional]: If using DHE or ECDH, modify the signature block in the Server's Key Exchange handshake message, and verify that the handshake does not finished successfully, and no application data flows. This test does not apply to cipher suites using RSA key exchange. If a TOE only supports RSA key exchange in conjunction with TLS, then this test shall be omitted.

Test 6: The evaluator performs the following 'scrambled message tests':

- a) Modify a byte in the Server Finished handshake message and verify that the handshake does not finish successfully and no application data flows.
- b) Send a garbled message from the server after the server has issued the ChangeCipherSpec message and verify that the handshake does not finish successfully and no application data flows.
- c) Modify at least one byte in the server's nonce in the Server Hello handshake message and verify that the client rejects the Server Key Exchange handshake message (if using a DHE or ECDHE ciphersuite) or that the server denies the client's Finished handshake message.

Test 1: The evaluator configured a test server to accept each ciphersuite allowed by the PP, a single ciphersuite at a time. While the test server listened to the single configured ciphersuite, the evaluator caused the TOE to attempt a connection to the test server. If a ciphersuite is supported by the TOE, the connection was successful. If a ciphersuite is not supported by the TOE, the connection was unsuccessful.



Test 2: The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a test server and attempted two connections. During the first TLS negotiation the test server sent a valid certificate chaining to a CA known by the TOE. The certificate included the Server Authentication extended key usage (EKU) field. The evaluator observed that the connection was successful. During the second connection, the server presented a certificate chaining to a CA known by the TOE. However, the certificate did not include the Server Authentication extended key usage (EKU) field. The evaluator observed that the connection failed.

Test 3: The evaluator configured the test server to negotiate TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 but then send an ECDSA key in its certificate message. The TOE rejected the connection attempt.

Test 4: (Part a): The evaluator configured the TOE to communicate with a test server that sends only a TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL ciphersuite in the server hello. The evaluator then attempted to establish a TLS session from the TOE to the test server and observed that the TOE rejected the connection attempt.

(Part b): The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a test server using TLS. During the connection the evaluator caused the server to choose a ciphersuite that the TOE did not offer in its Client Hello handshake message and observed that the TOE rejected the connection attempt.

(Part c): The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a test server using TLS with a TOE supported ECDHE key exchange method. The evaluator also configured the test server to accept that same ECHDE key exchange method, but to require a curve that was not supported by the TOE (i.e., P-192). The evaluator observed that the TOE rejected the connection attempt.

Test 5: (Part a): The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a test server using TLS. During the connection the evaluator caused the server to use a TLS version in the Server Hello that is a non-supported TLS version (version 1.4 represented by two bytes 0x0305). The evaluator observed that the TOE rejected the connection attempt.

(Part b): The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a test server using TLS. During the connection the evaluator caused the server to modify the signature block in the Server's Key Exchange handshake message and observed that the TOE rejected the connection attempt.

Test 6: (Part a): The evaluator attempted a connection to the TOE where the evaluator modified a byte in the Finished handshake message (by XORing 0xff with the first byte of the calculated MAC before the packet is TLS encrypted and sent to the TOE), verified that the TOE rejected the connection attempt after receiving the modified Finished message and that the TOE sent no application data.

(Part b): The evaluator garbled a message between the TOE and its TLS peer. The modification occurred after the Server sent the ChangeCipherSpec message. The evaluator observed that the Client denies the connection. Due to the nature of the error, regardless of whether the TOE is the client or server, the client is always the first to recognize the error.

(Part c): The evaluator configured the TOE to connect to a test server using TLS. During the connection the evaluator caused the server to modify one byte in the server's nonce in the Server Hello handshake message. The evaluator observed that the client rejected the connection.



2.2.10.2 NDcPP22E:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the client's method of establishing all reference identifiers from the administrator/application-configured reference identifier, including which types of reference identifiers are supported (e.g. application-specific Subject Alternative Names) and whether IP addresses and wildcards are supported.

Note that where a TLS channel is being used between components of a distributed TOE for FPT_ITT.1, the requirements to have the reference identifier established by the user are relaxed and the identifier may also be established through a 'Gatekeeper' discovery process. The TSS should describe the discovery process and highlight how the reference identifier is supplied to the 'joining' component. Where the secure channel is being used between components of a distributed TOE for FPT_ITT.1 and the ST author selected attributes from RFC 5280, the evaluator shall ensure the TSS describes which attribute type, or combination of attributes types, are used by the client to match the presented identifier with the configured identifier. The evaluator shall ensure the TSS presents an argument how the attribute type, or combination of attribute types, uniquely identify the remote TOE component; and the evaluator shall verify the attribute type, or combination of attribute types, is sufficient to support unique identification of the maximum supported number of TOE components.

If IP addresses are supported in the CN as reference identifiers, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the TOE's conversion of the text representation of the IP address in the CN to a binary representation of the IP address in network byte order. The evaluator shall also ensure that the TSS describes whether canonical format (RFC5952 for IPv6, RFC 3986 for IPv4) is enforced.

Section 6.1 (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1) in the ST states that when establishing a TLS connection, the TOE supports reference identifiers of type FQDN and IP address and will seek a match to the DNS domain name or IP address respectively in the subjectAltName extension. If the TOE determines there is a mismatch in the presented identifier, it will not establish the TLS trusted channel connection. The TOE does not support the use of wildcards within certificates and does not support certificate pinning.

Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance describes all supported identifiers, explicitly states whether the TOE supports the SAN extension or not, and includes detailed instructions on how to configure the reference identifier(s) used to check the identity of peer(s). If the identifier scheme implemented by the TOE includes support for IP addresses, the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance provides a set of warnings and/or CA policy recommendations that would result in secure TOE use.

Where the secure channel is being used between components of a distributed TOE for FPT_ITT.1, the SFR selects attributes from RFC 5280, and FCO_CPC_EXT.1.2 selects 'no channel'; the evaluator shall verify the guidance provides instructions for establishing unique reference identifiers based on RFC5280 attributes.

Section "Create and Configure a Certificate Map" in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the reference identifier of the peer syslog server. The identifier (either FQDN or IP address) of the peer is specified in the SAN and the instructions explicitly state that the SAN field should be specified along with the value to match for the remote syslog server.



Testing Assurance Activities: Note that the following tests are marked conditional and are applicable under the following conditions:

a) For TLS-based trusted channel communications according to FTP_ITC.1 where RFC 6125 is selected, tests 1-6 are applicable.

or

b) For TLS-based trusted path communications according to FTP_TRP where RFC 6125 is selected, tests 1-6 are applicable

or

c) For TLS-based trusted path communications according to FPT_ITT.1 where RFC 6125 is selected, tests 1-6 are applicable. Where RFC 5280 is selected, only test 7 is applicable.

Note that for some tests additional conditions apply.

IP addresses are binary values that must be converted to a textual representation when presented in the CN of a certificate. When testing IP addresses in the CN, the evaluator shall follow the following formatting rules:

- IPv4: The CN contains a single address that is represented a 32-bit numeric address (IPv4) is written in decimal as four numbers that range from 0-255 separated by periods as specified in RFC 3986.

- IPv6: The CN contains a single IPv6 address that is represented as eight colon separated groups of four lowercase hexadecimal digits, each group representing 16 bits as specified in RFC 4291. Note: Shortened addresses, suppressed zeros, and embedded IPv4 addresses are not tested.

The evaluator shall configure the reference identifier according to the AGD guidance and perform the following tests during a TLS connection:

a) Test 1 [conditional]: The evaluator shall present a server certificate that contains a CN that does not match the reference identifier and does not contain the SAN extension. The evaluator shall verify that the connection fails. The evaluator shall repeat this test for each identifier type (e.g. IPv4, IPv6, FQDN) supported in the CN. When testing IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, the evaluator shall modify a single decimal or hexadecimal digit in the CN.

Remark: Some systems might require the presence of the SAN extension. In this case the connection would still fail but for the reason of the missing SAN extension instead of the mismatch of CN and reference identifier. Both reasons are acceptable to pass Test 1.

b) Test 2 [conditional]: The evaluator shall present a server certificate that contains a CN that matches the reference identifier, contains the SAN extension, but does not contain an identifier in the SAN that matches the reference identifier. The evaluator shall verify that the connection fails. The evaluator shall repeat this test for each supported SAN type (e.g. IPv4, IPv6, FQDN, URI). When testing IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, the evaluator shall modify a single decimal or hexadecimal digit in the SAN.



c) Test 3 [conditional]: If the TOE does not mandate the presence of the SAN extension, the evaluator shall present a server certificate that contains a CN that matches the reference identifier and does not contain the SAN extension. The evaluator shall verify that the connection succeeds. The evaluator shall repeat this test for each identifier type (e.g. IPv4, IPv6, FQDN) supported in the CN. If the TOE does mandate the presence of the SAN extension, this Test shall be omitted.

d) Test 4 [conditional]: The evaluator shall present a server certificate that contains a CN that does not match the reference identifier but does contain an identifier in the SAN that matches. The evaluator shall verify that the connection succeeds. The evaluator shall repeat this test for each supported SAN type (e.g. IPv4, IPv6, FQDN, SRV).

e) Test 5 [conditional]: The evaluator shall perform the following wildcard tests with each supported type of reference identifier that includes a DNS name (i.e. CN-ID with DNS, DNS-ID, SRV-ID, URI-ID):

1) [conditional]: The evaluator shall present a server certificate containing a wildcard that is not in the left-most label of the presented identifier (e.g. foo.*.example.com) and verify that the connection fails.

2) [conditional]: The evaluator shall present a server certificate containing a wildcard in the left-most label (e.g. *.example.com). The evaluator shall configure the reference identifier with a single left-most label (e.g. foo.example.com) and verify that the connection succeeds if wildcards are supported or fails if wildcards are not supported. The evaluator shall configure the reference identifier without a left-most label as in the certificate (e.g. example.com) and verify that the connection fails. The evaluator shall configure the reference identifier with two left-most labels (e.g. bar.foo.example.com) and verify that the connection fails. (Remark: Support for wildcards was always intended to be optional. It is sufficient to state that the TOE does not support wildcards and observe rejected connection attempts to satisfy corresponding assurance activities.)

f) Objective: The objective of this test is to ensure the TOE is able to differentiate between IP address identifiers that are not allowed to contain wildcards and other types of identifiers that may contain wildcards.

Test 6: [conditional] If IP address identifiers are supported in the SAN or CN, the evaluator shall present a server certificate that contains a CN that matches the reference identifier, except one of the groups has been replaced with a wildcard asterisk (*) (e.g. CN=*.168.0.1 when connecting to 192.168.1.20, CN=2001:0DB8:0000:0000:0008:0800:200C:* when connecting to 2001:0DB8:0000:0000:0008:0800:200C:417A). The certificate shall not contain the SAN extension. The evaluator shall verify that the connection fails. The evaluator shall repeat this test for each supported IP address version (e.g. IPv4, IPv6).

This negative test corresponds to the following section of the Application Note 64/105: 'The exception being, the use of wildcards is not supported when using IP address as the reference identifier.'

Remark: Some systems might require the presence of the SAN extension. In this case the connection would still fail but for the reason of the missing SAN extension instead of the mismatch of CN and reference identifier. Both reasons are acceptable to pass Test 6.

(TD0790 applied, supersedes TD0670)



Test 7 [conditional]: If the secure channel is used for FPT_ITT, and RFC 5280 is selected, the evaluator shall perform the following tests. Note, when multiple attribute types are selected in the SFR (e.g. when multiple attribute types are combined to form the unique identifier), the evaluator modifies each attribute type in accordance with the matching criteria described in the TSS (e.g. creating a mismatch of one attribute type at a time while other attribute types contain values that will match a portion of the reference identifier):

- 1) The evaluator shall present a server certificate that does not contain an identifier in the Subject (DN) attribute type(s) that matches the reference identifier. The evaluator shall verify that the connection fails.
- 2) The evaluator shall present a server certificate that contains a valid identifier as an attribute type other than the expected attribute type (e.g. if the TOE is configured to expect id-atserialNumber=correct_identifier, the certificate could instead include id-at-name=correct_identifier), and does not contain the SAN extension. The evaluator shall verify that the connection fails. Remark: Some systems might require the presence of the SAN extension. In this case the connection would still fail but for the reason of the missing SAN extension instead of the mismatch of CN and reference identifier. Both reasons are acceptable to pass this test.
- 3) The evaluator shall present a server certificate that contains a Subject attribute type that matches the reference identifier and does not contain the SAN extension. The evaluator shall verify that the connection succeeds.
- 4) The evaluator shall confirm that all use of wildcards results in connection failure regardless of whether the wildcards are used in the left or right side of the presented identifier. (Remark: Use of wildcards is not addressed within RFC 5280.)

The evaluator configured the TOE to connect with a test server using TLS with the test server alternately configured with a certificate identifier as indicated in tests 1-6 in this assurance activity. The evaluator ensured the test server and TOE could connect only when the identifier fulfilled the required rules. This test was iterated using both DNS and IPv4 addresses.

Test 1: No SAN, Bad CN – the connection fails

Test 2: Bad SAN, Good CN – the connection fails.

Test 3: No SAN, Good CN – the connection fails as the TOE always requires SAN.

Test 4: Good SAN, Bad CN – the connection is successful

Test 5: As demonstrated by testing, the TOE does not support the use of wildcards.

Test 6: As demonstrated by testing, the TOE does not support the use of wildcards.

Test 7: Not applicable. The TOE does not support ITT channels.

2.2.10.3 NDcPP22E:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined



Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall demonstrate that using an invalid certificate results in the function failing as follows:

Test 1: Using the administrative guidance, the evaluator shall load a CA certificate or certificates needed to validate the presented certificate used to authenticate an external entity and demonstrate that the function succeeds and a trusted channel can be established.

Test 2: The evaluator shall then change the presented certificate(s) so that validation fails and show that the certificate is not automatically accepted. The evaluator shall repeat this test to cover the selected types of failure defined in the SFR (i.e. the selected ones from failed matching of the reference identifier, failed validation of the certificate path, failed validation of the expiration date, failed determination of the revocation status). The evaluator performs the action indicated in the SFR selection observing the TSF resulting in the expected state for the trusted channel (e.g. trusted channel was established) covering the types of failure for which an override mechanism is defined.

Test 3 : The purpose of this test to verify that only selected certificate validation failures could be administratively overridden. If any override mechanism is defined for failed certificate validation, the evaluator shall configure a new presented certificate that does not contain a valid entry in one of the mandatory fields or parameters (e.g. inappropriate value in extendedKeyUsage field) but is otherwise valid and signed by a trusted CA. The evaluator shall confirm that the certificate validation fails (i.e. certificate is rejected), and there is no administrative override available to accept such certificate.

Test 1: This test was performed as part of NDcPP22e:FTP_ITC.1 Test 1 which demonstrates a successful connection with a valid certificate chain.

Test 2: This test has been performed in several other test activities. Specifically, this test repeats the assurance activities as described here.

- match the reference identifier -- Corresponds to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 Tests 1 through 7.
- validate certificate path -- Corresponds to FIA_X509_EXT.1/REV.1 Test 1
- validate expiration date -- Corresponds to FIA_X509_EXT.1/REV.1 Test 2
- determine the revocation status -- Corresponds to FIA_X509_EXT.2 Test 1

Test 3: Not applicable. The TOE does not support administrative override.

2.2.10.4 NDcPP22e:FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4

TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that TSS describes the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension and whether the required behavior is performed by default or may be configured.



Section 6.1 (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1) in the ST states that for TLS 1.2 connections to the Syslog server, the TSF presents secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1 and no other curves in the Supported Group extension of the Client Hello. This behavior is implemented by default and is not configurable.

Guidance Assurance Activities: If the TSS indicates that the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension must be configured to meet the requirement, the evaluator shall verify that AGD guidance includes configuration of the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension.

Section “Enable Remote Syslog Server” in the **Admin Guide** states that the supported cryptographic algorithms and key strengths are configured implicitly by defining the supported TLS ciphersuites. The TOE presents the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension with NIST curves secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1 in the Client Hello. This behavior is performed by default and there is no security management function to disable it.

Testing Assurance Activities: Test 1 [conditional]: If the TOE presents the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension, the evaluator shall configure the server to perform ECDHE or DHE (as applicable) key exchange using each of the TOE's supported curves and/or groups. The evaluator shall verify that the TOE successfully connects to the server.

The evaluator attempted to establish a TLS session with the TOE when the evaluator's server specified only one key exchange method in the Server Hello. The evaluator observed that the connection was successful using each of the TOE's supported curves.

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA)

2.3.1 AUTHENTICATION FAILURE MANAGEMENT (NDcPP22E:FIA_AFL.1)

2.3.1.1 NDcPP22E:FIA_AFL.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.3.1.2 NDcPP22E:FIA_AFL.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined



Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it contains a description, for each supported method for remote administrative actions, of how successive unsuccessful authentication attempts are detected and tracked. The TSS shall also describe the method by which the remote administrator is prevented from successfully logging on to the TOE, and the actions necessary to restore this ability.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to confirm that the TOE ensures that authentication failures by remote administrators cannot lead to a situation where no administrator access is available, either permanently or temporarily (e.g. by providing local logon which is not subject to blocking).

Section 6.1 (FIA_AFL.1) of the ST states that the TOE provides the administrator the ability to specify the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts before an offending account will be blocked. The supported range is <1-65535>. The TOE also provides the ability to specify the time period to block offending accounts. To block password-based brute force attacks, the TOE uses an internal AAA function to detect and track failed login attempts. When an account attempting to log into an administrative interface reaches the set maximum number of failed authentication attempts, the account will not be granted access until the time period has elapsed.

To avoid a potential situation where password failures made by Administrators leads to no Administrator access until the defined blocking time period has elapsed, the CC Configuration Guide instructs the Administrator to configure the TOE for SSH public key authentication which is not subjected to password-based brute force attacks. During the block out period, the TOE provides the ability for the Administrator account to login remotely using SSH public key authentication.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to ensure that instructions for configuring the number of successive unsuccessful authentication attempts and time period (if implemented) are provided, and that the process of allowing the remote administrator to once again successfully log on is described for each 'action' specified (if that option is chosen). If different actions or mechanisms are implemented depending on the secure protocol employed (e.g., TLS vs. SSH), all must be described.

The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to confirm that it describes, and identifies the importance of, any actions that are required in order to ensure that administrator access will always be maintained, even if remote administration is made permanently or temporarily unavailable due to blocking of accounts as a result of FIA_AFL.1.

Section "Configure Authentication Failure" in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for specifying the value for maximum number of failed login attempts and the time period to lock the offending account.

Section "SSH Remote Administration Protocol" in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the switch for SSH public key authentication. This is necessary to avoid a potential situation where password failures by remote Administrators lead to no Administrator access for a temporary period of time. During the defined lockout



period, the Switch provides the ability for the Administrator account to login remotely using SSH public key authentication.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following tests for each method by which remote administrators access the TOE (e.g. any passwords entered as part of establishing the connection protocol or the remote administrator application):

a) Test 1: The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to configure the number of successive unsuccessful authentication attempts allowed by the TOE (and, if the time period selection in FIA_AFL.1.2 is included in the ST, then the evaluator shall also use the operational guidance to configure the time period after which access is re-enabled). The evaluator shall test that once the authentication attempts limit is reached, authentication attempts with valid credentials are no longer successful.

b) Test 2: After reaching the limit for unsuccessful authentication attempts as in Test 1 above, the evaluator shall proceed as follows.

If the administrator action selection in FIA_AFL.1.2 is included in the ST then the evaluator shall confirm by testing that following the operational guidance and performing each action specified in the ST to re-enable the remote administrator's access results in successful access (when using valid credentials for that administrator).

If the time period selection in FIA_AFL.1.2 is included in the ST then the evaluator shall wait for just less than the time period configured in Test 1 and show that an authorization attempt using valid credentials does not result in successful access. The evaluator shall then wait until just after the time period configured in Test 1 and show that an authorization attempt using valid credentials results in successful access.

Test 1 & 2: The evaluator performed lockout testing on the TOE device with two different values to verify that the configuration works correctly. The first case was performed with an invalid attempt threshold of 3 attempts and a lockout time of 1 minute. The second case was performed with an invalid attempt threshold of 5 attempts and a lockout time of 3 minutes. In each case, the evaluator observed that the use of valid credentials immediately after exceeding the limit does not result in a successful login. The evaluator also observed that the account was unlocked after the configured time period had passed.

2.3.2 PASSWORD MANAGEMENT (NDCPP22E:FIA_PMG_EXT.1)

2.3.2.1 NDCPP22E:FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check that the TSS lists the supported special character(s) for the composition of administrator passwords.

The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that the `minimum_password_length` parameter is configurable by a Security Administrator.



The evaluator shall check that the TSS lists the range of values supported for the `minimum_password_length` parameter. The listed range shall include the value of 15.

(TD0792 applied)

Section 6.1 (FIA_PMG_EXT.1) of the ST states the TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords. The passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters as specified in the requirement. Minimum password length is settable by the Authorized Administrator, and can be configured for minimum password lengths of 1 and maximum of 127 characters. This listed range (1-127) includes the value 15.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that it:

- a) identifies the characters that may be used in passwords and provides guidance to security administrators on the composition of strong passwords, and
- b) provides instructions on setting the minimum password length and describes the valid minimum password lengths supported.

Section “Define Password Policy” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for defining a common criteria policy that can be applied to each local account and that will ensure that passwords contain a minimum of 8 characters. This section provides instructions on setting the minimum password length and indicates that the TOE supports a minimum length from 1 to 127 characters. It is recommended to configure a password minimum length between 8 and 16 characters.

Section “Add Administrator Account” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring a user account and specifying the common criteria password policy for that account. It also identifies the characters that may be used in passwords.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following tests.

Test 1: The evaluator shall compose passwords that meet the requirements in some way. For each password, the evaluator shall verify that the TOE supports the password. While the evaluator is not required (nor is it feasible) to test all possible compositions of passwords, the evaluator shall ensure that all characters, and a minimum length listed in the requirement are supported and justify the subset of those characters chosen for testing.

Test 2: The evaluator shall compose passwords that do not meet the requirements in some way. For each password, the evaluator shall verify that the TOE does not support the password. While the evaluator is not required (nor is it feasible) to test all possible compositions of passwords, the evaluator shall ensure that the TOE enforces the allowed characters and the minimum length listed in the requirement and justify the subset of those characters chosen for testing.

Test 1 & 2: The evaluator performed attempts to set passwords of varying lengths and characters to demonstrate that passwords comply with a minimum length and support the claimed set of characters.



2.3.3 PROTECTED AUTHENTICATION FEEDBACK (NDcPP22E:FIA_UAU.7)

2.3.3.1 NDcPP22E:FIA_UAU.7.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that any necessary preparatory steps to ensure authentication data is not revealed while entering for each local login allowed.

There are no preparatory steps needed to ensure authentication data is not revealed. Section 6.1 (FIA_UAU.7) of the ST states that when a user enters their password at the local console, the TOE does not echo any characters as they are entered. For remote session authentication, the TOE does not echo any characters as they are entered.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test for each method of local login allowed:

a) Test 1: The evaluator shall locally authenticate to the TOE. While making this attempt, the evaluator shall verify that at most obscured feedback is provided while entering the authentication information.

Test 1: This test was performed as part of the tests for FIA_UIA_EXT.1 where the evaluator observed that passwords are obscured on the console logins.

2.3.4 PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM (NDcPP22E:FIA_UAU_EXT.2)

2.3.4.1 NDcPP22E:FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: Evaluation Activities for this requirement are covered under those for FIA_UIA_EXT.1. If other authentication mechanisms are specified, the evaluator shall include those methods in the activities for FIA_UIA_EXT.1.

See NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.



Component Guidance Assurance Activities: Evaluation Activities for this requirement are covered under those for FIA_UIA_EXT.1. If other authentication mechanisms are specified, the evaluator shall include those methods in the activities for FIA_UIA_EXT.1.

See NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: Evaluation Activities for this requirement are covered under those for FIA_UIA_EXT.1. If other authentication mechanisms are specified, the evaluator shall include those methods in the activities for FIA_UIA_EXT.1.

See NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.

2.3.5 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1)

2.3.5.1 NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.3.5.2 NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the logon process for each logon method (local, remote (HTTPS, SSH, etc.)) supported for the product. This description shall contain information pertaining to the credentials allowed/used, any protocol transactions that take place, and what constitutes a 'successful logon'.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes which actions are allowed before user identification and authentication. The description shall cover authentication and identification for local and remote TOE administration.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall examine that the TSS details how Security Administrators are authenticated and identified by all TOE components. If not all TOE components support authentication of Security Administrators according to FIA_UIA_EXT.1 and FIA_UAU_EXT.2, the TSS shall describe how the overall TOE functionality is split between TOE components including how it is ensured that no unauthorized access to any TOE component can occur.



For distributed TOEs, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes for each TOE component which actions are allowed before user identification and authentication. The description shall cover authentication and identification for local and remote TOE administration. For each TOE component that does not support authentication of Security Administrators according to FIA_UIA_EXT.1 and FIA_UAU_EXT.2 the TSS shall describe any unauthenticated services/services that are supported by the component.

Section 6.1 (FIA_UIA_EXT.1) of the ST explains the authentication process. The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any TSF mediated actions to be performed except for the login warning banner that is displayed prior to user authentication.

The process for authentication is the same for administrative access whether administration is occurring via a directly connected console or remotely via SSHv2 secured connection.

Administrative access to the TOE is facilitated through the TOE's CLI. The TOE mediates all administrative actions through the CLI. Once a potential administrative user attempts to access the CLI of the TOE through either a directly connected console or remotely through an SSHv2 secured connection, the TOE prompts the user for a user name and password (or SSH public key). Only after the administrative user presents the correct authentication credentials will access to the TOE administrative functionality be granted. No access is allowed to the administrative functionality of the TOE until an administrator is successfully identified and authenticated.

The TOE provides a local password based authentication mechanism. The TOE also performs remote authentication using SSH public key to login authorized administrative users.

At initial login, the administrative user is prompted to provide a username. After the user provides the username, the user is prompted to provide the administrative password associated with the user account. The TOE then either grant administrative access (if the combination of username and password is correct) or indicate that the login was unsuccessful. The TOE does not provide a reason for failure in the cases of a login failure.

Section 6.1 (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1) in the ST describes the login process for client public key based authentication. When the SSH client presents a public key, the TSF verifies it matches the one configured for the Administrator account. If the presented public key does not match the one configured for the Administrator account, access is denied.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that any necessary preparatory steps (e.g., establishing credential material such as pre-shared keys, tunnels, certificates, etc.) to logging in are described. For each supported the login method, the evaluator shall ensure the guidance documentation provides clear instructions for successfully logging on. If configuration is necessary to ensure the services provided before login are limited, the evaluator shall determine that the guidance documentation provides sufficient instruction on limiting the allowed services.

Section "Switch- Initial Configuration" in the **Admin Guide** provides manual steps for the initial configuration of the TOE including configuring the enable secret password, providing an initial configuration for the management interface and configuring the console to require username and password authentication.



Section “Configure Local Authentication” in the **Admin Guide** provides the steps to enable the authentication, authorization and accounting access control model, set the default authentication at login to use local authentication and the default authorization method to use local credentials.

Section “Define Password Policy” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for defining a common criteria policy that can be applied to each local account and that will ensure that passwords contain a minimum of 8 characters. This section provides instructions on setting the minimum password length and indicates that the valid minimum password lengths supported are from 1 to 127 characters and it is recommended to set the minimum length to between 8 and 16 characters.

Section “Add Administrator Account” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring an administrator account and specifying the common criteria password policy for that account. It also identifies the characters that may be used in passwords.

Section “Access Banner” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the warning banner that will display on the CLI and SSH interface prior to allowing any administrative access.

Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring remote administration using SSH. This includes SSH client authentication using either password or SSH public key.

Section “Access CLI Over SSH” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for initiating a connection using SSH from a remote management workstation. Successful login will result in privileged administrator access denoted by the ‘hashtag’ symbol.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following tests for each method by which administrators access the TOE (local and remote), as well as for each type of credential supported by the login method:

- a) Test 1: The evaluator shall use the guidance documentation to configure the appropriate credential supported for the login method. For that credential/login method, the evaluator shall show that providing correct I&A information results in the ability to access the system, while providing incorrect information results in denial of access.
- b) Test 2: The evaluator shall configure the services allowed (if any) according to the guidance documentation, and then determine the services available to an external remote entity. The evaluator shall determine that the list of services available is limited to those specified in the requirement.
- c) Test 3: For local access, the evaluator shall determine what services are available to a local administrator prior to logging in, and make sure this list is consistent with the requirement.
- d) Test 4: For distributed TOEs where not all TOE components support the authentication of Security Administrators according to FIA_UIA_EXT.1 and FIA_UAU_EXT.2, the evaluator shall test that the components authenticate Security Administrators as described in the TSS.

The TOE offers the following user interfaces where authentication is provided.



- Local console using local authentication with password
- SSH CLI using local authentication with password
- SSH CLI using local authentication with public key

Test 1 - Using each interface the evaluator performed an unsuccessful and successful logon of each type using bad and good credentials respectively.

Test 2 - Using each interface the evaluator was able to observe that the TOE displayed a banner to the user before login and that there were no other services available nor any configuration options offered to administrators to control services available prior to authentication.

Test 3 - This test was performed as part of test 1 & 2. Using each interface, the evaluator found that, prior to login, no functions were available to the administrator with the exception of acknowledging the banner.

Test 4 - Not applicable. The TOE is not a distributed TOE.

2.3.6 X.509 CERTIFICATE VALIDATION (NDcPP22E:FIA_X509_EXT.1/REV)

2.3.6.1 NDcPP22E:FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/REV

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall demonstrate that checking the validity of a certificate is performed when a certificate is used in an authentication step or when performing trusted updates (if FPT_TUD_EXT.2 is selected). It is not sufficient to verify the status of a X.509 certificate only when it is loaded onto the TOE. It is not necessary to verify the revocation status of X.509 certificates during power-up self-tests (if the option for using X.509 certificates for self-testing is selected). The evaluator shall perform the following tests for FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev. These tests must be repeated for each distinct security function that utilizes X.509v3 certificates. For example, if the TOE implements certificate-based authentication with IPSEC and TLS, then it shall be tested with each of these protocols:

a) Test 1a: The evaluator shall present the TOE with a valid chain of certificates (terminating in a trusted CA certificate) as needed to validate the leaf certificate to be used in the function, and shall use this chain to demonstrate that the function succeeds. Test 1a shall be designed in a way that the chain can be 'broken' in Test 1b by either being able to remove the trust anchor from the TOEs trust store, or by setting up the trust store in a way that at least one intermediate CA certificate needs to be provided, together with the leaf certificate from outside the TOE, to complete the chain (e.g. by storing only the root CA certificate in the trust store).

Test 1b: The evaluator shall then 'break' the chain used in Test 1a by either removing the trust anchor in the TOE's trust store used to terminate the chain, or by removing one of the intermediate CA certificates (provided together with the leaf certificate in Test 1a) to complete the chain. The evaluator shall show that an attempt to validate this broken chain fails.



b) Test 2: The evaluator shall demonstrate that validating an expired certificate results in the function failing.

c) Test 3: The evaluator shall test that the TOE can properly handle revoked certificates - conditional on whether CRL or OCSP is selected; if both are selected, then a test shall be performed for each method. The evaluator shall test revocation of the peer certificate and revocation of the peer intermediate CA certificate i.e. the intermediate CA certificate should be revoked by the root CA. The evaluator shall ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the validation function succeeds. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that has been revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the validation function fails. Revocation checking is only applied to certificates that are not designated as trust anchors. Therefore the revoked certificate(s) used for testing shall not be a trust anchor.

d) Test 4: If OCSP is selected, the evaluator shall configure the OCSP server or use a man-in-the-middle tool to present a certificate that does not have the OCSP signing purpose and verify that validation of the OCSP response fails. If CRL is selected, the evaluator shall configure the CA to sign a CRL with a certificate that does not have the cRLsign key usage bit set, and verify that validation of the CRL fails.

e) Test 5: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the first eight bytes of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The certificate will fail to parse correctly.)

f) Test 6: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the last byte of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The signature on the certificate will not validate.)

g) Test 7: The evaluator shall modify any byte in the public key of the certificate and demonstrate that the certificate fails to validate. (The hash of the certificate will not validate.)

h) The following tests are run when a minimum certificate path length of three certificates is implemented.

Test 8: (Conditional on support for EC certificates as indicated in FCS_COP.1/SigGen). The evaluator shall conduct the following tests:

Test 8a: (Conditional on TOE ability to process CA certificates presented in certificate message) The test shall be designed in a way such that only the EC root certificate is designated as a trust anchor, and by setting up the trust store in a way that the EC Intermediate CA certificate needs to be provided, together with the leaf certificate, from outside the TOE to complete the chain (e.g. by storing only the EC root CA certificate in the trust store). The evaluator shall present the TOE with a valid chain of EC certificates (terminating in a trusted CA certificate), where the elliptic curve parameters are specified as a named curve. The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE validates the certificate chain.

Test 8b: (Conditional on TOE ability to process CA certificates presented in certificate message) The test shall be designed in a way such that only the EC root certificate is designated as a trust anchor, and by setting up the trust store in a way that the EC Intermediate CA certificate needs to be provided, together with the leaf certificate, from outside the TOE to complete the chain (e.g. by storing only the EC root CA certificate in the trust store). The evaluator shall present the TOE with a chain of EC certificates (terminating in a trusted CA certificate), where the intermediate certificate in the certificate chain uses an explicit format version of the Elliptic Curve parameters in



the public key information field, and is signed by the trusted EC root CA, but having no other changes. The evaluator shall confirm the TOE treats the certificate as invalid.

Test 8c: The evaluator shall establish a subordinate CA certificate, where the elliptic curve parameters are specified as a named curve, that is signed by a trusted EC root CA. The evaluator shall attempt to load the certificate into the trust store and observe that it is accepted into the TOE's trust store. The evaluator shall then establish a subordinate CA certificate that uses an explicit format version of the elliptic curve parameters, and that is signed by a trusted EC root CA. The evaluator shall attempt to load the certificate into the trust store and observe that it is rejected, and not added to the TOE's trust store.

(TD0527 12/2020 update applied)

Test 1a: Successful TLS connections with valid certificate chains were demonstrated in the Control Tests in FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev-t2 and t3.

Test 1b: For this test, the evaluator configured the TOE to not have the trusted root CA used by the test peer to anchor all of its certificates. The evaluator then attempted to connect the TLSC TOE client to the test server and observed that the connection failed without a valid certificate chain.

Test 2: For this test, the evaluator alternately configured a test server to send an authentication certificate 1) that is valid and 2) that is expired and 3) issued by an intermediate CA that is expired. In each case, the evaluator then attempted to connect the TOE to the test server and observed that the connection succeeded only if there were no expired certificates.

Test 3: For this test, the evaluator alternately configured a test server to send an authentication certificate 1) that is valid, 2) that is revoked, and 3) issued by an intermediate CA that is revoked. In each case, the evaluator then attempted to connect the TOE to the test server and confirmed that the connection only succeeded if there were no revoked certificates. This test was executed using CRL. OCSP is not supported by the TOE.

Test 4: For this test, the evaluator alternately configured a test server to send an authentication certificate 1) that is valid, 2) issued by an intermediate CA referring to a CRL revocation server where the signer lacks cRLSign, and 3) issued by an intermediate CA whose issuer CA refers to a CRL revocation server where the signer lacks cRLSign. In each case, the evaluator then attempted to connect the TOE to the test server and confirmed that the connection only succeeded if all retrieved CRLs were signed using certificates with cRLSign.

Test 5: For this test, the evaluator alternately configured a test server to send an authentication certificate 1) that is valid, 2) that has one byte in the ASN1 field changed, 3) that has one byte in the certificate signature changed, and 4) that has one byte in the certificate public key changed. In each case, the evaluator attempted to connect the TOE to the test server and verified that the connection only succeeded if the certificate was not modified/corrupted.

Test 6: This test was performed as part of Test 5 above where the evaluator configured the test peer to send an authentication certificate with the last byte in the certificate signature modified and confirmed that the connection failed.



Test 7: This test was performed as part of Test 5 above where the evaluator configured the test peer to send an authentication certificate with one byte in the certificate public key modified and confirmed that the connection failed.

Test 8 (all parts): Not applicable. The TOE does not support ECDSA certificates.

2.3.6.2 NDcPP22E:FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/REV

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following tests for FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev. The tests described must be performed in conjunction with the other certificate services assurance activities, including the functions in FIA_X509_EXT.2.1/Rev. The tests for the extendedKeyUsage rules are performed in conjunction with the uses that require those rules. Where the TSS identifies any of the rules for extendedKeyUsage fields (in FIA_X509_EXT.1.1) that are not supported by the TOE (i.e. where the ST is therefore claiming that they are trivially satisfied) then the associated extendedKeyUsage rule testing may be omitted.

The goal of the following tests is to verify that the TOE accepts a certificate as a CA certificate only if it has been marked as a CA certificate by using basicConstraints with the CA flag set to True (and implicitly tests that the TOE correctly parses the basicConstraints extension as part of X509v3 certificate chain validation). For each of the following tests the evaluator shall create a chain of at least three certificates: a self-signed root CA certificate, an intermediate CA certificate and a leaf (node) certificate. The properties of the certificates in the chain are adjusted as described in each individual test below (and this modification shall be the only invalid aspect of the relevant certificate chain).

a) Test 1: The evaluator shall ensure that at least one of the CAs in the chain does not contain the basicConstraints extension. The evaluator confirms that the TOE rejects such a certificate at one (or both) of the following points: (i) as part of the validation of the leaf certificate belonging to this chain; (ii) when attempting to add a CA certificate without the basicConstraints extension to the TOE's trust store (i.e. when attempting to install the CA certificate as one which will be retrieved from the TOE itself when validating future certificate chains).

b) Test 2: The evaluator shall ensure that at least one of the CA certificates in the chain has a basicConstraints extension in which the CA flag is set to FALSE. The evaluator confirms that the TOE rejects such a certificate at one (or both) of the following points: (i) as part of the validation of the leaf certificate belonging to this chain; (ii) when attempting to add a CA certificate with the CA flag set to FALSE to the TOE's trust store (i.e. when attempting to install the CA certificate as one which will be retrieved from the TOE itself when validating future certificate chains).

The evaluator shall repeat these tests for each distinct use of certificates. Thus, for example, use of certificates for TLS connection is distinct from use of certificates for trusted updates so both of these uses would be tested. But there is no need to repeat the tests for each separate TLS channel in FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRP.1/Admin (unless the channels use separate implementations of TLS).



Test 1: For this test, the evaluator alternately configured a test peer to send an authentication certificate issued by a Sub CA with no basicConstraints and with basicConstraints but the CA Flag set to false. In each case, the evaluator then attempted to connect the TLSC TOE client with the test server and observed that the connection was rejected in each case.

Test 2: This was performed as part of Test 1 above.

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure the TSS describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place, and that the TSS identifies any of the rules for extendedKeyUsage fields (in FIA_X509_EXT.1.1) that are not supported by the TOE (i.e. where the ST is therefore claiming that they are trivially satisfied). It is expected that revocation checking is performed when a certificate is used in an authentication step and when performing trusted updates (if selected). It is not necessary to verify the revocation status of X.509 certificates during power-up self-tests (if the option for using X.509 certificates for self-testing is selected).

The TSS shall describe when revocation checking is performed and on what certificates. If the revocation checking during authentication is handled differently depending on whether a full certificate chain or only a leaf certificate is being presented, any differences must be summarized in the TSS section and explained in the Guidance.

Section 6.1 (FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev) in the ST states that certificate validity is performed when remote TLS peers present a certificate chain to the TOE and when certificates are imported into the TOE's trust store.

The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates to support authentication for TLS connections. The TSF determines the validity of certificates by ensuring that the certificate and the certificate path are valid in accordance with RFC 5280. The certificate path is validated by ensuring that all the CA certificates have the basicConstraints extension and the CA flag is set to TRUE and the certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.

The TOE will also verify the extendedKeyUsage field of the TLS peer certificate contains the Server Authentication purpose. OCSP is not supported; therefore, the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) is trivially satisfied by the TOE.

CRL revocation checking is supported by the TOE. Revocation checking is performed on the leaf and intermediate certificate(s) when authenticating a certificate chain provided by the remote peer. There are no functional differences if a full certificate chain or only a leaf certificate is presented.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also ensure that the guidance documentation describes where the check of validity of the certificates takes place, describes any of the rules for extendedKeyUsage fields (in FIA_X509_EXT.1.1) that are not supported by the TOE (i.e. where the ST is therefore claiming that they are trivially satisfied) and describes how certificate revocation checking is performed and on which certificate.

Section "TLS – Syslog" in the **Admin Guide** states that certificate validity is performed when the remote TLS peer presents a certificate chain to the TOE and when certificates are imported into the TOE's trust store. The TOE will validate the X.509 certificate presented by the remote syslog server but does not require a X.509 certificate for the TOE itself. The Administrator will need to ensure the remote syslog server is properly configured with a valid X.509 certificate and the CDP (Certificate Distribution Point) for CRL revocation checking is available on the network. If



the CDP for CRL revocation checking is unavailable or the remote syslog server is not properly configured with a valid X.509 certificate, the TOE will not establish the connection to the Syslog server. In this case, the Administrator should troubleshoot and resolve the issue before proceeding.

Section “Enable Remote Syslog Server” in the **Admin Guide** states that the TOE uses X.509v3 certificates to support authentication for TLS connections to a Syslog audit server. The TOE determines the validity of certificates by ensuring that the certificate and the certificate path are valid in accordance with RFC 5280. The certificate path is validated by ensuring that all the CA certificates have the basicConstraints extension and the CA flag is set to TRUE and the certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate. The TOE will also verify that the extendedKeyUsage field of the TLS peer certificate contains the Server Authentication purpose. OCSP is not supported; therefore, the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) is trivially satisfied by the TOE. Revocation checking is performed on the leaf and intermediate certificate(s) when authenticating a certificate chain provided by the remote peer.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.3.7 X.509 CERTIFICATE AUTHENTICATION (NDcPP22E:FIA_X509_EXT.2)

2.3.7.1 NDcPP22E:FIA_X509_EXT.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.3.7.2 NDcPP22E:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it describes how the TOE chooses which certificates to use, and any necessary instructions in the administrative guidance for configuring the operating environment so that the TOE can use the certificates.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to confirm that it describes the behaviour of the TOE when a connection cannot be established during the validity check of a certificate used in establishing a trusted channel. The evaluator shall verify that any distinctions between trusted channels are described. If the requirement that the administrator is able to specify the default action, then the evaluator shall ensure that the guidance documentation contains instructions on how this configuration action is performed.



Section 6.1 (FIA_X509_EXT.2) of the ST states that the TOE determines which certificate to use based upon the trustpoint configured. The instructions for configuring trustpoints is provided in the CC Configuration Guide. If the connection to determine the certificate validity cannot be established, the connection is rejected.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also ensure that the guidance documentation describes the configuration required in the operating environment so the TOE can use the certificates. The guidance documentation shall also include any required configuration on the TOE to use the certificates. The guidance document shall also describe the steps for the Security Administrator to follow if the connection cannot be established during the validity check of a certificate used in establishing a trusted channel.

The following sections in the **Admin Guide** provide instructions on configuring the TOE to use TLS to securely transmit generated audit data to an external syslog server: “TLS – Syslog”, “Create and Configure a Certificate Map”, “Create, Configure, and Authenticate the Root Trustpoint”, “Create, Configure, and Authenticate the Intermediate Trustpoint”, “Configure a TLS Profile” and “Enable Remote Syslog Server”. These instructions include configuring a root and intermediate trustpoint and importing CA certificates to the TOE.

Section “TLS - Syslog” in the Admin Guide states that the TOE requires an Audit (syslog) Server in the IT Environment to which the TOE transmits syslog messages over TLS. The TOE will validate the X.509 certificate presented by the remote syslog server but does not require a X.509 certificate for the TOE itself. The Administrator will need to ensure the remote syslog server is properly configured with a valid X.509 certificate and the CDP (Certificate Distribution Point) for CRL revocation checking is available on the network. If the CDP for CRL revocation checking is unavailable or the remote syslog server is not properly configured with a valid X.509 certificate, the TOE will not establish the connection to the Syslog server. In this case, the Administrator should troubleshoot and resolve the issue before proceeding.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test for each trusted channel:

The evaluator shall demonstrate that using a valid certificate that requires certificate validation checking to be performed in at least some part by communicating with a non-TOE IT entity. The evaluator shall then manipulate the environment so that the TOE is unable to verify the validity of the certificate, and observe that the action selected in FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 is performed. If the selected action is administrator-configurable, then the evaluator shall follow the guidance documentation to determine that all supported administrator-configurable options behave in their documented manner.

The evaluator alternately configured a test peer to send an authentication certificate with valid/accessible revocation servers and an authentication certificate with revocation information referring to an inaccessible revocation server. In each case, the evaluator then attempted to make a connection between the test peer and the TOE expecting the connection to be successful when the revocation server is accessible and to fail when the revocation server is not accessible. The evaluator observed the certificate validation checking behavior in each case and confirmed that it was consistent with the actions selected in FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 in the ST.

2.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT)



2.4.1 MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS BEHAVIOUR (NDcPP22E:FMT_MOF.1/MANUALUPDATE)

2.4.1.1 NDcPP22E:FMT_MOF.1.1/MANUALUPDATE

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: For distributed TOEs it is required to verify the TSS to ensure that it describes how every function related to security management is realized for every TOE component and shared between different TOE components. The evaluator shall confirm that all relevant aspects of each TOE component are covered by the FMT SFRs.

There are no specific requirements for non-distributed TOEs.

The TOE is not distributed.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that any necessary steps to perform manual update are described. The guidance documentation shall also provide warnings regarding functions that may cease to operate during the update (if applicable).

For distributed TOEs the guidance documentation shall describe all steps how to update all TOE components. This shall contain description of the order in which components need to be updated if the order is relevant to the update process. The guidance documentation shall also provide warnings regarding functions of TOE components and the overall TOE that may cease to operate during the update (if applicable).

Section “Update TOE Software” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions to manually update the TOE. Since the process involves rebooting before an upgrade can be completed, the TOE does not pass traffic during the update.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall try to perform the update using a legitimate update image without prior authentication as Security Administrator (either by authentication as a user with no administrator privileges or without user authentication at all - depending on the configuration of the TOE). The attempt to update the TOE should fail.

The evaluator shall try to perform the update with prior authentication as Security Administrator using a legitimate update image. This attempt should be successful. This test case should be covered by the tests for FPT_TUD_EXT.1 already.

The set of functions available to administrators prior to login do not include TOE update as specified in NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1-t2. The successful update of the TOE by an authorized administrator was demonstrated in NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1-t1.



2.4.2 MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (NDCPP22E:FMT_MTD.1/COREDATA)

2.4.2.1 NDCPP22E:FMT_MTD.1.1/COREDATA

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that, for each administrative function identified in the guidance documentation; those that are accessible through an interface prior to administrator log-in are identified. For each of these functions, the evaluator shall also confirm that the TSS details how the ability to manipulate the TSF data through these interfaces is disallowed for non-administrative users.

If the TOE supports handling of X.509v3 certificates and implements a trust store, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it contains sufficient information to describe how the ability to manage the TOE's trust store is restricted.

Section 6.1 (FMT_MTD.1/CoreData) of the ST states that the term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions.

The TOE provides the ability for Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) to access TOE data, such as audit data, configuration data, security attributes, session thresholds, cryptographic keys, trust store and updates. Each of the predefined and administratively configured privilege levels has a set of permissions that will grant them access to the TOE data, though with some privilege levels, the access is limited.

The warning and access banner may be displayed prior to the identification and authentication of an Authorized Administrator. No administrative functionality is available prior to administrative login.

Section 6.1 (FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys) in the ST states that only the Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) can manage the TOE's trust store and import or remove X509v3 certificates.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall review the guidance documentation to determine that each of the TSF-data-manipulating functions implemented in response to the requirements of the cPP is identified, and that configuration information is provided to ensure that only administrators have access to the functions.

If the TOE supports handling of X.509v3 certificates and provides a trust store, the evaluator shall review the guidance documentation to determine that it provides sufficient information for the administrator to configure and maintain the trust store in a secure way. If the TOE supports loading of CA certificates, the evaluator shall review the guidance documentation to determine that it provides sufficient information for the administrator to securely load CA certificates into the trust store. The evaluator shall also review the guidance documentation to determine that it explains how to designate a CA certificate a trust anchor.



The TSF data manipulating functions and the corresponding configuration information are identified or referenced throughout this AAR with the requirement to which they apply.

Section “Add Administrator Account” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring an administrator with privilege level 15. Administrative users with privilege level 15 have full access to all TOE security functions including importing X.509v3 certificates to the TOE’s trust store and otherwise maintaining the trust store securely.

See NDcPP22e:FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 which identifies the sections in the Guide(s) that describe how the administrator role can configure and maintain the trust store including loading of CA certificates.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: No separate testing for FMT_MTD.1/CoreData is required unless one of the management functions has not already been exercised under any other SFR.

No additional testing was required as all management functions were demonstrated throughout the course of testing other SFRs.

2.4.3 MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1/CRYPTOKEYS)

2.4.3.1 NDcPP22e:FMT_MTD.1.1/CRYPTOKEYS

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: For distributed TOEs see chapter 2.4.1.1.

For non-distributed TOEs, the evaluator shall ensure the TSS lists the keys the Security Administrator is able to manage to include the options available (e.g. generating keys, importing keys, modifying keys or deleting keys) and how that how those operations are performed.

Section 6.1 (FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys) of the ST states that the TOE provides the ability for Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) to access TOE data, such as audit data, configuration data, security attributes, session thresholds, cryptographic keys and updates. Each of the predefined and administratively configured privilege level has a set of permissions that will grant them access to the TOE data, though with some privilege levels, the access is limited. TOE Administrators can control (generate/delete SSH RSA Key Pairs by following the instructions in the CC Configuration Guide.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: For distributed TOEs see chapter 2.4.1.2.

For non-distributed TOEs, the evaluator shall also ensure the Guidance Documentation lists the keys the Security Administrator is able to manage to include the options available (e.g. generating keys, importing keys, modifying keys or deleting keys) and how that how those operations are performed.



Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for generating an RSA 2048 or 3072 bit key for SSH, configuring the SSH server key exchange algorithm, configuring the host key and user public key algorithms and configuring ssh rekey settings.

Section “Configure a TLS Profile” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for creating a TLS profile for Syslog including configuring TLSv1.2 and the supported list of TLS ciphersuites. Section “Enable Remote Syslog Server” states that RSA signature services using 2048 or 3072 key sizes are automatically configured when TLS is configured as instructed.

Section “Zeroize Private Key” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for deleting the private key stored in NVRAM that is generated for SSH. Other keys stored in SDRAM are zeroized when no longer in use, zeroized with a new value of the key, or zeroized on power-cycle.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall try to perform at least one of the related actions (modify, delete, generate/import) without prior authentication as security administrator (either by authentication as a non-administrative user, if supported, or without authentication at all). Attempts to perform related actions without prior authentication should fail. According to the implementation no other users than the Security Administrator might be defined and without any user authentication the user might not be able to get to the point where the attempt to manage cryptographic keys can be executed. In that case it shall be demonstrated that access control mechanisms prevent execution up to the step that can be reached without authentication as Security Administrator. The evaluator shall try to perform at least one of the related actions with prior authentication as security administrator. This attempt should be successful.

The set of functions available to administrators prior to login do not include performing any cryptographic functions as specified by NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1-t2. The successful management of crypto keys by an authorized administrator (including generation and deletion) is demonstrated in FMT_MTD.1/Cryptokeys-t1.

2.4.4 SPECIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (NDcPP22E:FMT_SMF.1)

2.4.4.1 NDcPP22E:FMT_SMF.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The security management functions for FMT_SMF.1 are distributed throughout the cPP and are included as part of the requirements in FTA_SSL_EXT.1, FTA_SSL.3, FTA_TAB.1, FMT_MOF.1(1)/ManualUpdate, FMT_MOF.1(4)/AutoUpdate (if included in the ST), FIA_AFL.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 (if included in the ST), FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 & FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 (if included in the ST and if they include an



administrator-configurable action), FMT_MOF.1(2)/Services, and FMT_MOF.1(3)/Functions (for all of these SFRs that are included in the ST), FMT_MTD, FPT_TST_EXT, and any cryptographic management functions specified in the reference standards. Compliance to these requirements satisfies compliance with FMT_SMF.1.

(containing also requirements on Guidance Documentation and Tests)

The evaluator shall examine the TSS, Guidance Documentation and the TOE as observed during all other testing and shall confirm that the management functions specified in FMT_SMF.1 are provided by the TOE. The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS details which security management functions are available through which interface(s) (local administration interface, remote administration interface).

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and Guidance Documentation to verify they both describe the local administrative interface. The evaluator shall ensure the Guidance Documentation includes appropriate warnings for the administrator to ensure the interface is local.

For distributed TOEs with the option 'ability to configure the interaction between TOE components' the evaluator shall examine that the ways to configure the interaction between TOE components is detailed in the TSS and Guidance Documentation. The evaluator shall check that the TOE behaviour observed during testing of the configured SFRs is as described in the TSS and Guidance Documentation.

Section 6.1 (FMT_SMF.1) of the ST states the TOE provides all the capabilities necessary to securely manage the TOE. The Security Administrators (a.k.a Authorized Administrators) user can connect to the TOE using the CLI to perform these functions via SSHv2 secured connection, a terminal server, or at the local console.

The specific management capabilities available from the TOE include:

- Local and remote administration of the TOE and the services provided by the TOE via the TOE CLI, as described above;
- The ability to manage the warning banner message and content which allows the Authorized Administrator the ability to define warning banner that is displayed prior to establishing a session (note this applies to the interactive (human) users; e.g. administrative users);
- The ability to manage the time limits of session inactivity which allows the Authorized Administrator the ability to set and modify the inactivity time threshold;
- The ability to configure the number of failed administrator logon attempts that will cause the account to be locked for an administrator specified time period;
- The ability to update the IOS-XE software. The validity of the image is provided using SHA-512 published hash to verify the update prior to installing the update;
- The ability to modify the behavior of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity;
- The ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
- The ability to manage the cryptographic functionality which allows the Authorized Administrator the ability to identify and configure the algorithms used to provide protection of the data;
- The ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
- The ability to manage the trusted public key database”;



- The ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;
- The ability to import the X.509v3 certificates and validate for use in authentication and secure connections;
- The ability to configure and set the time clock.
- The ability to configure the reference identifiers for peers, which is SAN: FQDN identifier and SAN: IPv4 address.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: See TSS Assurance Activities

See TSS Assurance Activities.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator tests management functions as part of testing the SFRs identified in section 2.4.4. No separate testing for FMT_SMF.1 is required unless one of the management functions in FMT_SMF.1.1 has not already been exercised under any other SFR.

All of the management functions were demonstrated throughout the course of testing.

2.4.5 RESTRICTIONS ON SECURITY ROLES (NDcPP22E:FMT_SMR.2)

2.4.5.1 NDcPP22E:FMT_SMR.2.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.4.5.2 NDcPP22E:FMT_SMR.2.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.4.5.3 NDcPP22E:FMT_SMR.2.3

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it details the TOE supported roles and any restrictions of the roles involving administration of the TOE.



Section 6.1 (FMT_SMR.2) of the ST states the TOE maintains Authorizer Administrators that include privileged and semi-privileged administrator roles to administer the TOE locally and remotely.

The TOE performs role-based authorization, using TOE platform authorization mechanisms, to grant access to the privileged and semi-privileged roles. For the purposes of this evaluation, the privileged role is equivalent to full administrative access to the CLI, which is the default access for IOS privilege level 15; and the semi-privileged role equates to any privilege level that has a subset of the privileges assigned to level 15. Privilege levels 0 and 1 are defined by default and are customizable, while levels 2-14 are undefined by default and are also customizable. Note: the levels are not theoretically hierarchical.

The term “Authorized Administrator” is used in this ST to refer to any user which has been assigned to a privilege level that is permitted to perform the relevant action; therefore, has the appropriate privileges to perform the requested functions.

The privilege level determines the functions the user can perform; hence the Authorized Administrator with the appropriate privileges.

The TOE can and shall be configured to authenticate all access to the command line interface using a username and password.

The TOE supports both local administration via a directly connected console cable and remote administration via SSHv2 secure connection.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall review the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions for administering the TOE both locally and remotely, including any configuration that needs to be performed on the client for remote administration.

See FIA_UIA_EXT.1 which identifies the instructions in the **Admin Guide** for administering the TOE both locally and remotely.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: In the course of performing the testing activities for the evaluation, the evaluator shall use all supported interfaces, although it is not necessary to repeat each test involving an administrative action with each interface. The evaluator shall ensure, however, that each supported method of administering the TOE that conforms to the requirements of this cPP be tested; for instance, if the TOE can be administered through a local hardware interface; SSH; and TLS/HTTPS; then all three methods of administration must be exercised during the evaluation team's test activities.

Throughout the course of testing, the TOE was administered both via local CLI and SSH.

2.5 PROTECTION OF THE TSF (FPT)

2.5.1 PROTECTION OF ADMINISTRATOR PASSWORDS (NDCPP22E:FPT_APW_EXT.1)

2.5.1.1 NDCPP22E:FPT_APW_EXT.1.1



TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.5.1.2 NDCPP22E:FPT_APW_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it details all authentication data that are subject to this requirement, and the method used to obscure the plaintext password data when stored. The TSS shall also detail passwords are stored in such a way that they are unable to be viewed through an interface designed specifically for that purpose, as outlined in the application note.

Section 6.1 (FPT_APW_EXT.1) of the ST states that the TOE is designed specifically to not disclose any passwords stored in the TOE. All passwords are stored using a SHA-2 hash. 'Show' commands display only the hashed password. The CC Configuration Guide instructs the Administrator to use the algorithm-type script sub-command when passwords are created or updated. The script is password type 9 and uses a SHA-2 hash.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.5.2 PROTECTION OF TSF DATA (FOR READING OF ALL PRE-SHARED, SYMMETRIC AND PRIVATE KEYS) (NDCPP22E:FPT_SKP_EXT.1)

2.5.2.1 NDCPP22E:FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it details how any pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys are stored and that they are unable to be viewed through an interface designed specifically for that purpose, as outlined in the application note. If these values are not stored in plaintext, the TSS shall describe how they are protected/obscured.

Section 6.1 (FPT_SKP_EXT.1) of the ST states that the TOE is designed specifically to not disclose any keys stored in the TOE. The TOE stores all private keys in a secure directory that cannot be viewed or accessed, even by the



Administrator. The TOE stores symmetric keys only in volatile memory. Only the Administrator may view the configuration file.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.5.3 RELIABLE TIME STAMPS (NDcPP22E:FPT_STM_EXT.1)

2.5.3.1 NDcPP22E:FPT_STM_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.5.3.2 NDcPP22E:FPT_STM_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it lists each security function that makes use of time, and that it provides a description of how the time is maintained and considered reliable in the context of each of the time related functions.

If 'obtain time from the underlying virtualization system' is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it identifies the VS interface the TOE uses to obtain time. If there is a delay between updates to the time on the VS and updating the time on the TOE, the TSS shall identify the maximum possible delay. (TD0632 applied)

Section 6.1 (FPT_STM_EXT.1) of the ST states the TOE provides a source of date and time information used in audit event timestamps. The clock function is reliant on the system clock provided by the underlying hardware. This date and time are used as the time stamp that is applied to TOE generated audit records and used to track inactivity of administrative sessions.

The TOE relies upon date and time information for the following security functions:

- To monitor local and remote interactive administrative sessions for inactivity (FTA_SSL_EXT.1, FTA_SSL.3);
- Validating X.509 certificates to determine if a certificate has expired (FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev);
- To determine when SSH session keys have expired and to initiate a rekey (FCS_SSHS_EXT.1);
- To provide accurate timestamps in audit records (FAU_GEN.1.2).



Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator examines the guidance documentation to ensure it instructs the administrator how to set the time. If the TOE supports the use of an NTP server, the guidance documentation instructs how a communication path is established between the TOE and the NTP server, and any configuration of the NTP client on the TOE to support this communication.

If the TOE supports obtaining time from the underlying VS, the evaluator shall verify the Guidance Documentation specifies any configuration steps necessary. If no configuration is necessary, no statement is necessary in the Guidance Documentation. If there is a delay between updates to the time on the VS and updating the time on the TOE, the evaluator shall ensure the Guidance Documentation informs the administrator of the maximum possible delay. (TD0632 applied)

Section “Configure Time and Date” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for the administrator to manually set the time on the TOE.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

a) Test 1: If the TOE supports direct setting of the time by the Security Administrator, then the evaluator uses the guidance documentation to set the time. The evaluator shall then use an available interface to observe that the time was set correctly.

b) Test 2: If the TOE supports the use of an NTP server; the evaluator shall use the guidance documentation to configure the NTP client on the TOE, and set up a communication path with the NTP server. The evaluator will observe that the NTP server has set the time to what is expected. If the TOE supports multiple protocols for establishing a connection with the NTP server, the evaluator shall perform this test using each supported protocol claimed in the guidance documentation.

If the audit component of the TOE consists of several parts with independent time information, then the evaluator shall verify that the time information between the different parts are either synchronized or that it is possible for all audit information to relate the time information of the different part to one base information unambiguously.

c) Test 3: [conditional] If the TOE obtains time from the underlying VS, the evaluator shall record the time on the TOE, modify the time on the underlying VS, and verify the modified time is reflected by the TOE. If there is a delay between the setting the time on the VS and when the time is reflected on the TOE, the evaluator shall ensure this delay is consistent with the TSS and Guidance. (TD0632 applied)

Test 1: The evaluator set the clock from the local console and then observed via the console display and the audit records that the time was set as intended.

Test 2: Not applicable. The TOE does not support the use of an NTP server.

Test 3: Not applicable. The TOE does not obtain time from an underlying VS.

2.5.4 TSF TESTING (NDCPP22E:FPT_TST_EXT.1)



2.5.4.1 NDcPP22E:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details the self-tests that are run by the TSF; this description should include an outline of what the tests are actually doing (e.g., rather than saying 'memory is tested', a description similar to 'memory is tested by writing a value to each memory location and reading it back to ensure it is identical to what was written' shall be used). The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF is operating correctly.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details which TOE component performs which self-tests and when these self-tests are run.

Section 6.1 (FPT_TST_EXT.1) of the ST states that The TOE runs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to verify correct operation of the IOS Common Cryptographic Module, Rel5a and the CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a Cryptographic Module. All ports are blocked from moving to forwarding state during the POST. If all components of all modules pass the POST, the system is placed in FIPS PASS state and ports are allowed to forward data traffic. If any of the tests fail, a message is displayed to the local console and the TOE component will automatically reboot. These tests include:

AES Known Answer Test:

For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt a known plain text value resulting in an encrypted value. This encrypted value is compared to a known encrypted value. If the encrypted texts match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a known key is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value is compared to a known plaintext value. If the decrypted texts match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails.

RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification):

This test takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value. If the encrypted values, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the original plaintext value. If the decrypted values match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails.

RNG/DRBG Known Answer Test:

For this test, known seed values are provided to the DRBG implementation. The DRBG uses these values to generate random bits. These random bits are compared to known random bits. If the random bits match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails.

HMAC Known Answer Test:

For each of the hash values listed, the HMAC implementation is fed known plaintext data and a known key. These values are used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC. If the MAC values match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails.

Software Integrity Test:



The Software Integrity Test uses HMAC-SHA256 (IC2M) and HMAC-SHA-1 (CiscoSSL FOM) verification to confirm the cryptographic module has maintained its integrity. The Software Integrity Test is run automatically when the module is loaded.

SHA-1/256/384/512 Known Answer Test:

For each of the values listed, the SHA implementation is fed known data and a key. These values are used to generate a hash. This hash is compared to a known value. If the hash values match, the test passes; otherwise, the test fails.

If any component reports failure for the POST, the system crashes. Appropriate information is displayed to the local console.

All ports are blocked during the POST. If all components pass the POST, the system is placed in FIPS PASS state and ports can forward data traffic. If any of the tests fail, a message is displayed to the local console and the TOE component will automatically reboot.

If an error occurs during the self-test, a SELF_TEST_FAILURE system log is generated.

Example Error Message:

%CRYPTO-0-SELF_TEST_FAILURE: Crypto algorithms self-test failed (SHA hashing)

These tests are sufficient to verify that the correct version of the TOE software is running as well as that the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected because any deviation in the TSF behaviour will be identified by the failure of a self-test.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also ensure that the guidance documentation describes the possible errors that may result from such tests, and actions the administrator should take in response; these possible errors shall correspond to those described in the TSS.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall ensure that the guidance documentation describes how to determine from an error message returned which TOE component has failed the self-test.

Section “Cryptographic Self-Tests” in the **Admin Guide** states that the TOE runs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to verify correct operation of cryptographic modules. If any component reports failure for the POST, the system crashes and appropriate information is displayed on the local console. All ports are blocked from moving to forwarding state during the POST. If all components of all modules pass the POST, the system is placed in FIPS PASS state and ports are allowed to forward data traffic. If any of the tests fail, a message is displayed to the local console and the TOE component will automatically reboot. If the Administrator observes a cryptographic self-test failure, they should contact Cisco Technical Support as indicated in the “Contact Cisco” section of the **Admin Guide**.

If the Administrator needs to execute cryptographic self-tests for the Switch after the image is loaded the following command can be used: SWITCH# test crypto self-test.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: It is expected that at least the following tests are performed:

- a) Verification of the integrity of the firmware and executable software of the TOE
- b) Verification of the correct operation of the cryptographic functions necessary to fulfill any of the SFRs.



Although formal compliance is not mandated, the self-tests performed should aim for a level of confidence comparable to:

- a) FIPS 140-2, chap. 4.9.1, Software/firmware integrity test for the verification of the integrity of the firmware and executable software. Note that the testing is not restricted to the cryptographic functions of the TOE.
- b) FIPS 140-2, chap. 4.9.1, Cryptographic algorithm test for the verification of the correct operation of cryptographic functions. Alternatively, national requirements of any CCRA member state for the security evaluation of cryptographic functions should be considered as appropriate.

The evaluator shall either verify that the self tests described above are carried out during initial start-up or that the developer has justified any deviation from this.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall perform testing of self-tests on all TOE components according to the description in the TSS about which self-test are performed by which component.

During testing, the evaluator observed the following audit records which indicated that the self-tests ran and completed successfully.

- When restarting the TOE, the TOE generates an audit indicating that the self-tests ran successfully.
- When performing the “test crypto self-test” command, the TOE generates an audit which identifies each test and indicates their pass status.

2.5.5 TRUSTED UPDATE (NDcPP22E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)

2.5.5.1 NDcPP22E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.5.5.2 NDcPP22E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.5.5.3 NDcPP22E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined



Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describe how to query the currently active version. If a trusted update can be installed on the TOE with a delayed activation, the TSS needs to describe how and when the inactive version becomes active. The evaluator shall verify this description.

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes all TSF software update mechanisms for updating the system firmware and software (for simplicity the term 'software' will be used in the following although the requirements apply to firmware and software). The evaluator shall verify that the description includes a digital signature verification of the software before installation and that installation fails if the verification fails. Alternatively an approach using a published hash can be used. In this case the TSS shall detail this mechanism instead of the digital signature verification mechanism. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the method by which the digital signature or published hash is verified to include how the candidate updates are obtained, the processing associated with verifying the digital signature or published hash of the update, and the actions that take place for both successful and unsuccessful signature verification or published hash verification.

If the options 'support automatic checking for updates' or 'support automatic updates' are chosen from the selection in FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS explains what actions are involved in automatic checking or automatic updating by the TOE, respectively.

For distributed TOEs, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how all TOE components are updated, that it describes all mechanisms that support continuous proper functioning of the TOE during update (when applying updates separately to individual TOE components) and how verification of the signature or checksum is performed for each TOE component. Alternatively, this description can be provided in the guidance documentation. In that case the evaluator should examine the guidance documentation instead.

If a published hash is used to protect the trusted update mechanism, then the evaluator shall verify that the trusted update mechanism does involve an active authorization step of the Security Administrator, and that download of the published hash value, hash comparison and update is not a fully automated process involving no active authorization by the Security Administrator. In particular, authentication as Security Administration according to FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate needs to be part of the update process when using published hashes.

Section 6.1 (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) of the ST states that an Authorized Administrator can query the software version running on the TOE and can initiate updates to (replacements of) software images.

The software version information for the TOE specific image can be displayed using the following commands. The administrator in privileged EXEC mode enters:

```
Switch# show version (this displays information about the Cisco IOS software version running on the TOE the ROM Monitor and Bootflash software versions, and the hardware configuration, including the amount of system memory.
```

When updates are made available by Cisco, an Authorized Administrator can obtain and install those updates. The Authorized Administrator can download the approved image file from Cisco.com onto a trusted computer system



for usage in the trusted update functionality. Software images are available from Cisco.com at the following:
<https://software.cisco.com/download/home>.

Published hash mechanisms are used to verify software/firmware update files (to ensure they have not been modified from the originals distributed by Cisco) before they are used to update the TOE. The process associated with verifying the published hash requires: 1) Use a hash generation utility to compute a SHA-512 hash; 2) Compare the result with the SHA-512 hash associated with the image at Cisco Software Central; and 3) If the hash values match, the administrator may proceed with installing the image. If the hash values do not match the administrator must not install the image and should contact Cisco Technical Support.

Once the image is loaded into bootflash, the Authorized Administrator can display information related to software authenticity for a specific image file, using the verify command.

The image name and hash can be verified on the [TOE] download page on Cisco.com
(<https://software.cisco.com/download/home/286320755/type/282046477/release/Dublin-17.12.2>).

Once the Authorized Administrator has verified the TOE image, the file can be installed.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation describes how to query the currently active version. If a trusted update can be installed on the TOE with a delayed activation, the guidance documentation needs to describe how to query the loaded but inactive version.

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation describes how the verification of the authenticity of the update is performed (digital signature verification or verification of published hash). The description shall include the procedures for successful and unsuccessful verification. The description shall correspond to the description in the TSS.

If a published hash is used to protect the trusted update mechanism, the evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation describes how the Security Administrator can obtain authentic published hash values for the updates.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall verify that the guidance documentation describes how the versions of individual TOE components are determined for FPT_TUD_EXT.1, how all TOE components are updated, and the error conditions that may arise from checking or applying the update (e.g. failure of signature verification, or exceeding available storage space) along with appropriate recovery actions. The guidance documentation only has to describe the procedures relevant for the Security Administrator; it does not need to give information about the internal communication that takes place when applying updates.

If this was information was not provided in the TSS: For distributed TOEs, the evaluator shall examine the Guidance Documentation to ensure that it describes how all TOE components are updated, that it describes all mechanisms that support continuous proper functioning of the TOE during update (when applying updates separately to individual TOE components) and how verification of the signature or checksum is performed for each TOE component.



If this information was not provided in the TSS: If the ST author indicates that a certificate-based mechanism is used for software update digital signature verification, the evaluator shall verify that the Guidance Documentation contains a description of how the certificates are contained on the device. The evaluator also ensures that the Guidance Documentation describes how the certificates are installed/updated/selected, if necessary.

Section “Verify TOE Software” in the **Admin Guide** provides the “show version” command which is used to view the currently active version.

Section “Update TOE Software” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for updating the TOE software including where to obtain the updated software image and how to upload the image to the switch to make it available for installation and activation or alternatively performing all three steps in one stage using the “install add file [tftp | ftp | sftp://<IP Address of TFTP/FTP/SFTP server>] <image name.bin> activate commit” command.

Section “Update TOE Software” in the **Admin Guide** further details how the administrator can obtain the SHA-512 published hash when obtaining the software from the Cisco Software Central website and how to verify the hash on the image in bootflash before it is installed. When comparing the obtained hash with the hash on the image in bootflash, if the administrator finds that the hash values match, the installation of the image should proceed. If the hash values do not match, the image should not be installed and the administrator should contact Cisco Technical Support.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

a) Test 1: The evaluator performs the version verification activity to determine the current version of the product. If a trusted update can be installed on the TOE with a delayed activation, the evaluator shall also query the most recently installed version (for this test the TOE shall be in a state where these two versions match). The evaluator obtains a legitimate update using procedures described in the guidance documentation and verifies that it is successfully installed on the TOE. For some TOEs loading the update onto the TOE and activation of the update are separate steps ('activation' could be performed e.g. by a distinct activation step or by rebooting the device). In that case the evaluator verifies after loading the update onto the TOE but before activation of the update that the current version of the product did not change but the most recently installed version has changed to the new product version. After the update, the evaluator performs the version verification activity again to verify the version correctly corresponds to that of the update and that current version of the product and most recently installed version match again.

b) Test 2 [conditional]: If the TOE itself verifies a digital signature to authorize the installation of an image to update the TOE the following test shall be performed (otherwise the test shall be omitted). The evaluator first confirms that no updates are pending and then performs the version verification activity to determine the current version of the product, verifying that it is different from the version claimed in the update(s) to be used in this test. The evaluator obtains or produces illegitimate updates as defined below, and attempts to install them on the TOE. The evaluator verifies that the TOE rejects all of the illegitimate updates. The evaluator performs this test using all of the following forms of illegitimate updates:

1) A modified version (e.g. using a hex editor) of a legitimately signed update



- 2) An image that has not been signed
 - 3) An image signed with an invalid signature (e.g. by using a different key as expected for creating the signature or by manual modification of a legitimate signature)
 - 4) If the TOE allows a delayed activation of updates the TOE must be able to display both the currently executing version and most recently installed version. The handling of version information of the most recently installed version might differ between different TOEs depending on the point in time when an attempted update is rejected. The evaluator shall verify that the TOE handles the most recently installed version information for that case as described in the guidance documentation. After the TOE has rejected the update the evaluator shall verify, that both, current version and most recently installed version, reflect the same version information as prior to the update attempt.
- c) Test 3 [conditional]: If the TOE itself verifies a hash value over an image against a published hash value (i.e. reference value) that has been imported to the TOE from outside such that the TOE itself authorizes the installation of an image to update the TOE, the following test shall be performed (otherwise the test shall be omitted). If the published hash is provided to the TOE by the Security Administrator and the verification of the hash value over the update file(s) against the published hash is performed by the TOE, then the evaluator shall perform the following tests. The evaluator first confirms that no update is pending and then performs the version verification activity to determine the current version of the product, verifying that it is different from the version claimed in the update(s) to be used in this test.
- 1) The evaluator obtains or produces an illegitimate update such that the hash of the update does not match the published hash. The evaluator provides the published hash value to the TOE and calculates the hash of the update either on the TOE itself (if that functionality is provided by the TOE), or else outside the TOE. The evaluator confirms that the hash values are different, and attempts to install the update on the TOE, verifying that this fails because of the difference in hash values (and that the failure is logged). Depending on the implementation of the TOE, the TOE might not allow the Security Administrator to even attempt updating the TOE after the verification of the hash value fails. In that case the verification that the hash comparison fails is regarded as sufficient verification of the correct behaviour of the TOE.
 - 2) The evaluator uses a legitimate update and tries to perform verification of the hash value without providing the published hash value to the TOE. The evaluator confirms that this attempt fails. Depending on the implementation of the TOE it might not be possible to attempt the verification of the hash value without providing a hash value to the TOE, e.g. if the hash value needs to be handed over to the TOE as a parameter in a command line message and the syntax check of the command prevents the execution of the command without providing a hash value. In that case the mechanism that prevents the execution of this check shall be tested accordingly, e.g. that the syntax check rejects the command without providing a hash value, and the rejection of the attempt is regarded as sufficient verification of the correct behaviour of the TOE in failing to verify the hash. The evaluator then attempts to install the update on the TOE (in spite of the unsuccessful hash verification) and confirms that this fails. Depending on the implementation of the TOE, the TOE might not allow to even attempt updating the TOE after the verification of the hash value fails. In that case the verification that the hash comparison fails is regarded as sufficient verification of the correct behaviour of the TOE.



3) If the TOE allows delayed activation of updates, the TOE must be able to display both the currently executing version and most recently installed version. The handling of version information of the most recently installed version might differ between different TOEs. Depending on the point in time when the attempted update is rejected, the most recently installed version might or might not be updated. The evaluator shall verify that the TOE handles the most recently installed version information for that case as described in the guidance documentation. After the TOE has rejected the update the evaluator shall verify, that both, current version and most recently installed version, reflect the same version information as prior to the update attempt.

If the verification of the hash value over the update file(s) against the published hash is not performed by the TOE, Test 3 shall be skipped.

The evaluator shall perform Test 1, Test 2 and Test 3 (if applicable) for all methods supported (manual updates, automatic checking for updates, automatic updates).

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall perform Test 1, Test 2 and Test 3 (if applicable) for all TOE components.

Test 1: Prior to performing an update, the evaluator verified the TOE version using TOE commands. The evaluator then followed guidance to install a valid update to the TOE. Upon successful installation, the evaluator verified the TOE version once again and confirmed that the version after the successful update was changed as expected.

Test 2: Not applicable. Digital signature is not claimed.

Test 3: Not applicable. The TOE relies on the administrator to verify the hash of the update outside the TOE. The expected hash of the update is provided by the vendor.

2.6 TOE ACCESS (FTA)

2.6.1 TSF-INITIATED TERMINATION (NDcPP22E:FTA_SSL.3)

2.6.1.1 NDcPP22E:FTA_SSL.3.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it details the administrative remote session termination and the related inactivity time period.

Section 6.1 (FTA_SSL.3) of the ST states that an Authorized Administrator can configure maximum inactivity times individually for both local and remote administrative sessions through the use of the “exec-timeout” setting applied to the console and virtual terminal (vty) lines. The configuration of the vty lines sets the configuration for the remote console access.



If a remote user session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be terminated and will require re-identification and authentication to establish a new session.

The allowable inactivity timeout range is from <0-35791> minutes. A session (local or remote) that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing from the local or remote client) for the defined timeout value will be terminated.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation includes instructions for configuring the inactivity time period for remote administrative session termination.

Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the inactivity time period for remote administrative session termination.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: For each method of remote administration, the evaluator shall perform the following test:

a) Test 1: The evaluator follows the guidance documentation to configure several different values for the inactivity time period referenced in the component. For each period configured, the evaluator establishes a remote interactive session with the TOE. The evaluator then observes that the session is terminated after the configured time period.

The evaluator performed a test that demonstrates operation of inactivity timeouts over SSH with timeout values of 1 minute, 3 minutes and 5 minutes. For each time period, the evaluator recorded the time immediately prior to login, logged in, and performed no further actions. When the TOE terminated the SSH session for inactivity the evaluator recorded the time again. The period of time observed matched the configured timeout values.

2.6.2 USER-INITIATED TERMINATION (NDcPP22E:FTA_SSL.4)

2.6.2.1 NDcPP22E:FTA_SSL.4.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it details how the local and remote administrative sessions are terminated.

Section 6.1 (FTA_SSL.4) of the ST states that an Authorized Administrator is able to exit out of both local and remote administrative sessions by issuing the ‘exit’ or ‘logout’ command.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation states how to terminate a local or remote interactive session.



Throughout the **Admin Guide** there are numerous examples of the administrator using the ‘exit’ command to exit out of both local and remote administrative sessions. Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** further instructs the administrator to logout of the local console by entering “exit” or “logout”.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: For each method of remote administration, the evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- a) Test 1: The evaluator initiates an interactive local session with the TOE. The evaluator then follows the guidance documentation to exit or log off the session and observes that the session has been terminated.
- b) Test 2: The evaluator initiates an interactive remote session with the TOE. The evaluator then follows the guidance documentation to exit or log off the session and observes that the session has been terminated.

Test 1: This test was performed as part of NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1 where the evaluator performed a logout for the interactive console session by typing “exit” after a successful authentication attempt.

Test 2: This test was performed as part of NDcPP22e:FIA_UIA_EXT.1 where the evaluator performed a logout for the remote interactive session by typing “exit” after a successful authentication attempt.

2.6.3 TSF-INITIATED SESSION LOCKING (NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1)

2.6.3.1 NDcPP22e:FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it details whether local administrative session locking or termination is supported and the related inactivity time period settings.

Section 6.1 (FTA_SSL_EXT.1) of the ST states that an Authorized Administrator can configure maximum inactivity times individually for both local and remote administrative sessions through the use of the “exec-timeout” setting applied to the console and virtual terminal (vty) lines.

The line console settings are not immediately activated for the current session. The current line console session must be exited. When the user logs back in, the inactivity timer will be activated for the new session. If a local user session is inactive for a configured period of time, the session will be terminated and will require re-identification and authentication to login.

The allowable inactivity timeout range is from <0-35791> minutes. A session (local or remote) that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing from the local or remote client) for the defined timeout value will be terminated.



Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation states whether local administrative session locking or termination is supported and instructions for configuring the inactivity time period.

Section “Session Termination” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring local admin session termination after a specified time period of inactivity by using the exec-timeout command applied to the console lines.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test:

a) Test 1: The evaluator follows the guidance documentation to configure several different values for the inactivity time period referenced in the component. For each period configured, the evaluator establishes a local interactive session with the TOE. The evaluator then observes that the session is either locked or terminated after the configured time period. If locking was selected from the component, the evaluator then ensures that reauthentication is needed when trying to unlock the session.

Test 1: The evaluator performed a test that demonstrates operation of inactivity timeouts on the local console with timeout values of 1 minute, 3 minutes and 5 minutes. For each time period, the evaluator recorded the time immediately prior to login, logged in, and performed no further actions. When the TOE terminated the local console session for inactivity the evaluator recorded the time again. The period of time observed matched the configured timeout values.

2.6.4 DEFAULT TOE ACCESS BANNERS (NDCPP22E:FTA_TAB.1)

2.6.4.1 NDCPP22E:FTA_TAB.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it details each administrative method of access (local and remote) available to the Security Administrator (e.g., serial port, SSH, HTTPS). The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that all administrative methods of access available to the Security Administrator are listed and that the TSS states that the TOE is displaying an advisory notice and a consent warning message for each administrative method of access. The advisory notice and the consent warning message might be different for different administrative methods of access, and might be configured during initial configuration (e.g. via configuration file).

Section 6.1 (FTA_TAB.1) of the ST states that Authorized administrators define a custom login banner that will be displayed at the CLI for both local and remote access configurations prior to allowing Authorized Administrator access through those interfaces.



A local console includes any IT Environment Console that is directly connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration. Whereas a remote console is one that includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a SSH client installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration through SSH protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the guidance documentation to ensure that it describes how to configure the banner message.

Section “Access Banner” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the banner message.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following test:

a) Test 1: The evaluator follows the guidance documentation to configure a notice and consent warning message. The evaluator shall then, for each method of access specified in the TSS, establish a session with the TOE. The evaluator shall verify that the notice and consent warning message is displayed in each instance.

The evaluator configured a banner and verified that the banner was displayed appropriately for console and SSH CLI logins.

2.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS (FTP)

2.7.1 INTER-TSF TRUSTED CHANNEL (NDcPP22E:FTP_ITC. 1)

2.7.1.1 NDcPP22E:FTP_ITC.1.1

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.7.1.2 NDcPP22E:FTP_ITC.1.2

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.7.1.3 NDcPP22E:FTP_ITC.1.3

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined



Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that, for all communications with authorized IT entities identified in the requirement, each secure communication mechanism is identified in terms of the allowed protocols for that IT entity, whether the TOE acts as a server or a client, and the method of assured identification of the non-TSF endpoint. The evaluator shall also confirm that all secure communication mechanisms are described in sufficient detail to allow the evaluator to match them to the cryptographic protocol Security Functional Requirements listed in the ST.

Section 6.1 (FTP_ITC.1) of the ST states the TOE protects communications with a remote audit server using IPsec.

The TOE protects communications with the syslog server using keyed hash as defined in FCS_COP.1.1/keyedhash and cryptographic hashing functions FCS_COP.1.1/hash. This protects the data from modification by hashing that verifies that data has not been modified in transit. In addition, encryption of the data as defined in FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption is provided to ensure the data is not disclosed in transit. The TSF allows the TOE, or the syslog server to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

Section 6.1 (FCS_CKM.2) in the ST states that the TOE acts as a receiver for SSH communications (remote administration) and as both a sender and receiver for TLS communications (transmit generated audit records to an external IT entity (syslog server).

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation contains instructions for establishing the allowed protocols with each authorized IT entity, and that it contains recovery instructions should a connection be unintentionally broken.

The following sections in the **Admin Guide** provide instructions on configuring the TOE to use TLS to securely transmit generated audit data to an external syslog server: “TLS – Syslog”, “Create and Configure a Certificate Map”, “Create, Configure, and Authenticate the Root Trustpoint”, “Create, Configure, and Authenticate the Intermediate Trustpoint”, “Configure a TLS Profile” and “Enable Remote Syslog Server”. These instructions include configuring a root trustpoint, enabling a remote syslog server, creating a TLS profile for syslog, configuring TLSv1.2 and configuring the TLS ciphersuites supported by the TOE. The instructions conform to the description in the TSS.

Section “TLS Syslog Server Interruption and Recovery” in the **Admin Guide** states that if the TLS connection to the Syslog Server is unexpectedly interrupted, the TLS client connection will be broken. When the connection is broken no administrative interaction is required. The TLS session will be reestablished once communication to the Syslog Server is available again.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The developer shall provide to the evaluator application layer configuration settings for all secure communication mechanisms specified by the FTP_ITC.1 requirement. This information should be sufficiently detailed to allow the evaluator to determine the application layer timeout settings for each cryptographic protocol. There is no expectation that this information must be recorded in any public-facing document or report.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:



- a) Test 1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each protocol with each authorized IT entity is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the guidance documentation and ensuring that communication is successful.
- b) Test 2: For each protocol that the TOE can initiate as defined in the requirement, the evaluator shall follow the guidance documentation to ensure that in fact the communication channel can be initiated from the TOE.
- c) Test 3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with an authorized IT entity, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.
- d) Test 4: Objective: The objective of this test is to ensure that the TOE reacts appropriately to any connection outage or interruption of the route to the external IT entities.

The evaluator shall, for each instance where the TOE acts as a client utilizing a secure communication mechanism with a distinct IT entity, physically interrupt the connection of that IT entity for the following durations: i) a duration that exceeds the TOE's application layer timeout setting, ii) a duration shorter than the application layer timeout but of sufficient length to interrupt the network link layer.

The evaluator shall ensure that, when the physical connectivity is restored, communications are appropriately protected and no TSF data is sent in plaintext.

In the case where the TOE is able to detect when the cable is removed from the device, another physical network device (e.g. a core switch) shall be used to interrupt the connection between the TOE and the distinct IT entity. The interruption shall not be performed at the virtual node (e.g. virtual switch) and must be physical in nature.

Further assurance activities are associated with the specific protocols.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall perform tests on all TOE components according to the mapping of external secure channels to TOE components in the Security Target.

The developer shall provide to the evaluator application layer configuration settings for all secure communication mechanisms specified by the FTP_ITC.1 requirement. This information should be sufficiently detailed to allow the evaluator to determine the application layer timeout settings for each cryptographic protocol. There is no expectation that this information must be recorded in any public-facing document or report.

Test 1-3: The evaluator followed the guidance documentation to configure a secure TLS connection between the TOE and an external test server that served as the syslog server. The evaluator observed and confirmed via the packet captures that the TOE initiated the connection to the syslog server in order to transmit audit records. The evaluator also observed that the channel data was encrypted and no channel data was sent in plaintext.

Test 4: The evaluator started a packet capture and established a TLS connection between the TOE and the external test server. The evaluator then initiated the physical interruption of the connection for roughly 2 minutes and then restored the connection. The packet capture shows no traffic between the TOE and external server during the disruption. Upon reconnection the TOE renegotiated the TLS session to continue sending traffic. The evaluator repeated this disruption test for a period of roughly 15 minutes. The evaluator observed that there was no traffic between the TOE and the external server during the disruption. Upon reconnection, the evaluator observed that



the TOE initiated a new TLS session between the TOE and the test server. The evaluator also observed audit records appearing on the syslog server after the connection was repaired in each case.

2.7.2 TRUSTED PATH (NDCPP22E:FTP_TRP.1/ADMIN)

2.7.2.1 NDCPP22E:FTP_TRP.1.1/ADMIN

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.7.2.2 NDCPP22E:FTP_TRP.1.2/ADMIN

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

2.7.2.3 NDCPP22E:FTP_TRP.1.3/ADMIN

TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined

Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined

Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined

Component TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote TOE administration are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of TOE administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.

Section 6.1 (FTP_TRP.1/Admin) of the ST states that all remote administrative communications take place over a secure encrypted SSHv2 session. The SSHv2 session is encrypted using AES encryption. The remote users (Authorized Administrators) are able to initiate SSHv2 communications with the TOE.

Component Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation contains instructions for establishing the remote administrative sessions for each supported method.

Section “SSH Remote Administration Protocol” in the **Admin Guide** provides instructions for establishing the remote administrative sessions using SSH.

Component Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following tests:



a) Test 1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the guidance documentation) remote administration method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the guidance documentation and ensuring that communication is successful.

b) Test 2: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.

Further assurance activities are associated with the specific protocols.

For distributed TOEs the evaluator shall perform tests on all TOE components according to the mapping of trusted paths to TOE components in the Security Target.

Test 1 and Test 2: Remote SSH administration was tested throughout the course of the evaluation. The successful testing of the SSH channel and demonstration of its encryption was performed in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.



3. PROTECTION PROFILE SAR ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES

The following sections address assurance activities specifically defined in the claimed Protection Profile that correspond with Security Assurance Requirements.

3.1 DEVELOPMENT (ADV)

3.1.1 BASIC FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION (ADV_FSP.1)

Assurance Activities: The EAs for this assurance component focus on understanding the interfaces (e.g., application programming interfaces, command line interfaces, graphical user interfaces, network interfaces) described in the AGD documentation, and possibly identified in the TOE Summary Specification (TSS) in response to the SFRs. Specific evaluator actions to be performed against this documentation are identified (where relevant) for each SFR in Section 2, and in EAs for AGD, ATE and AVA SARs in other parts of Section 5.

The EAs presented in this section address the CEM work units ADV_FSP.1-1, ADV_FSP.1-2, ADV_FSP.1-3, and ADV_FSP.1-5.

The EAs are reworded for clarity and interpret the CEM work units such that they will result in more objective and repeatable actions by the evaluator. The EAs in this SD are intended to ensure the evaluators are consistently performing equivalent actions.

The documents to be examined for this assurance component in an evaluation are therefore the Security Target, AGD documentation, and any required supplementary information required by the cPP: no additional 'functional specification' documentation is necessary to satisfy the EAs. The interfaces that need to be evaluated are also identified by reference to the EAs listed for each SFR, and are expected to be identified in the context of the Security Target, AGD documentation, and any required supplementary information defined in the cPP rather than as a separate list specifically for the purposes of CC evaluation. The direct identification of documentation requirements and their assessment as part of the EAs for each SFR also means that the tracing required in ADV_FSP.1.2D (work units ADV_FSP.1-4, ADV_FSP.1-6 and ADV_FSP.1-7) is treated as implicit and no separate mapping information is required for this element.

The evaluator shall examine the interface documentation to ensure it describes the purpose and method of use for each TSFI that is identified as being security relevant.

In this context, TSFI are deemed security relevant if they are used by the administrator to configure the TOE, or to perform other administrative functions (e.g. audit review or performing updates). Additionally, those interfaces that are identified in the ST, or guidance documentation, as adhering to the security policies (as presented in the SFRs), are also considered security relevant. The intent is that these interfaces will be adequately tested, and having an understanding of how these interfaces are used in the TOE is necessary to ensure proper test coverage is applied.

The set of TSFI that are provided as evaluation evidence are contained in the Administrative Guidance and User Guidance.



The evaluator shall check the interface documentation to ensure it identifies and describes the parameters for each TSFI that is identified as being security relevant.

The evaluator shall examine the interface documentation to develop a mapping of the interfaces to SFRs.

The evaluator uses the provided documentation and first identifies, and then examines a representative set of interfaces to perform the EAs presented in Section 2, including the EAs associated with testing of the interfaces.

It should be noted that there may be some SFRs that do not have an interface that is explicitly 'mapped' to invoke the desired functionality. For example, generating a random bit string, destroying a cryptographic key that is no longer needed, or the TSF failing to a secure state, are capabilities that may be specified in SFRs, but are not invoked by an interface.

However, if the evaluator is unable to perform some other required EA because there is insufficient design and interface information, then the evaluator is entitled to conclude that an adequate functional specification has not been provided, and hence that the verdict for the ADV_FSP.1 assurance component is a 'fail'.

For this cPP, the Evaluation Activities for this family focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional 'functional specification' documentation is necessary to satisfy the Evaluation Activities specified in the SD.

3.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS (AGD)

3.2.1 OPERATIONAL USER GUIDANCE (AGD_OPE.1)

Assurance Activities: The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with the AGD_OPE.1 SAR. Specific requirements and EAs on the guidance documentation are identified (where relevant) in the individual EAs for each SFR.

In addition, the evaluator performs the EAs specified below.

The evaluator shall ensure the Operational guidance documentation is distributed to administrators and users (as appropriate) as part of the TOE, so that there is a reasonable guarantee that administrators and users are aware of the existence and role of the documentation in establishing and maintaining the evaluated configuration.

The evaluator shall ensure that the Operational guidance is provided for every Operational Environment that the product supports as claimed in the Security Target and shall adequately address all platforms claimed for the TOE in the Security Target.

The evaluator shall ensure that the Operational guidance contains instructions for configuring any cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the TOE. It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the TOE.

The evaluator shall ensure the Operational guidance makes it clear to an administrator which security functionality and interfaces have been assessed and tested by the EAs.



In addition, the evaluator shall ensure that the following requirements are also met.

- a) The guidance documentation shall contain instructions for configuring any cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the TOE. It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the TOE.
- b) The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the TOE for each method selected for FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 in the Security Target. The evaluator shall verify that this process includes the following steps (per TD0536):
 - 5) Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the TOE (e.g., placement in a specific directory).
 - 6) Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes instructions that describe at least one method of validating the hash/digital signature.
- c) The TOE will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this cPP. The guidance documentation shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the Evaluation Activities.

The **Admin Guide** provides instructions for configuring the allowed cryptographic algorithms and parameters as claimed in the Security Target. This ensures that the TOE is configured into its evaluated configuration. The **Admin Guide** also defines which functions are allowed and which are not allowed in the evaluated configuration. Section “Excluded Functionality” makes it clear which functions are excluded and specifies that no other cryptographic engine, other than the IC2M Rel5a and the CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a have been evaluated or tested. Section “Disable Unused Protocols” provides instructions for disabling protocols that are not included in the evaluated configuration. All sections in the **Admin Guide** which describe configuring TOE security functions include only those settings that should be enabled and can be used in the evaluated configuration.

The process for updating the TOE is described above in NDcPP22e:FPT_TUD_EXT.1 where the guidance assurance activities identify sections of the **Admin Guide** that describe how the updates can be obtained and made accessible to the TOE, as well as how to verify the hash on the image before it is installed. The image should only be installed if the hash values match.

3.2.2 PREPARATIVE PROCEDURES (AGD_PRE.1)

Assurance Activities: As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the Evaluation Activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

It is noted that specific requirements for Preparative Procedures are defined in [SD] for distributed TOEs as part of the Evaluation Activities for FCO_CPC_EXT.1 and FTP_TRP.1(2)/Join.

The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with the AGD_PRE.1 SAR. Specific requirements and EAs on the preparative documentation are identified (and where relevant are captured in the Guidance Documentation portions of the EAs) in the individual EAs for each SFR.



Preparative procedures are distributed to administrators and users (as appropriate) as part of the TOE, so that there is a reasonable guarantee that administrators and users are aware of the existence and role of the documentation in establishing and maintaining the evaluated configuration.

In addition, the evaluator performs the EAs specified below.

The evaluator shall examine the Preparative procedures to ensure they include a description of how the administrator verifies that the operational environment can fulfil its role to support the security functionality (including the requirements of the Security Objectives for the Operational Environment specified in the Security Target).

The documentation should be in an informal style and should be written with sufficient detail and explanation that they can be understood and used by the target audience (which will typically include IT staff who have general IT experience but not necessarily experience with the TOE product itself).

The evaluator shall examine the Preparative procedures to ensure they are provided for every Operational Environment that the product supports as claimed in the Security Target and shall adequately address all platforms claimed for the TOE in the Security Target.

The evaluator shall examine the preparative procedures to ensure they include instructions to successfully install the TSF in each Operational Environment.

The evaluator shall examine the preparative procedures to ensure they include instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment.

In addition, the evaluator shall ensure that the following requirements are also met.

The preparative procedures must

- a) include instructions to provide a protected administrative capability; and
- b) identify TOE passwords that have default values associated with them and instructions shall be provided for how these can be changed.

The evaluation team had the following documents to use when configuring the TOE:

- Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3100 (IE3100) Rugged Series Switches IOS-XE 17.12 CC Configuration Guide, Version 0.4, August 12, 2024 (**Admin Guide**)

In some instances, the document referenced general Cisco manuals which the evaluator could find on the Cisco web site. The completeness of the documentation is addressed by their use in the AA's carried out in the evaluation.



3.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT (ALC)

3.3.1 LABELLING OF THE TOE (ALC_CMC.1)

Assurance Activities: This component is targeted at identifying the TOE such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user. A label could consist of a 'hard label' (e.g., stamped into the metal, paper label) or a 'soft label' (e.g., electronically presented when queried).

The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC_CMC.1.

When evaluating that the TOE has been provided and is labelled with a unique reference, the evaluator performs the work units as presented in the CEM.

The evaluator verified that the ST, TOE, and Admin Guide are all labeled with the same hardware versions and software. The information is specific enough to procure the TOE and it includes hardware models and software versions. The evaluator checked the TOE software version and hardware identifiers during testing by examining the actual machines used for testing.

3.3.2 TOE CM COVERAGE (ALC_CMS.1)

Assurance Activities: Given the scope of the TOE and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, the evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC_CMS.1.

When evaluating the developer's coverage of the TOE in their CM system, the evaluator performs the work units as presented in the CEM.

See section 3.3.1 for an explanation of how all CM items are addressed.

3.4 TESTS (ATE)

3.4.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING - CONFORMANCE (ATE_IND.1)

Assurance Activities: Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the guidance documentation (includes 'evaluated configuration' instructions). The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in Section 5.1.7 are being met. The Evaluation Activities in [SD] identify the specific testing activities necessary to verify compliance with the SFRs. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/TOE combinations that are claiming conformance to this cPP.

The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in the SFRs are being met. Additionally, testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS, as well as the dependencies on the Operational guidance documentation is accurate.




The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with the ATE_IND.1 SAR. Specific testing requirements and EAs are captured for each SFR in Sections 2, 3 and 4.

The evaluator should consult Appendix B when determining the appropriate strategy for testing multiple variations or models of the TOE that may be under evaluation.

Note that additional Evaluation Activities relating to evaluator testing in the case of a distributed TOE are defined in section B.4.3.1.

The evaluator created a Detailed Test Report (DTR) to address all aspects of this requirement. The DTR discusses the test configuration, test cases, expected results, and test results. The test configuration consisted of the following TOE platform along with supporting products.



TOE Platform:

- IE3100 model running IOS-XE 17.12

Supporting Software:

The Gossamer Test servers utilized both a windows and Ubuntu environment. The Windows supporting software included the following.

- Windows 10.0
- Wireshark version 3.4.8
- Windows SSH Client – Putty version 0.73 (used to connect to device console and SSH)
- Tftpd64.exe v4.64

The Gossamer Test server with an Ubuntu environment acted as a platform to initiate testing. The test server also acted as a syslog server.

- Openssl version 1.0.2g
- Openssh client version 7.2p2



- Big Packet Putty, Openssh-client version 6.8p1
- Rsyslog version 8.16.0
- Tcpdump version 4.9.3
- Libpcap version 1.7.4
- Nmap version 7.01
- Strongswan v5.3.5

3.5 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (AVA)

3.5.1 VULNERABILITY SURVEY (AVA_VAN.1)

Assurance Activities: While vulnerability analysis is inherently a subjective activity, a minimum level of analysis can be defined and some measure of objectivity and repeatability (or at least comparability) can be imposed on the vulnerability analysis process. In order to achieve such objectivity and repeatability it is important that the evaluator follows a set of well-defined activities, and documents their findings so others can follow their arguments and come to the same conclusions as the evaluator. While this does not guarantee that different evaluation facilities will identify exactly the same type of vulnerabilities or come to exactly the same conclusions, the approach defines the minimum level of analysis and the scope of that analysis, and provides Certification Bodies a measure of assurance that the minimum level of analysis is being performed by the evaluation facilities.

In order to meet these goals some refinement of the AVA_VAN.1 CEM work units is needed. The following table indicates, for each work unit in AVA_VAN.1, whether the CEM work unit is to be performed as written, or if it has been clarified by an Evaluation Activity. If clarification has been provided, a reference to this clarification is provided in the table.

Because of the level of detail required for the evaluation activities, the bulk of the instructions are contained in Appendix A, while an 'outline' of the assurance activity is provided below.

In addition to the activities specified by the CEM in accordance with Table 2, the evaluator shall perform the following activities.

The evaluator shall examine the documentation outlined below provided by the developer to confirm that it contains all required information. This documentation is in addition to the documentation already required to be supplied in response to the EAs listed previously.

The developer shall provide documentation identifying the list of software and hardware components⁷ that compose the TOE. Hardware components should identify at a minimum the processors used by the TOE. Software components include applications, the operating system and other major components that are independently identifiable and reusable (outside the TOE) such as a web server and protocol or cryptographic libraries. This additional documentation is merely a list of the name and version number of the components, and will be used by the evaluators in formulating hypotheses during their analysis.

If the TOE is a distributed TOE then the developer shall provide:



- a) documentation describing the allocation of requirements between distributed TOE components as in [NDcPP, 3.4]
- b) a mapping of the auditable events recorded by each distributed TOE component as in [NDcPP, 6.3.3]
- c) additional information in the Preparative Procedures as identified in the refinement of AGD_PRE.1 in additional information in the Preparative Procedures as identified in 3.5.1.2 and 3.6.1.2.

The evaluator formulates hypotheses in accordance with process defined in Appendix A. The evaluator documents the flaw hypotheses generated for the TOE in the report in accordance with the guidelines in Appendix A.3. The evaluator shall perform vulnerability analysis in accordance with Appendix A.2. The results of the analysis shall be documented in the report according to Appendix A.3.

The vulnerability analysis is in the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities and fuzz testing. None of the public search for vulnerabilities, or the fuzz testing uncovered any residual vulnerability.

The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities in order to ensure there are no publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE from the following sources:

- National Vulnerability Database (<https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search>)
- Vulnerability Notes Database (<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/>)
- Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (<https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities>)
- Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (<http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories>)
- Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine (<http://www.exploitsearch.net>)
- Tenable Network Security (<http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search>)
- Offensive Security Exploit Database (<https://www.exploit-db.com/>)

The search was performed on 08/12/2024 with the following search terms: "SSH", "TLS", "Cisco IOS XE", "IOS-XE 17", "Cisco Catalyst", "IE3100", "Marvell Prestera", "Arm Cortex-A55", "Armv8 Cortex-A55", "IOS Common Cryptographic Module", "IC2M", "IC2M Rel5a", "CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module", "CiscoSSL FOM 7.2a".

3.5.2 ADDITIONAL FLAW HYPOTHESIS (AVA_VAN.1)

Assurance Activities: The following additional tests shall be performed:1.) [Conditional]: If the TOE is a TLS server and supports ciphersuites that use RSA transport (e.g. supporting TLS_RSA_WITH_* ciphers) the following test shall be performed. Where RSA Key Establishment schemes are claimed and especially when PKCS#1 v1.5* padding is used, the evaluators shall test for implementation flaws allowing Bleichenbacher and Klima et al. style attacks, including Bock et al's ROBOT attacks of 2017 in the flaw analysis. Even though Bleichenbacher's original paper is two decades old, Bock et al. found these attacks to still be effective in weakening the security of RSA key establishment in current products. Bleichenbacher and Klima et al. style attacks are complex and may be difficult to detect, but a number of software testing tools have been created to assist in that process. The iTC strongly recommends that at least one of the tools mentioned in Bock et al's ROBOT attacks of 2017 webpage or paper, as effective to detect padding oracle attacks, be used to test TOE communications channels using RSA based Key



Establishment (related sources: <http://archiv.infsec.ethz.ch/education/fs08/secsem/bleichenbacher98.pdf>, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052>, <https://robotattack.org/>). Network Device Equivalency Consideration.

The TOE does not support a TLS server implementation and therefore is not subject to Bleichenbacher attacks.