


**National Information Assurance Partnership  
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme**



**Validation Report**

**Apple iPadOS 16: iPads**

**Report Number:** CCEVS-VR-VID11350-2023

**Dated:** October 10, 2023

**Version:** 1.0

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# 1. Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Apple iPadOS 16: iPads provided by Apple Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) atsec information security corporation in Austin, TX, United States of America, and was completed in October 2023. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by the CCTL, atsec information security corporation. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria (CC) Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Extended and meets the assurance requirements given in:

- PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrollment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0 (CFG\_MDF-BIO-BT-MDMA-VPNC-WLANC\_V1.0)

This PP-Configuration is comprised of the following components:

- Base-PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3 (PP\_MDF\_V3.3)
- PP-Module: collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification – \_for unlocking the device – \_[BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1 (MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1)
- PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0 (MOD\_BT\_V1.0)
- PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0 (MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0)
- PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4 (MOD\_VPNC\_V2.4)
- PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0 (MOD\_WLANC\_V1.0)
- Package
  - Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1 (PKG\_TLS\_V1.1)

The TOE is Apple iPadOS 16: iPads executing on the following platforms:

- iPad (5<sup>th</sup> gen) (A9 processor)

- iPad (6th gen) (A10 Fusion processor)
- iPad (7th gen) (A10 Fusion processor)
- iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen) (A10X Fusion processor)
- iPad Pro 10.5-inch (A10X Fusion processor)
- iPad mini (5th gen) (A12 Bionic processor)
- iPad Air 10.5-inch (3rd gen) (A12 Bionic processor)
- iPad (8th gen) (A12 Bionic processor)
- iPad Pro 11-inch (A12X Bionic processor)
- iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd gen) (A12X Bionic processor)
- iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd gen) (A12Z Bionic processor)
- iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4th gen) (A12Z Bionic processor)
- iPad (9th gen) (A13 Bionic processor)
- iPad Air (4th gen) (A14 Bionic processor)
- iPad (10th gen) (A14 Bionic processor)
- iPad mini (6th gen) (A15 Bionic processor)
- iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd gen) (M1 processor)
- iPad Pro 12.9-inch (5th gen) (M1 processor)
- iPad Air (5th gen) (M1 processor)
- iPad Pro 11-inch (4th gen) (M2 processor)
- iPad Pro 12.9-inch (6th gen) (M2 processor)

The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP-approved CCTL using the “Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5)” (CEM) for conformance to the “Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5)” (CC) and the Assurance Activities (AA) of the aforementioned PP-Configuration, Protection Profile, PP Modules, and Extended Packages. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, reviewed testing activities, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual

work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). The validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.

The atsec information security corporation CCTL evaluation team concluded that the CC requirements specified by:

- PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrollment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0

This PP-Configuration is comprised of the following components:

- Base-PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3 (PP\_MDF\_V3.3)
  - PP-Module: collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification – for unlocking the device – [BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1 (MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1)
  - PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0 (MOD\_BT\_V1.0)
  - PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0 (MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0)
  - PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4 (MOD\_VPNC\_V2.4)
  - PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0 (MOD\_WLANC\_V1.0)
- 
- Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1

have been met.

The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Apple iPadOS 16: iPads Security Target, Version 1.1.

## 2. Identification

The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common

Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.

The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant List.

The following table provides information needed to completely identify the product, including the following.

- The Target of Evaluation (TOE): The fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated
- The ST: Describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product
- The conformance results of the evaluation
- The Protection Profile (PP) to which the product is conformant
- The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation

Item	Identifier
<b>Evaluation Scheme</b>	United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
<b>TOE</b>	Apple iPadOS 16: iPads executing on the following platforms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• iPad (5th gen) (A9 processor)</li> <li>• iPad (6th gen) (A10 Fusion processor)</li> <li>• iPad (7th gen) (A10 Fusion processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen) (A10X Fusion processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 10.5-inch (A10X Fusion processor)</li> <li>• iPad mini (5th gen) (A12 Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad Air 10.5-inch (3rd gen) (A12 Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad (8th gen) (A12 Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 11-inch (A12X Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd gen) (A12X Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd gen) (A12Z Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4th gen) (A12Z Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad (9th gen) (A13 Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad Air (4th gen) (A14 Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad (10th gen) (A14 Bionic processor)</li> </ul>



Item	Identifier
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• iPad mini (6th gen) (A15 Bionic processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd gen) (M1 processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 12.9-inch (5th gen) (M1 processor)</li> <li>• iPad Air (5th gen) (M1 processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 11-inch (4th gen) (M2 processor)</li> <li>• iPad Pro 12.9-inch (6th gen) (M2 processor)</li> </ul>
<b>PP</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrollment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0</li> </ul> <p>This PP-Configuration is comprised of the following components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Base-PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3 (PP_MDF_V3.3)</li> <li>○ PP-Module: collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification – _for unlocking the device – _[BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1 (MOD_CPP_BIO_V1.1)</li> <li>○ PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0 (MOD_BT_V1.0)</li> <li>○ PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0 (MOD_MDM_AGENT_V1.0)</li> <li>○ PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4 (MOD_VPNC_V2.4)</li> <li>○ PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0 (MOD_WLANC_V1.0)</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1</li> </ul>
<b>ST</b>	Apple iPadOS 16: iPads Security Target (ST), Version 1.1, dated 2023-09-26
<b>ETR</b>	Evaluation Technical Report for a Target of Evaluation Apple iPadOS 16: iPads, Version 1.0, dated 2023-09-19
<b>CC Version</b>	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5
<b>Conformance Result</b>	CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
<b>Sponsor</b>	Apple Inc.
<b>Developer</b>	Apple Inc.
<b>CCTL</b>	atsec information security corporation, Austin, TX
<b>CCEVS Validators</b>	Patrick W. Mallett, Jerome F. Myers, Seada Mohammed, VietHung D Le

### 3. Architectural Information

Note that the following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.

The implementation of TOE architecture can be viewed as a set of layers. Lower layers contain fundamental services and technologies. Higher-level layers build upon the lower layers and provide more sophisticated services and technologies.

These individual layers provide the following services.

The **Cocoa Touch layer** contains key frameworks for building apps. These frameworks define the appearance of apps. They also provide the basic app infrastructure and support for key technologies such as multitasking, touch-based input, push notifications, and many high-level system services.

The **Media layer** contains the graphics, audio, and video technologies you use to implement multimedia experiences in apps.

The **Core Services layer** contains fundamental system services for apps. Key among these services are the Core Foundation and Foundation frameworks, which define the basic types that all apps use. This layer also contains individual technologies to support features such as location, iCloud, social media, and networking.

This layer also implements data protection functions that allow apps that work with sensitive user data to take advantage of the built-in encryption available on some devices. When an app designates a specific file as protected, the system stores that file in an encrypted format. While the device is locked, the contents of the file are inaccessible to both the app and to any potential intruders. However, when the device is unlocked by the user, a decryption key is created to allow the app to access the file. Other levels of data protection are also available.

The **Core OS layer** contains the low-level features that most other technologies are built upon. Even if an app does not use these technologies directly, they are most likely being used by other frameworks. And in situations where an app needs to explicitly deal with security or communicating with an external hardware accessory, it does so by using the frameworks in this layer.

Security-related frameworks provided by this layer are as follows.

- the Generic Security Services Framework, providing services as specified in Request for Comment (RFC) 2743 (Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update 1) and RFC 4401 (Pseudo Random Function);
- the Local Authentication Framework;
- the Network Extension Framework, providing support for configuring and controlling VPN tunnels;

- the Security Framework, providing services to manage and store certificates, public and private keys, and trust policies (this framework also provides the Common Crypto library for symmetric encryption and hash-based message authentication codes); and
- the System Framework, providing the kernel environment, drivers, and low-level UNIX interfaces (the kernel manages the virtual memory system, threads, file system, network, and inter-process communication and is therefore responsible for separating apps from each other and controlling the use of low-level resources).

The TOE is managed by an MDM solution that enables an enterprise to control and administer the TOE instances that are enrolled in the MDM solution.

## TOE Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration consists of the following hardware and software, when configured in accordance with the documentation specified in Section 6. The evaluation covers the following Apple iPads running iPadOS 16 operating system as detailed in Table 1.

**Table 11: Devices covered by the evaluation**

Processor	Device Name	Model Number
A9	iPad (5th gen)	A1822
		A1823
A10 Fusion	iPad (6th gen)	A1893
		A1954
	iPad (7th gen)	A2197
		A2198 (Hong Kong)
		A2199
		A2200
A10X Fusion	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen)	A1670
		A1671
		A1821 (China)
	iPad Pro 10.5-inch	A1701
		A1709
		A1852 (China)
A12 Bionic	iPad mini (5th gen)	A2124
		A2125 (China)
		A2126

	iPad Air 10.5-inch (3rd gen)	A2133
		A2123
		A2152
		A2153
		A2154 (China)
	iPad (8th gen)	A2270
		A2428
		A2429
A2430 (China)		
A12X Bionic	iPad Pro 11-inch	A1934 (US/CA)
		A1979 (China)
		A1980
		A2013 (US/CA)
	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd gen)	A1876
		A1895
		A1983 (China)
		A2014 (US/CA)
A12Z Bionic	iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd gen)	A2068
		A2228
		A2230
		A2231 (China)
	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4th gen)	A2069
		A2229
		A2232
		A2233 (China)
A13 Bionic	iPad (9th gen)	A2602
		A2603 (US/CA)
		A2604
		A2605
A14 Bionic	iPad Air (4th gen)	A2072 (Global)
		A2316
		A2324 (US/CA)
		A2325 (China)
	iPad (10th gen)	A2696
		A2757

A15 Bionic	iPad mini (6th gen)	A2567
		A2568 (Global)
		A2569 (China)
M1	iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd gen)	A2301 (US/CA)
		A2377
		A2460 (China)
	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (5th gen)	A2378
		A2379
		A2461
		A2462
	iPad Air (5th gen)	A2588
		A2589
A2591		
M2	iPad Pro 11-inch (4th gen)	A2759
		A2761
	iPad Pro 12.9-inch (6th gen)	A2436
		A2437

### Physical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is a Mobile Device that consists of a hardware platform and its system software. It provides wireless connectivity and includes software for VPN connections to access the protected enterprise network and other Mobile Devices.

The TOE provides secured communication channels between itself and other trusted IT products using IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.11ac-2013 (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 5), IEEE 802.11ax (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 6, Wi-Fi 6E), IEEE 802.1X, EAP-TLS (v1.1, v1.2), TLS (v1.2), IPsec, and Bluetooth (v4.2, v5.0, v5.2, v5.3). Via the established network connection, the TOE can communicate with an MDM server allowing administrative control of the TOE.

### Un-evaluated Functionality

The following functions were not evaluated and are therefore not included in the secure configuration of the Mobile Devices.

- **Two-Factor Authentication**

Two-factor authentication is an extra layer of security for an Apple ID used in the Apple store, iCloud and other Apple services.

- **Bonjour**

Bonjour is Apple’s standards-based, zero configuration network protocol that lets devices find services on a network.
- **VPN Split Tunnel**

VPN split tunnel is not included in the evaluation and must be disabled in the Mobile Device configurations to meet the requirements of this CC evaluation.
- **Siri Interface**

The Siri interface is capable of supporting commands related to configuration settings.
- **Shared iPad for education**

Apple offers the ability to configure the iPad devices for multiple users. This configuration was not included in the evaluation and must not be used in the mobile device configurations that meet the requirements of this CC evaluation.
- **Third-party MDM Agents**

Third-party applications are available that provide functionality as a Mobile Device MDM Agent. No third-party MDM Agent applications were included in the evaluation and are outside the scope of the evaluated configuration.
- **VPN Protocols and Authentication Methods**

The following Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocols are not included in the evaluation and must be disabled in the Mobile Device configurations that meet the requirements of this CC evaluation.

  - Cisco IPsec
  - Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) over IPsec
  - Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPN
  - Shared secret authentication
- **Face ID with a Mask**

Face unlock with a face mask was not included in the evaluation. The Face ID with a Mask setting must be disabled in the evaluated configuration.

## 4. Security Policy

This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE including the following.

1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection

4. Identification and authentication
5. Security Management
6. Protection of the TSF (TOE Security Functionality)
7. TOE access
8. Trusted Path/Channels
9. Objective Requirements

## Security Audit

The TOE provides the ability for responses to be sent from the MDM Device Agent to the MDM Server. These responses are configurable by the organization as per the Over-the-Air Profile Delivery and Configuration document.

## Cryptographic Support

The TOE provides cryptographic services for the encryption of data at rest, secure communication channels, and for use by applications. In addition, the TOE implements several cryptographic protocols that can be used to establish a trusted channel to other IT entities.

The TOE provides cryptographic services via the following cryptographic modules.

- Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, User, Software, SL1]
- Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Kernel, Software, SL1]
- Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]

The **Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, User, Software, SL1]** is a dynamically loadable library that resides within the TOE OS user space. The library is loaded into an app running in user space to provide cryptographic functions.

The functions listed below are used to implement the security protocols supported and the encryption of data at rest:

- Random number generation
- Data encryption and decryption
- Signature generation/verification
- Message digest
- Message authentication
- Key derivation (PBKDF2)
- Key generation
- Key wrapping

The **Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Kernel, Software, SL1]** is a TOE OS kernel extension (KEXT) optimized for library use within the TOE OS kernel. Once the module is loaded into the kernel, its cryptographic functions are made available to TOE OS Kernel services only.

The functions listed below are used to implement the security protocols supported as well as for the encryption of data at rest.

- Random number generation
- Data encryption/decryption
- Signature generation/verification
- Message digest
- Message authentication
- Key generation
- Key wrapping

The **Apple corecrypto Module v13.0 [Apple ARM, Secure Key Store, Hardware, SL2]** is a single-chip standalone hardware cryptographic module (System on a Chip (SoC)/System-in-Package (SiP)) running on a multi-chip device and provides services intended to protect data in transit and at rest.

The cryptographic services provided by the module are:

- Random number generation
- Data encryption/decryption
- Message digest
- Message authentication
- Key generation
- Key wrapping

## User Data Protection

User data in files is protected using cryptographic functions, ensuring this data remains protected even if the device gets lost or is stolen. Critical data (like passcodes used by apps or application-defined cryptographic keys) can be stored in the key chain, which provides additional protection. Passcode protection and encryption ensure that data at rest remains protected even in the case of the device being lost or stolen.

The Secure Enclave Processor (SEP), a separate CPU that executes a stand-alone operating system and has separate memory, provides protection for critical security data such as keys.



Data is protected such that only the app that owns the data can access it.

## Identification and Authentication

Except for making/answering calls, emergency calls, accessing Medical ID information, using the cameras (unless their use is generally disallowed), using the flashlight, using the control center, and using the notification center, users need to authenticate using a passcode or a biometric (fingerprint or face). The user is required to use the passcode authentication mechanism under the following conditions.

- Turn on or restart the device
- Press the Home button or swipe up to unlock your device (configurable)
- Update software
- Erase the device
- View or change passcode settings (including biometric enrollment)
- Install iPadOS Configuration Profiles

The passcode can be configured for a minimum length, for dedicated passcode policies, and for a maximum lifetime. When entered, passcodes are obscured and the frequency of entering passcodes is limited as well as the number of consecutive failed attempts of entering the passcode.

The TOE also enters a locked state after a (configurable) time of user inactivity and the user is required to either enter his passcode or use biometric authentication (fingerprint or face) to unlock the TOE.

The TOE's biometric face authentication is known as Face ID and its fingerprint authentication is known as Touch ID. There are also multiple generations of these BAFs.

External entities connecting to the TOE via a secure protocol (e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS), Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), IPsec) can be authenticated using X.509 certificates.

## Security Management

Security functions can be managed either by the user or by an authorized administrator through a Mobile Device Management system. Tables 15, 16, and 17 of the Security Target identify the functions that can be managed and if the management function can be performed by the user, the authorized administrator, or both.

## Protection of the TSF

Some of the functions the TOE implements to protect the TSF and TSF data are as follows:

- Protection of cryptographic keys
- Use of memory protection and processor states to separate applications and protect the TSF from unauthorized access to TSF resources
- Digital signature protection of the TSF image
- Software/firmware integrity self-test upon startup
- Digital signature verification for apps
- Access to defined TSF data and TSF services only when the TOE is unlocked

## **TOE Access**

The TSF provides functions to lock the TOE upon request and after an administrator-configurable time of inactivity.

Access to the TOE via a wireless network is controlled by user/administrator defined policy.

## **Trusted Path/Channels**

The TOE supports the use of the following cryptographic protocols that define a trusted channel between itself and another trusted IT product.

- IEEE 802.11-2012
- IEEE 802.11ac-2013 (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 5)
- IEEE 802.11ax (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 6, Wi-Fi 6E)
- IEEE 802.1X
- EAP-TLS (v1.1, v1.2)
- TLS (v1.2)
- IPsec
- Bluetooth (v4.2, v5.0, v5.2, v5.3)

## **5. Assumptions**

The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the associated PP-Configuration:

- PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrollment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0

This PP-Configuration is comprised of the following components:

- Base-PP: Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3
- PP-Module: collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification – \_for unlocking the device – \_[BIOPP-Module], Version 1.1
- PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0
- PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0
- PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4
- PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0
- Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1

That information has not been reproduced here and the respective documents should be consulted if there is interest in that material. Additionally, the Security Problem Description has been presented in the Security Target.

## Clarification of Scope

The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in ST and the associated PP-Configuration.

Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the device needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation.

Note: As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified in the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIOV1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0, and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1) performed by the evaluation team.

Specific exclusions from this evaluation are described in the subsection Un-evaluated Functionality in Section 3.

## 6. Documentation

The following documentation must be used to configure, administer, and use the product in its evaluated configuration.

Reference	Document Name	Location
[CCGUIDE]	Apple iOS 16: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 16: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide (This document)	<a href="https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11349-agd.pdf">https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11349-agd.pdf</a> <a href="https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11350-agd.pdf">https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11350-agd.pdf</a>

Any additional customer documentation that was not included in the scope of the evaluation, should not be relied upon when configuring or using the products in the evaluated configuration.

## 7. IT Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. The specific test configurations and test tools utilized may be found in Section 2.3.4 of the Assurance Activity Report (AAR).

### Developer Testing

No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.

### Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The ST lists more devices compared to the subset of devices used for testing. The tests were performed on the Mobile Devices listed above, which were selected by choosing one from within each device family. The specific test configurations and test tools utilized may be found in the AAR.

One device family is defined by the hardware that impacts the TSF operation: the CPU. The other hardware, such as form factor, size of non-volatile storage, presence or absence of modem devices such as GSM, CDMA, or LTE do not affect the TSF. All TSF functions are solely implemented in software that uses the process isolation and memory separation capabilities offered by the CPU. The software of the TOE is compiled once to form one set of binaries, which run on all devices and, therefore, on all CPUs equally.

In addition, the security functions specified in the ST are all implemented above the hardware layer. Once a request is processed by the hardware, the security relevant decisions have been already made by the software. The hardware now only needs to enforce the functionality requested by the software. Based on this consideration, the evaluation team used the hardware information provided by the developer, which lists all devices found in the ST and references the CPUs used by those devices. All devices listed in the ST use one of the following CPUs:

- A9
- A10 Fusion
- A10X Fusion
- A12 Bionic
- A12X Bionic
- A12Z Bionic
- A13 Bionic
- A14 Bionic
- A15 Bionic
- M1
- M2

The test system was set up according to a setup strategy that followed the evaluated configuration requirements specified in the guidance, supplemented by configurations required to perform testing.

The basic testing infrastructure was configured as follows. The TOE is connected to a private WLAN network which also hosts a Linux system as well as a macOS server.

The Linux server provides the following support:

- WLAN access point functionality
- Internet access
- network sniffer tools
- a VPN Gateway with the Strongswan IKE daemon and the Linux kernel IPsec support.

The macOS server provides the following support:

- MDM server
- Apple Configurator 2

The Linux system was equipped with the appropriate tools to perform sniffing of the different traffic types and analyzing the traffic, e.g., wireshark, tcpdump, and hcidump.

Apple Configurator 2 was used to create the configuration profiles/policies and deploy the profiles/policies onto the different test systems. An Apple system hosting the Apple Profile Manager software component acted as the MDM server to which the test devices connected.

## 8. Evaluated Configuration

The guidance documentation provides specific instructions for creating Configuration Profiles that configure the TOE to comply with the functions defined in the Security Target. The evaluated configuration included the devices listed below running Apple iPadOS 16 on iPads:

- Apple device with CPU A9: iPad (5th gen)
- Apple device with CPU A10 Fusion: iPad (6th gen), iPad (7th gen)
- Apple device with CPU A10X Fusion: iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen), iPad Pro 10.5-inch
- Apple device with CPU A12 Bionic: iPad mini (5th gen), iPad Air 10.5-inch (3rd gen), iPad (8th gen)
- Apple device with CPU A12X Bionic: iPad Pro 11-inch, iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd gen)
- Apple device with CPU A12Z Bionic: iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd gen), iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4th gen)
- Apple device with CPU A13 Bionic: iPad (9th gen)
- Apple device with CPU A14 Bionic: iPad Air (4th gen) iPad (10th gen)
- Apple device with CPU A15 Bionic: iPad mini (6th gen)
- Apple device with CPU M1: iPad Pro 11-inch (3rd gen), iPad Pro 12.9-inch (5th gen), iPad Air (5th gen)
- Apple device with CPU M2: iPad Pro 11-inch (4th gen), iPad Pro 12.9-inch (6th gen)

## 9. Results of the Evaluation

The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR.

All work units defined by CC Version 3.1 Revision 5 and CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5 and the CFG\_MDF-BIO-BT-MDMA-VPNC-WLANC\_V1.0 (PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, and MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0) and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1 received a pass verdict.

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements as well as assurance activities. The evaluation was conducted based upon CEM Version 3.1 Revision 5. The evaluation determined the TOE to be CC Part 2 extended and Part 3 extended, and to meet the assurance requirements defined by the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1.

## **Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)**

The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit and the assurance activity specified in the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1.

The ST evaluation ensured that the ST contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the Apple iPadOS 16 iPad products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.

The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification were provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1. and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

## **Evaluation of the Development Documentation (ADV)**

The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security Target and guidance documents.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification were provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

## **Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)**

The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit and assurance activity specified in PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. Both the administrator and user guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.

The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification were provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP\_MDF\_V3.3,

MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1 and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

### **Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)**

The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit and assurance activity specified in the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the developer procedures to protect the TOE and the TOE documentation during TOE development and maintenance to reduce the risk of the introduction of TOE exploitable vulnerabilities during TOE development and maintenance. The ALC evaluation also ensured the TOE is identified such that the consumer can identify the evaluated TOE.

The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification were provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1 and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

### **Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)**

The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit and assurance activity specified in the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1. The evaluation team ensured that the TOE performed as described in the design documentation and demonstrated that the TOE enforces the TOE security functional requirements. The evaluation team performed devised an independent set of tests as mandated by the protection profile.

The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification were provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1 and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

### **Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)**

The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit and assurance activity specified in the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1. The vendor provided security updates to the TOE during the evaluation; therefore, while the tested version of the TOE



did contain vulnerabilities, subsequent security updates, in line with the guidance provided in Scheme Policy Letter 15, fixed all known issues. The evaluation team ensured that the currently available version of the TOE does not contain known exploitable flaws or weaknesses in the TOE based upon the evaluation team's vulnerability analysis and the evaluation team's performance of penetration tests.

The evaluators searched for publicly known vulnerabilities applicable to iPadOS using the following sources. The search was performed on multiple occasions on the following dates:

- 2023-06-02
- 2023-06-05
- 2023-07-17
- 2023-07-28
- 2023-08-04
- 2023-08-31
- 2023-09-17

Apple security content disclosure statements for releases of iPadOS 16 related to this evaluation are provided on Apple support website.

In addition, the evaluation team used the following public sources:

- MITRE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) List
- NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

using the following search terms:

- iPadOS iPad
- iPadOS apple
- iPadOS 16.3
- iPadOS core tls
- iPadOS core crypto
- iPadOS common crypto
- iPadOS http
- iPadOS https
- iPadOS tcp
- iPadOS ip
- iPadOS bluetooth
- iPadOS ipsec

- iPadOS vpn
- iPadOS mdm
- iPadOS mobile
- iPadOS touchid
- iPadOS faceid
- broadcom wi-fi

The evaluator's CVE search found no vulnerabilities apart from the ones listed in the developer's security content disclosure statements, all of which have been fixed in subsequent releases of iPadOS.

The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and justification were provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM and the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1 and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.

## Summary of Evaluation Results

The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's performance of the testing defined by the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1 and the penetration test also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.

The validator's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM and the PP\_MDF\_V3.3, MOD\_CPP\_BIO\_V1.1, MOD\_BT\_V1.0, MOD\_MDM\_AGENT\_V1.0, MOD\_VPN\_CLI\_V2.4, MOD\_WLAN\_CLI\_V1.0 and PKG\_TLS\_V1.1 and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.

## 10. Validator Comments/Recommendations

The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the documents listed in section 6. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later, were evaluated. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment, such as the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.

## 11. Annexes

Not applicable.

## 12. Security Target

Apple iPadOS 16: iPads Security Target (ST) Version 1.1, dated 2023-09-26.

## 13. Glossary

The following definitions are used throughout this document.

<b>AA</b>	Assurance Activity
<b>AES</b>	Advanced Encryption Standard
<b>ARM</b>	Advanced RISC Machine
<b>CC</b>	Common Criteria
<b>CCEVS</b>	Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
<b>CDMA</b>	Code Division Multiple Access
<b>CCTL</b>	Common Criteria Testing Laboratory—An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
<b>CEM</b>	Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology
<b>CPU</b>	Central Processing Unit
<b>Conformance</b>	The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
<b>EAP-TLS</b>	Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security
<b>EC</b>	Elliptic Curve
<b>EP</b>	Extended Package (for a Protection Profile)
<b>ETR</b>	Evaluation Technical Report
<b>Evaluation</b>	The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
<b>Evaluation Evidence</b>	Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.

<b>GSM</b>	Global System for Mobile Communication
<b>HKDF</b>	HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function
<b>HMAC</b>	Keyed-hash Message Authentication Code
<b>IETF</b>	Internet Engineering Task Force
<b>IKE</b>	Internet Key Exchange
<b>LTE</b>	Long-Term Evolution
<b>MDM</b>	Mobile Device Management
<b>NIAP</b>	National Information Assurance Partnership
<b>NSA</b>	National Security Agency
<b>NVLAP</b>	National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
<b>PBKDF</b>	Password Based Key Derivation Function
<b>PP</b>	Protection Profile
<b>REK</b>	Root Encryption Key
<b>RFC</b>	Request For Comments
<b>SEP</b>	Secure Enclave Processor
<b>SFR</b>	Security Functional Requirement
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation—A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
<b>TLS</b>	Transport Layer Security
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functionality
<b>Validation</b>	The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
<b>Validation Body</b>	A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
<b>VPN</b>	Virtual Private Network
<b>VR</b>	Validation Report
<b>WLAN</b>	Wireless Local Area Network

## 14. Bibliography

The evaluation team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Biometric enrollment and verification – for unlocking the device, Bluetooth, MDM Agents, Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, and WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 2022-10-11
- Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.3, 2022-09-12
- collaborative PP-Module for Biometric enrolment and verification - for unlocking the device, Version 1.1, 2022-09-12
- PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 2021-04-15
- PP-Module for MDM Agents, Version 1.0, 2019-04-25
- PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.4, 2022-03-31
- PP-Module for WLAN Clients, Version 1.0, 2022-03-31
- Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 2019-03-01
- Apple iOS 16: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 16: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Version 1.0, 2023-09-08
- Apple iOS 16: iPhones Security Target Version 1.1, 2023-09-26
- Apple iOS 16: iPhones Assurance Activity Report, Version 1.1, 2023-10-06