Trellix Intrusion Prevention System 11.1 FIPS and CC Certification Guide




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An overview of Trellix Intrusion Prevention System

Trellix Intrusion Prevention System combines Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Sensor and Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Manager for the accurate detection and prevention of attacks using signature detection, zero-day attacks using anomaly detection, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.

Sensors can be deployed in a variety of topologies such as SPAN or Hub, Tap, In-line fail-closed, and In-line fail-open. Additionally, Sensors support features like interface groups or port clustering where multiple ports on a single Sensor can be grouped together for effective traffic monitoring, particularly useful for asymmetrically routed networks. Trellix IPS also provides high-availability; if one Sensor fails, the standby Sensor automatically takes over and continues to monitor the traffic with no loss of session state or degradation of protection level.

The following are the currently available NS-series Sensor models for IPS/IDS: NS9500(1.10), NS9500(1.00), NS9300(P & S), NS9200, NS9100, NS7600, NS7500, NS7350, NS7250, NS7150, NS5200, NS5100, NS3600, NS3200, and NS3100.

Overview

The information in this document supplements that released in the Trellix Intrusion Prevention System 11.1 user documentation.

This document covers new features and enhancements that are supported in the following versions of Trellix IPS software:

- Manager software version: 11.1.19.x
- Signature set: 11.x.x.x
- NS-series Sensor software version: 11.1.17.x

The Manager in this release can be run using two modes:

- Non-FIPS mode: All Manager features up to 11.1 are supported in the non-FIPS mode.
- FIPS mode: All features supported in this mode are FIPS compliant:
- The Manager and Sensor versions support features that are mandatory requirements for FIPS and Common Criteria certification.
- The new features are certified for FIPS and Common Criteria for Manager Appliance Linux and NS-series Sensors.



Do not use the Manager to set the inactivity option under Account Lockout via GUI. This way of managing account lockouts has not been evaluated for use in the Common Criteria configuration.

Sensor features in FIPS compliant images

The algorithms implemented in the Sensor image are FIPS 140-3 compliant. Make note of the following features when FIPS compliant images are enabled in the Sensor:



NOTE

For a list of Sensor features that do not specifically relate to FIPS mode, refer to [Trellix Intrusion Prevention System 11.1.x Product Guide1.

- The Sensor version supports features that are mandatory requirement for Common Criteria certification.
- This FIPS Sensor image permits loading only SHA-256 signed images. You must netboot the Sensor to load a non-FIPS image signed with a weaker algorithm.
- All critical security parameters (CSPs)/Sensitive security parameters (SSPs) are zeroized, in compliance with FIPS 140-3.
- The following channels operate with algorithms approved by FIPS 140-3:
 - Install channel (8501)
 - · Alert channel (8502)
 - Packet Log channel (8503)
 - Authentication channel (8502)
 - Malware file upload channel (8510)



The SNMPv3 channel between the Manager and Sensor uses AES128 encryption, SHA authentication, and is RFC3414 and RFC3826 compliant. All CSP/SSP information on this channel is additionally encrypted by the Manager using the Sensor 2048-bit RSA public key and can be decrypted only by the Sensor private key.

• Common Criteria compliance requires the use of specific secure protocols. Hence, SNMPv3 is further encapsulated within TLS (TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 256 GCM SHA384). The Sensor will use port 18500 as a TLS server for this service.



If the trust between the Manager and Sensor is established using a self-signed certificate, the Sensor will use port 8500 to service SNMPv3 as a TCP/UDP server. If the trust between the Manager and Sensor is established using a CA-signed certificate, the Sensor will use port 18500 to service SNMPv3 as a TLS server.

- The Sensor supports read-only access to third party SNMPv3 clients. Third party SNMPv3 clients can only be configured at the Manager. The Sensor retains the use of port 8500 for SNMPv3 service to these clients.
- · The Sensor install, alert, packet log, authentication, and malware file upload channels use TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.
- TACACS+ authentication configuration is disabled at the Sensor level.
- Stronger authentication for user login is enforced.
- The Manager version that supports FIPS can manage Sensors that are not FIPS compliant. In the Common Criteria (CC) evaluated configuration, all Sensors must be in FIPS mode.
- · When a Sensor of a fail-over pair is running a FIPS image, it is mandatory for the peer Sensor to also be FIPS compliant.



Before you upgrade, convert the Sensors in the fail-over pair to standalone Sensors. If you do not do this, trust will not be re-established after the upgrade.

- The channels use RSA certificates based on 2048-bit RSA keys.
- Use SCP for file transfers. The use of TFTP is not permitted.

- Cryptographic support is provided by Trellix modified OpenSSL-FIPS-Object-Module v2.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2zh-fips.
- Trellix modified OpenSSH v7.8p1 is configured to support only the following:

SSH Client Configuration:

- Ciphers: aes256-gcm@openssh.com and aes128-gcm@openssh.com
- MACs: Implicit
- · KexAlgorithms: ecdh-sha2-nistp256
- · HostKeyAlgorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256

SSH Server Configuration:

- Ciphers: aes256-gcm@openssh.com and aes128-gcm@openssh.com
- · MACs: Implicit
- · KexAlgorithms: ecdh-sha2-nistp256
- HostKeyAlgorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256

User authentication:

- Password, ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-512 and ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
- SSH in 11.1 FIPS Sensor image is restricted to AES128 and AES256 GCM Mode cipher only. The use of AES CBC or CTR mode is not permitted.
- This requires that an external SSH client or server must support AES128 and AES256 GCM mode ciphers. Some popular
 clients (like PuTTY) may not support them currently. In such scenarios, you must migrate to an alternative SSH client or
 server approved by your local administrator.
- The external SSH client is used to log into a Sensor running 11.1 FIPS image.
- The external SSH server is used to host a remote Sensor image, that you can SCP into the Sensor running a 11.1 FIPS image using the **loadimage** CLI command.

Key destruction (zeroization) mechanism details and exceptions

There are no exceptions to the Sensor and Manager. For more details, refer to the tables **Manager Key zeroisation** and **Sensor Key zeroisation** under the topic [Cryptographic Key Destruction] within the [Trellix IPS Sensor and Manager Appliances version 11.1 Security Target] document.

Protocol features in the certified evaluated configuration

Usage of NTP is not permitted. The system time may be configured by authorized administrators via the "timedatect1" command of the Manager CLI.

The TLS functionality of the Trellix IPS components is pre-configured and fixed with the following behaviors:

- Only TLS v1.2 is supported
- The reference identifier is the IPv4 address or fully qualified domain name of the configured endpoint (matching the type used to configure the endpoint) and may be found in the SAN or CN fields of the presented certificate.
- The management GUI interface on the Manager supports the following cipher suite:
 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

- TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- The management GUI interface on the Manager supports the secp256r1 Elliptic Curve Extension.
- · Between Sensors and the Manager, the cipher suite used to perform mutual authentication are TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. The systems must use CA-signed RSA certificates with key size 2048 bits.
- The syslog server interface on the Manager supports the following cipher suites:
 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- The syslog server interface on the Manager supports the secp256r1 and secp384r1 Elliptic Curve Extensions.
- The TOE uses HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384 for TLS KDF and TLS message authentication.



The Target of Evaluation (TOE) supports session resumption using session ID, which does not require any separate configura-

Device bootup processing

- · The FIPS Sensor boot-up executes all the FIPS compliant algorithms, as part of the pre-operational self-tests, firmware integrity tests, and known answer tests (KAT).
- If a self-test fails, the Sensor enters into error state and reboots continuously. User needs to netboot the Sensor with a valid firmware to come out of the error state. A user can refer to the console log to view which self-test has failed.
- · Similarly, Manager executes power-up self tests and software integrity tests. Failure of self-tests will cause the module to transition to an error state. Logical components will shut-down and no data output will be provided during error states. User needs to install a valid software image to come out of the error state. Users can refer to the console log to view which self-test has failed. Additionally, users can refer to ems.log for more details.
- The Random Number Generation (RNG) functionality does not require any manual configuration and is initialized on startup.

Verification of authenticity of the software images

IPS Sensor and Manager:

The modules perform firmware integrity check using RSA 2048 with SHA2-256. If the integrity check fails, the new image is not accepted and an error message is thrown to the user. Users are expected to re-attempt with a valid image.

Upgrade Paths

This section mentions the various upgrade paths available to the latest FIPS and CC Intrusion Prevention System. It takes into consideration several scenarios to migrate to a FIPS and CC supported version of Trellix IPS 11.1. For a list of upgrade paths not related to FIPS and CC refer to the [Trellix Intrusion Prevention System 11.1.x Installation Guide].

Upgrade paths for Manager software versions

This section shows you different scenarios of deployment from which you can upgrade/migrate to the latest version of the Manager.



You can log in to the Trellix Download Server using your Grant ID to verify the file hash for the software build.

NOTE

When you migrate the Manager to a FIPS image, the installation validates certain files to make sure they have not been tampered with. For example, if you change tms.bat, you can regenerate the FIPS hash by running initdb.bat update.

NOTE

Windows based Manager is not supported for FIPS and CC.

Linux based Manager:

Table 1. Linux based Manager upgrade paths

Manager version	Recommended Manager version
10.1.19.17, 10.1.19.30, 10.1.19.33, 10.1.19.38, 10.1.19.47, 10.1.19.53	11.1.19.x

Upgrade paths for Sensor software versions

This section shows you different scenarios of deployment from which you can upgrade to the latest version of the Sensors.

Table 2. Sensor upgrade paths

Sensor model	Current Sensor software	Upgrade path to latest FIPS and CC compliant Sensor software
	(FIPS and CC)	CC Compilant Sensor Software
NS3100, NS3200, NS3500, NS5100, NS5200, NS7100, NS7200, NS7300,	10.1.17.15, 10.1.17.26, 10.1.17.36, 10.1.17.47, 10.1.17.63, 10.1.17.75	11.1.17.x
NS9100, NS9200, NS9300,		

Sensor model	Current Sensor software	Upgrade path to latest FIPS and
	(FIPS and CC)	CC compliant Sensor software
NS7150, NS7250, NS7350, N9500	10.1.17.15, 10.1.17.26, 10.1.17.36, 10.1.17.50, 10.1.17.63, 10.1.17.75	11.1.17.x
NS7500	10.1.17.15, 10.1.17.36, 10.1.17.47, 10.1.17.63, 10.1.17.75	11.1.17.x

The following applies for FIPS software running on NS-series Sensors:

• The user must synchronize a symmetric key, specified from the CLI using the **set fips sharedkey** command, on both the Primary and Secondary Sensors of an NS9300. The Sensor bootloaders are automatically upgraded to allow verification of subsequent image downloads signed with SHA256.

Configuration of Trellix IPS for Certification



This section is not applicable for Common Criteria evaluated configuration.

This section provides guidelines to set up the product in a manner that meets certification configuration requirements. The guidelines and requirements listed below are in addition to the instructions written in the generic documentation of Trellix IPS. For a complete list of documentation, refer to the appendix.

Note the following:

- If a feature or service is listed below, you must configure the mentioned item as described in this section.
- If a feature or service is not listed below, configure it as written in the reference documentation.

Install the Manager

Follow the directions in the [Manager Appliance (Linux) Installation] section within [Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Manager Appliance Product Guide]. When installing the virtual Manager, follow the directions in the [Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Installation Guidel.



Trellix recommends you to change the Manager shell password immediately. The new password must be compliant with the site's password requirements.



For Manager shell, the default user name is admin and password is MLOSnsmApp.

Install an IPS Sensor with a FIPS mode software image

When installing a Sensor with a FIPS mode image, perform the initial Sensor setup using the serial console interface but do not enter the shared secret key to avoid a FIPS mode violation. Connect and log onto the Sensor using an SSH client, such as Tera Term, and enter the shared secret key. Wait for the Sensor initialization to complete and the trust to be established with the Manager.



∧ CAUTION

Using the serial console interface for configuring shared secret key will cause a FIPS mode violation.

Sensor CLI for Certification

SSH public key based authentication for Sensor

You can use SSH public key authentication or password based authentication to login to the Sensor/remote machine using SSH. Use of public key authentication allows administrators and users to access the Sensor or the remote machine without the use of password based authentication.

Sensor as the SSH server

You can access the Sensor remotely using SSH from a remote machine. The SSH public key from the remote machine has to be configured in the Sensor. Since the Sensor does not permit any key to be exported by the remote client, you must import the key explicitly for every user.

The steps to access Sensor through SSH from a remote machine is as follows:

- 1. Generate the key pair (SSH public and private keys) for a user accessing the Sensor through a remote machine.
- 2. Add the user to the Sensor using adduser CLI command.
- 3. Set SCP server IP address from where the SSH public key is to be imported to the Sensor to login.
- 4. Import your SSH public key to the Sensor using the importsshpublickey CLI command.
- 5. Sensor updates the SSH local repository with the SSH public key.
- 6. When you login to the Sensor using the SSH key, the Sensor authenticates the user with the SSH public key stored in the local repository.



The sensor accepts both RSA and ECDSA public keys for user authentication. DSA is not supported.

Sensor as the SSH client

You can SCP files to a remote machine serving as a SCP server from the Sensor. This requires the Sensor SSH public key to be configured on the remote SCP server for the user. The Sensor exports this key to the remote SCP server if permitted to do so.

The steps to configure Sensor's ssh public key on remote machine are as follows:

- 1. The Sensor generates a public-private key (ECDSA) pair using the SSH utility "ssh-keygen".
- 2. The Sensor retains the private-key and exports the SSH public key to the remote machine using **exportsshpublickey** CLI command.



The exportsshpublickey CLI command exports the Sensor's SSH public key to the configured SCP server.



The exportsshpublickey CLI command exports the Sensor's SSH public key to the remote machine only by password based authentication.

There are two outcomes while executing **exportsshpublickey** CLI command:

• When the public key of the Sensor is directly configured on the remote machine:

```
intruShell@ips-ns9500#> exportsshpublickey <path>
Please enter the SCP User Name : emb-demo
Please enter the SCP User Password :
Public Key configured on the remote machine
```

In this scenario, the Sensor successfully configures the SSH public key on the remote machine.

• When the public key is not configured but just copied on the remote machine:

```
intruShell@ips-ns9500#> exportsshpublickey <path>
Please enter the SCP User Name : emb-demo
Please enter the SCP User Password :
```

Transfer Successful through scp, User need to configure the public key manually on the remote machine.

In this scenario, the Sensor fails to configure the SSH public key on the remote machine, but a copy of it is saved in the file path provided (<path>) in the remote machine. You need to manually configure the SSH public key on the remote machine's authorized_keys file.



If the SSH public key authentication fails, the Sensor will use password based authentication method.



The SSH public key authentication could fail due to incorrect permission of authorized keys; change the mode of authorized_keys file to 600 and try again.

Sensor CLI commands related to Certification

The following CLI commands support the mandated requirements for FIPS and Common Criteria and can be used on a FIPS and Common Criteria compliant Sensor. However, for a list of commands that can be used in other modes of operation and their availability for different roles, refer to the [Trellix Intrusion Prevention System 11.1.x Product Guide].

auditlogupload

This command uploads the audit log file to the configured SCP server.

Syntax:

auditlogupload scp WORD

where word stands for the name of the audit file on the server as per the CLI command.

Note the following:

· For NS-series Sensors, when loading the audit log file to the SCP server, the first attempt will be based on SSH public key authentication. If that fails, the Sensor will use password based authentication.



For NS-series Sensors, even if the public key authentication is not configured on the Sensor, the first login attempt will be using the public key. If the SSH public key is not present, a warning message will be displayed and the Sensor will then use password based authentication.

· When loading an audit log file on the SCP server, you are prompted for the SCP server credentials. The command succeeds only on providing the correct SCP server credentials.



NOTE

If the Sensor's SSH public key authentication is successful, you will not be prompted for the SCP server credentials.

• When loading an audit log file on the SCP server, the pathname of the file should be absolute.

auditlog remove

It removes auditlog file on the Sensor.

Syntax

auditlog remove

deinstall

This command clears the Manager-Sensor trust data (the certificates and the shared key value). Every time you delete a Sensor from the Manager, you must issue this command on the Sensor to clear the established trust relationship before reconfiguring the Sensor.

This command has no parameters.

Syntax:

deinstall

On executing the command, the following messages are displayed if the Sensor has CA-signed certificate:

Do you want to retain the current CA signed certificate chain ?

Enter Y/y(for yes) or N/n(for no): Y



✓ NOTE

If you enter Y, the CA-signed certificate chain for the Sensor is retained. If you enter N, both the current Sensor CA-signed certificate and self-signed certificate will be removed along with the trust.

Pressing Y displays the following message:

deinstall the sensor and remove the trust with the manager ?

Please enter Y to confirm: Y



NOTE

If you enter Y, the Manager-Sensor trust is removed. If you enter N, the Manager-Sensor trust remains intact and you exit the deinstall prompt.

deinstall in progress ...

this will take a couple of seconds, please check status on CLI

On executing the command, the following messages are displayed if the Sensor has self-signed certificate:

deinstall the sensor and remove the trust with the manager ?

Please enter Y to confirm: Y



NOTE

If you enter Y, the Manager-Sensor trust is removed. If you enter N, the Manager-Sensor trust remains intact and you exit the deinstall prompt.

Entering Y displays the following message:

deinstall in progress ...

this will take a couple of seconds, please check status on CLI

loadconfiguration

This command loads the Sensor configuration from the configured SCP server. The SCP server IP is specified in the Sensor. When the Sensor is added to the Manager, the configuration type should be specified as offline.

Syntax:

loadconfiguration scp WORD

where word stands for the name of the configuration file on the SCP server.

Note the following:

- · For NS-series Sensors, when loading Sensor configuration from the SCP server, the first attempt will be based on SSH public key authentication. If that fails, the Sensor uses password authentication.
- · When loading Sensor configuration from the SCP server, you are prompted for the SCP server credentials (username and password). The command succeeds only on providing the correct SCP server credentials.



If SSH public key authentication is successful, you will not be prompted for the SCP server credentials.

• When loading Sensor configuration from the SCP server, the pathname of the file should be absolute.

loadimage

Upon execution, this command loads a Sensor image file from the configured SCP server.

Syntax:

loadimage scp WORD

where word stands for the name of the image file on the SCP server.

Note the following:

- For NS-series Sensors, when loading a Sensor image file from the SCP server, the first attempt will be based on SSH public key authentication. If that fails, the Sensor uses password authentication.
- · When loading a Sensor image file from the SCP server, you are prompted for the SCP server credentials (username and password). The command succeeds only on providing the correct SCP server credentials.



NOTE

If SSH public key authentication is successful, you will not be prompted for the SCP server credentials.

• When loading a Sensor image file from the SCP server, the pathname of the file should be absolute.

resetconfig

This command resets all configuration values to their default values. It deletes or resets values as described below. This command causes an automatic reboot of the Sensor.

Deleted Values	Values Reset to Defaults
 Manager IP addresses (and secondary interface's IP address, if configured). This can be IPv4 or IPv6 address. 	 Monitoring and Response port settings
Certificates establishing trust between Sensor and Manager	Management port settings
Shared secret key	Manager Install port value
Signatures	Manager Alert port value
TFTP server IP address (IPv4 or IPv6 address)	Manager Log port value

- SCP server IP address (IPv4 or IPv6 address)
- · DoS profile files (learned DoS behavior)
- SSL Keys
- Exception Object
- ACL
- Advanced Setting
- SSH Host Public/Private Key (Client/Server)
- SSH Session Key
- Administrator Passwords
- Sensor User Passwords (Users created by admin using "adduser" CLI)
- 3rd Party SNMP Client Privacy and Authentication Keys
- Manager SNMP Client Privacy and Authentication Keys

On executing the command, the following messages are displayed:

Reset other configurations and reboot? Please enter Y to confirm: Y



If you enter Y, the Manager-Sensor trust is removed. If you enter N, the Manager-Sensor trust remains intact and you come out of the deinstall prompt.

Pressing Y displays the following message:

resetting the configuration and rebooting the sensor

On executing the command, the following messages are displayed if the CA signed certificate is present:

CA cert detected, will be deleted on resetconfig

reset the configuration and reboot the sensor? Please enter Y to confirm: Y

Entering **Y** displays the following message:

resetting the configuration and rebooting the sensor

Syntax:

resetconfig

sshlogupload

Use this command to upload the SSH log file to the SCP Server.

Ensure the following before using this command:

• The SCP server IP address must be set using the command set scpserver ip <server_ip>.

The file uploaded on the SCP server is the TAR file containing one or more zipped files:

- Untar the file using the command tar -xvf <filename> to get the individual zipped files.
- Each file must be unzipped using the command gunzip <zipped_file> to view the file.
- For NS-series Sensors, when loading the SSH log file to the SCP server, the first attempt will be based on SSH public key authentication. If that fails, the Sensor will fall back to the password authentication. If SSH public key authentication is successful, you will not be prompted for the SCP server credentials.

Syntax

sshlogupload scp word

A sample SSH log message is displayed below:

Sep 16 09:09:52 localhost kernel: SSHD_DROP:IN=eth0 OUT=
MAC=00:06:92:25:9d:80:00:0b:bf:a1:b7:fc:08:00 SRC=172.16.232.47
DST=172.16.199.89 LEN=48 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=127 ID=4286 DF
PROTO=TCP SPT=2821 DPT=22 WINDOW=65535 RES=0x00 SYN URGP=0



SSH log only contains entries for SSH accept or SSH drop from a particular client IP address.

Log Message Fields	Description
SSHD_DROP	The Log prefix. It can be SSHD_DROP or SSHD_ACCEPT.
IN=eth0	Interface the packet was received from; empty value for locally generated packets
OUT=	Interface the packet was sent to; empty value for locally received packets
MAC=00:06:92:25:9d:80:00:0b:bf:a1:b7:fc:08:00	The MAC field consisting of 14 entities, separated by colons, and this can read as:
	• Dest MAC= 00:06:92:25:9d:80 - The destination MAC address
	• Src MAC=00:0b:bf:a1:b7:fc - The source MAC address
	• Type=08:00 - Ethernet frame carrying an IPv4 datagram
SRC=172.16.232.47	Source IP address
DST=172.16.199.89	Destination IP address
LEN=48	The total length of IP packet in bytes
TOS=0x00	The Type Of Service, "Type" field
PREC=0x00	The Type Of Service, "Precedence" field
TTL=127	The remaining Time To Live is 127 hops.

Log Message Fields	Description
ID=4286	The unique ID for this IP datagram, shared by all fragments if frag-
DF	mented
	Do not Fragment flag
PROTO=TCP	The protocol name
SPT=2821	The source port
DPT=22	The destination port
WINDOW=65535	The number of bits specified on the "Window Scale" TCP option
RES=0x00	The reserved bits
SYN	The synchronize flag which is only exchanged at TCP connection es-
URGP=0	tablishment
	The urgent flag

set auditlog

This command helps in configuring the Sensor to begin or stop archival of audit logs.

Syntax:

set auditlog <enable | disable>

where <enable> allows the audit log feature to record system events and <disable> stops the audit log feature from recording system events

Default Value:

enable

Example:

set auditlog enable

set fips sharedkey

This command is used to authenticate the Primary and the Secondary Sensors in FIPS mode. The Primary and the Secondary Sensors exchange the shared key (user configured keys) for authentication. Any difference in key specifications will result in authentication failure.

The shared key can be created only in FIPS mode.

Syntax:

set fips sharedkey

The shared key must be entered once from the Primary Sensor and once from the Secondary Sensor.

Applicable to:

NS9300 Sensors

set password age

This command allows you to set a limit on password validity period.

Syntax

set password age <days>

Where days can be between 10-99 days.

set password length

This command allows you to set the length of the password.

Syntax

set password length <number of characters>

Where number of characters can be between 15-255.

set sensor sharedsecretkey

Use this command to set the shared secret key value that the Manager and Sensor use to establish trust.

Type the command as shown in the syntax below. The Sensor prompts you for a secret key value. The value you enter is not shown. You will be prompted to type the value a second time to verify that the two entries match.



NOTE

The sharedsecretkey value you enter in the CLI to identify the Sensor must match the shared secret key entered in the Manager GUI. If the shared secret keys between the Manager GUI and Sensor CLI do not match, the Manager and Sensor cannot communicate. If you want to change the shared secret key, you must change the value in the CLI as well as the Manager GUI.

Syntax:

set sensor sharedsecretkey

At the Sensor's prompt for a secret key value, enter a case-sensitive character string between 8 and 25 characters of any ASCII text. The shared secret key value is case-sensitive (for example, IPSkey123.)

Sample Output:

On executing the command, the following messages are displayed:

- · When the Sensor is installed
 - sensor is already installed, please do a deinstall before changing this parameter
- · When Sensor is deinstalled -
 - intruShell@john> set sensor shared secretkey

Please enter shared secret key:

Please Re-enter shared secret key:

This will take a couple of seconds, please check status on CLI



If the Sensor and Manager already have a CA-signed certificate chain, the Sensor will try to establish trust with the Manager using the CA-signed certificate chain. If the CA-signed certificate does not exist in the Manager, the Sensor uses the self-signed certificate chain.

set sshlog

Use this command to enable or disable SSH logging (archiving SSH activity into log files).

Syntax

set sshlog <enable/disable>

It is disabled by default.

show

Upon execution, this command displays all the current configuration settings on the Sensor, such as the model, installed software version, IP address, and Manager details.

This command has no parameters.

Syntax:

show

Information displayed by the **show** command includes the following:

[Sensor Info]

- · System Name
- Date
- · System Uptime
- · System Type
- System serial number (displays the primary, secondary and master/system serial numbers separately in case of NS9300)
- Software Version
- · Hardware Version
- · MGMT Ethernet Port
- MGMT port Link Status

[Sensor Network Config]

- IP Address
- Netmask

- Default Gateway
- · SSH Remote Logins

[Manager Config]

Self Signed cert support

- Install TCP Port
- Alert TCP Port
- Logging TCP Port

CA Signed cert support

- Install TCP Port
- Alert TCP Port
- Logging TCP Port
- · FIPS Mode
- · Admin SSH/Console Access

Sample Output:

```
For Sensor, the output is as shown:
```

```
intruShell@NS3200_FIPS> show
```

[Sensor Info] System Name : NS3200_FIPS

Date : 1/15/2024 - 16:1:3 UTC

System Uptime: 41 days 21 hrs 34 min 46 secs

System Type : IPS-NS3200

System Mode : Standalone

Serial Number: 0123456789

Software Version : 11.1.17.x

Hardware Version: 1.10

MGMT Ethernet port : auto negotiated

MGMT port Link Status : link up

[Sensor Network Config]

IP Address : 10.x.x.x

Netmask: 255.255.255.0

Default Gateway : 10.x.x.x

```
Default SCPserver: 10.x.x.x

SSH Remote Logins: enabled

[Manager Config]

Manager IP addr: 10.x.x.x (primary intf)

Install TCP Port: 8501

Alert TCP Port: 8502

Logging TCP Port: 8503

FIPS Mode: Enabled

Admin SSH/Console Access: Enabled
```

show fips mode status

This command displays the status of the FIPS mode.

Syntax

```
show fips mode status
```

This command displays the following information:

- FIPS mode status Displays the status as enabled
- The admin SSH/console access status

show firmware version

This command shows the current bootloader version information running on the Sensor.

Syntax

```
show firmware version
```

Sample Output

For Sensor, the output is as shown:

```
IntruDbg#> show firmware version

Bootloader Version: GRUB 2.01 - Production

Group 0: 0x32 - 2-SFP+ On-board Controller; FPGA version 01; Working image
Group 1: Module not installed

Group 2: Module not installed

Group 3: 0x32 - 8-1GBE On-board Controller; FPGA version 01; Working image
```

CPLD Device ID: 0x31; Version: 0x01; Revision: 0x01



You can append the all parameter in the command to fetch additional details such as the BIOS version, BMC version, IPMI version, and Linux version.

show ssh config

This command displays the SSH version, client configuration, and sever configuration information.

Syntax:

```
show ssh config
```

```
Sample output:
intruShell@NS7500_FIPS> show ssh config
SSH Version: OpenSSH_7.8p1, OpenSSL 1.0.2zh-fips 30 May 2023
SSH Client Configuration:
Ciphers: aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com
MACs: hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512
KexAlgorithms : ecdh-sha2-nistp256
SSH Server Configuration:
Ciphers: aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com
MACs: hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512
KexAlgorithms: ecdh-sha2-nistp256
PublickeyAuthentication: Enabled
PasswordAuthentication : Enabled
```

status

The status command shows Sensor system status, such as System Health, Manager communication, signature set details, total number of alerts detected, and total number of alerts sent to the Manager.

This command has no parameters.

Syntax:

status

Sample Output:

```
For Sensor, the output is as shown:
intruShell@NS3200_FIPS> status
[Sensor]
System Initialized : yes
System Health Status : good
Layer 2 Status : normal (IDS/IPS)
Installation Status : complete
IPv6 Status : Dont Parse and Allow Inline
Reboot Status: Not Required
Guest Portal Status : up
Hitless Reboot : Available
Last Reboot reason: unknown
[Signature Status]
Present : yes
Version: 11.10.10.5
Power up signature : good
Geo Location database : Present
DAT file : Present
DAT file Version: 3756.0
[Manager Communications]
Trust Established : yes (Self Signed cert support)
Alert Channel: up
Log Channel: up
Authentication Channel: up
Last Error : None
Alerts Sent: 14
Logs Sent: 42
[Alerts Detected]
```

Signature: 0

Alerts Suppressed: 0

Scan: 0

Denial of Service: 0

Malware: 14

[TIS Communication]

Status : down

IP: 0.0.0.0

Port(Secure): 8505

FIPS Mode : Enabled

Admin SSH/Console Access: Enabled



If there is a failure in establishing trust relationship between the Sensor and Manager due to mismatch in shared secret key, the Last Error displays the message Alert Channel - Install Keys Mismatch. In such an instance, check the shared secret key on the Manager and set it on the Sensor using set sensor sharedsecretkey command.

traceupload

This command uploads an encoded diagnostic trace file to the configured SCP server from which you can send it to Trellix Technical Support for diagnosing a problem with the Sensor. A trace upload facility is also available on the Manager GUI.

Syntax:

traceupload scp WORD

where word stands for the file name to which the trace must be written.

For NS-series Sensors, when loading an encoded diagnostic trace file to the SCP server, the first attempt will be based on SSH public key authentication. If that fails, the Sensor will use password authentication. If SSH public key authentication is successful, you will not be prompted for the SCP server credentials.



As part of traceupload, additional information is collected using logstat. Due to this, additional time is required to collect logs from the Sensor, and can take around 10-30 minutes based on the Sensor model.

Manager configuration for Certification

For information about all other Manager user interfaces, refer to the [Trellix Intrusion Prevention System 11.1.x Product Guide].

SSH public key based authentication for Manager Appliance (Linux)

For information about SSH public key based authentication, refer to the [Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Manager Appliance Product Guide].



Manager supports both RSA and ECDSA based public key authentication.

FIPS-related Manager user interfaces

TACACS+ authentication

Go to Devices → <Admin Domain Name> → Devices → <Device Name> → Setup → Remote Access → TACACS+.

When FIPS mode is enabled in the Sensor, configuration for TACACS+ authentication is disabled.

Importing a Sensor's configuration

Go to Devices \rightarrow <Admin Domain Name> \rightarrow Devices \rightarrow <Device Name> \rightarrow Maintenance \rightarrow Import Configuration.

While importing a Sensor configuration file from a non-FIPS-enabled Sensor to a FIPS-enabled Sensor, the configurations that are not supported in the FIPS mode are ignored.

Sensor Failover

Go to Devices → <Admin Domain Name> → Global → Failover Pairs.

When one of the Sensors in a failover pair is FIPS-enabled, it is required that the peer Sensor is also FIPS-enabled.

Sensor Report

Go to Manager \rightarrow <Admin Domain Name> \rightarrow Reporting \rightarrow Configuration Reports \rightarrow **IPS Sensor**.

The Sensor report displays the **FIPS Mode** field with the status of the configuration. The Sensor Information table displays whether the FIPS mode is enabled, disabled, or not supported in the Sensor.

Certificate Expiration Fault

To view the fault information, select Manager \rightarrow <Admin Domain Name> \rightarrow Troubleshooting \rightarrow Logs \rightarrow Faults.

The Manager raises a fault if a certificate has either expired or is approaching expiration. This check is done as part of scheduled file pruning and will not be done during Manager start-up.

View Details

You should update the **ems.properties** file for various settings explained in the sections below. This file is available at /opt/IPSManager/App/config/.

Go to Devices → <Admin Domain Name> → Devices → <Device Name> → Summary.

The details includes a field called **FIPS Mode** that displays FIPS compliance information for an installed Sensor. The **FIPS Mode** field displays whether FIPS is enabled, disabled or not supported in the Sensor.

Logon History

This feature is enabled by setting this property in **ems.properties** file:


iv.access.control.authentication.loginHistoryTimePeriodLastNumberOfDays=30

To view Recent Logon History window, click Login History link in the header bar located on top of the menu bar.

The **Recent Logon History** window displays failed and successful logon attempts for a number of days set in **ems.properties**.

The period of time is set by assigning a value to the loginHistoryTimePeriodLastNumberOfDays property in the ems.properties file. If this property is not defined or set to -1 in the ems.properties file, then the Recent Logon History page will display failed logon attempts.

Figure 1. Logon history



Shutdown on audit failure

This feature is enabled by setting this property in **ems.properties** file:

iv.core.audit.ShutDownOnAuditFailureEnabled=true

The Manager must invoke a system shutdown in the event of an audit failure. If the audit system detects an exception while attempting to audit to database or audit to file, it shuts down the Manager. Note since audit failure forcibly shuts down the Manager, it requires the Manager to be manually restarted. Server logs contain the root cause of audit failure. Also, system fault is listed after the Manager is successfully restarted.

Handling user password between FIPS and non-FIPS Sensor images

The MD5/SHA1 algorithm standards are used by non-FIPS sensor images to verify a user password. FIPS capable Sensor images use the SHA-512 algorithm standard to verify the user password.

FIPS images require passwords to satisfy the following criterion:

- Password length should be of minimum 15 characters.
- Password should at the least contain 2 lower case, 2 upper case letters, 2 numeric, and 2 of the following special characters: !@#\$%^&*()
- New password must differ from the previous password by at least 4 characters.
- Password must not be reused from the last 10 passwords.
- · Password expire in 45 days.

There can be issues during upgrade or downgrade between FIPS and non-FIPS Sensor images as mentioned below:

- The default admin password has not changed: If there is no change in the default password, no conflict arises during upgrade/downgrade.
- The default admin password has changed with FIPS capable image: If there is a change in the FIPS capable image, the password is reset to default. The initial bootup script of the FIPS capable image detects the password format to be of MD5 format and deletes it. The password is then reset to default SHA-512 supported format.
- The default admin password has changed with non-FIPS capable image: Any change to a non-FIPS capable image will result in the password being reset to default. This process of resetting the password is done when the image is downloaded. The newly downloaded image version is compared to a tag, and if the newly downloaded image is non-FIPS capable, the password is deleted. The password is then reset to default MD5 supported format.

Upgrade or downgrade from non-FIPS to FIPS images

On a transition from non-FIPS to FIPS image, you can only login with default admin password. Since this default admin password is not FIPS compliant, you will be prompted to change the default admin password.



If you had previously changed your password in a non-FIPS image, logging into the FIPS Sensor requires the default admin password for a FIPS images. The automatic configuration reset enforces the FIPS default password. The Manager notifies about this reset.

Upgrade or downgrade from FIPS images to non-FIPS

A transition from FIPS to non-FIPS will result in password being reset to default. You can only login using the default passwords for admin of the non FIPS image.

Password requirements for Manager CLI and GUI

The Linux based Manager CLI requires passwords to satisfy the following criterion:

- Password length should be of minimum 15 characters.
- Password should at the least contain 1 lowercase, 1 upper case letter, 1 numeric, and 1 of the following special characters: !@#\$%^&*()
- Must differ from the previous password by at least 4 characters.
- Must not be reused from the last 5 passwords.
- Must not contain same type of character more than four times consecutively.
- · Must not be a palindrome.
- · Must not contain the username.
- Must not be similar to the previous password.
- · Password expires in 60 days.


For Manager GUI password requirements, refer to the section [Add users] in [Trellix Intrusion Prevention System 11.1.x Product Guide].

Trellix Threat Intelligence Exchange (TIE) broker configuration

By default, Threat Intelligence Exchange/Trellix Agent with integrated Trellix Data Exchange Layer broker uses RSA based ciphers. Follow these steps to switch from weak cipher (RSA) to strong cipher (ECDHE):

Windows based setup

- 1. Navigate to <Install_Dir>\McAfee\dxlbroker and open dxlbroker.conf.defaults in a text editor.
- 2. Scroll down to the section where you can edit the ciphers that the broker can be restricted to. Ensure that the broker is restricted only to the cipher ECDHE+arsA+AESGCM: ECDHE+arsA+SHA384: ECDHE+arsA+SHA256. A sample screenshot is shown below:



- 3. Save the text file and close it.
- 4. Restart the TIE server and the ePO service to effectively use this cipher.


Linux based setup

Open dxlbroker.conf.defaults file located in /opt/Mcafee/dxlbroker/conf using a text editor.



You need to open the file as a root user to be able to edit the file and save changes.

2. Scroll down to the section where you can edit the ciphers that the broker can be restricted to. Ensure that the broker is restricted only to the cipher - ECDHE+aRSA+AESGCM: ECDHE+aRSA+SHA384: ECDHE+aRSA+SHA256. A sample screenshot is shown below:



- Save the changes.
- 4. Restart the TIE server and the ePO service to effectively use this cipher.

Product Functionality not Included in the Scope of the Evaluation

The following product functionality is not included in the CC evaluation:

- Trellix Intrusion Prevention System can be configured to maintain accurate time via NTP. NTP must be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
- The Manager can manage Sensors that are not FIPS compliant. All Sensors must be in FIPS mode in the evaluated configuration.
- The Manager can manage Sensors that are using self-signed X.509 certificates. In the evaluated configurations, all Sensors must use CA-signed certificates.
- Trellix IPS can be configured to authenticate users via an LDAP server (rather than relying solely on internal user accounts). This optional functionality was not evaluated.

Security Functions Provided by the TOE

· Security Audit:

The TOE generates audit records related to TOE operation and administration. These audit records are stored on the IPS Manager (and stored in a local database) and are also forwarded to an external audit server. The database stores 50,000 audit records. When the database reaches capacity, the oldest audit records are overwritten.

The Sensor generates audit records and forwards the audit records to the IPS Manager, the Sensor caches audit records in a local file. The audit file can be uploaded to Manager(or any other SCP server using the auditlogupoload CLI command). If the file reaches capacity, new events are dropped.

Only authenticated users can view audit records.

Cryptographic Support:

The TOE uses symmetric key cryptography to secure communication between the Sensors and the Manager for the following functionality:

- Exchange of configuration information (including IPS policies)
- Time/date synchronization from the Manager to Sensors
- · Transfer of IPS data to the Manager
- · Transfer of audit records to the Manager
- Distribution of TOE updates to Sensors

Connections between the Manager and Sensors are secured using TLS.

Connections between the Manager and the Audit Server (for audit record upload) are secured using TLS.

Connections between the Manager and the SCP Server is secured using SSH.

Sessions between the Management Workstation and the TOE are secured using SSH or HTTPS and authenticated using username and password. Local console connections between the Console Workstation and the TOE are physically secured. The Sensors also use SSH to securely copy a new image to update the Sensor.

· Identification and Authentication:

Administrators connecting to the TOE are required to enter an IPS administrator username and password to authenticate the administrative connection prior to access being granted.

The Manager and Sensors authenticate to one another through a shared secret that is configured during the initial installation and setup process of the TOE. Although in the evaluated configuration, the Manager supports use of a default self-signed certificate for trust establishment with the sensor, such a channel is out of scope for this evaluation. The sensor-Manager channel must be established using CA-signed certificates.

· Security Management:

An administrative CLI can be accessed via the Console port or SSH connection, and an administrative GUI can be accessed via HTTPS. These interfaces are used for administration of the TOE, including audit log configuration, upgrade of firmware and signatures, administration of users, configuration of SSH and TLS connections.

Only administrators authenticated to the **admin** role are considered to be authorized administrators.

· Protection of the TSF:

The presence of the Sensors' components on the network is transparent (other than network packets sent as reactions to be configured IPS conditions). The Sensors are protected from the monitored networks as the system is configured to not accept any management requests or input via the monitored interfaces.

The TOE users must authenticate to the TOE before any administrative operations can be performed on the system.

The TOE ensures consistent timestamps are used by synchronizing time information on the Sensors with the Manager, so that all parts of the IPS system share the same relative time information.

Synchronization occurs over a secure communications channel. Time on the Manager may be configured by an administrator.

The administrator can query the currently installed versions of software on the Sensor using the **show** command, which returns details about the software and hardware version. A trusted update of the TOE software can be performed from the Manager UI, which is then pushed out to the Sensors.

A suite of self-tests is performed by the TOE at power on, and conditional self-tests are performed continuously.

· TOE Access:

The TOE monitors local and remote administrative sessions for inactivity and terminates the session when a threshold time is reached. An advisory notice is displayed at the start of each session.

Trusted Path/Channels:

The TSF provides the following trusted communication channels:

- · TLS for an audit server
- TLS for communication between Manager and Sensors
- SSH for communication with an SCP Server for updates

The TOE implements TLS/HTTPS and SSH for protection of communications between itself and the administrators.

Appendix: Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Documentation List

To find Trellix IPS product documentation:

- 1. Go to Trellix Documentation Portal (https://docs.trellix.com).
- 2. Click Intrusion Prevention System from the Network Security tile under the Featured Content section.



You can alternatively scroll down the page and click Intrusion Prevention System from the Products A-Z section.

The **Intrusion Prevention System** documentation landing page appears displaying the list of documents categorized under various tiles.



The documentation category tiles primarily list the latest 11.1 documents. If you plan to access 10.1.10 or older documents, you can click the version specific links provided under the **Older Product Documents** tile.

Table 3. Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Software Documentation

Software Documentation
Certification Guide
Installation Guide
Product Guide
Integration Guide
Manager API Reference Guide

Table 4. Trellix Intrusion Prevention System Hardware Documentation

Guide	Models
Manager Appliance Product Guide	MLOS
NS-series Sensor Product Guide	NS9500, NS9x00, NS7600, NS7500, NS7x50, NS7x00, NS5x00, NS3600, NS3500, and NS3x00
NS-series Reference Guide	1. NS-series Interface Modules
	2. NS-series Transceiver Modules
	3. NS-series Sensors DC Power Supply Installation


Guide	Models
Fail-Open Kit Product Guide	100 Gigabit Modular Active Fail-Open Bypass Kit
	• 10/40 Gigabit Modular Active Fail-Open Bypass Kit
	• 1/10 Gigabit Modular Active Fail-Open Kit
	• 1/10 Gigabit Modular Passive Fail-Open Kit
	• 40 Gigabit Active Fail-Open Bypass Kit

Appendix: Audit Log Records

This section describes the audit log records in relation to a user's activities. The general format of audit records is:

Time, Results, Category, Summary, Details, Domain, UserDate, Admin Domain, User, Attack Category, Action, Result, Description

An example of an audit record displayed in the GUI is:



The following table documents the messages within audit log records generated by Trellix Intrusion Prevention System.

Table 5. Audit Log Records

Action	Log Message
Changes to the system time by an Administrator	Time has been changed
Communication between	Enabling: Successfully added sensor "sensor_name"
the Manager and Sensors	 Disabling: Successfully deleted sensor "sensor_name"
Failure to establish a TLS	Certificate having missing Extended keys
Session	Mismatch between configured Server Name and Subject Alt Name in Imported certificate
	 The connection to syslog server IP_Address:port_number failed. Error: Syslog TCP connection failed.
Failure to establish an HTTPS Session	Mismatch between configured Server Name and Subject Alt Name in Imported certificate
Failure to establish an	Disconnecting: Too many authentication failures [preauth]
SSH session	 Unable to negotiate with IP_Address port port_number: no matching host key type found. Their offer: host_key_type [preauth]
	 Unable to negotiate with IP_Address port port_number: no matching key exchange method found. Their offer: key_exchange_method [preauth]

Action	Log Message
Management activities of	Read audit log
system data	Successfully set Session Timeout
	Logon Banner Configuration updated
	Successfully set Password Content, Configuration is
Trusted connections	• Initiation:
	 Pktlog Channel back up. Clear the Pktlog Channel Down event of sensor sensor
	 Alert Channel back up. Clear the Alert Channel Down event of sensor sensor
	Syslog Client - Added to Retry Q
	Syslog Client - Flushing and Shutting down
	• Request for Authentication for User name= <i>Username</i>
	• Termination:
	 The link on Port: Port_identifier is Down Count: number. The link between this port and the external device to which it is connected is down.
	 Received disconnect from IP_Address port port_number: disconnected by user
	 User "User Name" with login id "Username" logged off Trellix IPS Manager from "Hostname (IP_Address)"
	• Failure:
	Certificate having missing Extended keys
	 Mismatch between configured Server Name and Subject Alt Name in Imported certificate
	Received fatal alert: handshake_failure
	Connection refused (Connection refused)
	 Disconnecting: Too many authentication failures [preauth]
	 Unable to negotiate with IP_Address port port_number: no matching host key type found. Their offer: hostkey_type [preauth]
	 Unable to negotiate with IP_Address port port_number: no matching key exchange method found. Their offer: key_exchange_method [preauth]
Unsuccessful attempt to	Certificate having missing Extended keys
validate an X.509 certificate	Mismatch between configured Server Name and Subject Alt Name in Imported certificate
Unsuccessful login at- tempts limit is met or ex- ceeded	Login failed: Maximum allowable login attempts <i>number</i> have exceeded

Action	Log Message		
Use of the identification and authentication mech-	 Postponed keyboard-interactive/pam for username from IP_Address port port_number ssh2 [preauth] 		
anism	 Postponed publickey for username from IP_Address port port_number ssh2 [preauth] 		
	 Accepted keyboard-interactive/pam for username from IP_Address port port_number ssh2 		
	 error: Could not load host key: path_to_hostkey_file 		
	 Failed keyboard-interactive/pam for username from IP_Address port port_number ssh2 		
	 Failed publickey for username from IP_Address port port_number ssh2: RSA SHA256:pub- lic_key_value 		
	 User "username" failed to log in to Trellix IPS Manager from "Hostname (IP_Address)". Login URI: /intruvert/jsp/module/Login.jsp. URI referrer: https://Hostname//intruvert/jsp/module/Login.jsp, protocol: HTTP/1.2 		
	 Unknown login ID "Username". Login failed from "Hostname (IP_Address)". Login URI: /in-truvert/jsp/module/Login.jsp. URI referrer: https://Hostname//intruvert/jsp/module/Login.jsp, protocol: HTTP/1.2 		
	Starting Session number of user Username		
	Trellix IPS Manager Login failed at timestamp		
User session terminated	Removed session <i>number</i>		
	 User "User Name" with login id "Username" logged out of the Manager from "Hostname (IP_Address)" 		
	 Close session: user Username from IP_Address port port_number id number 		

Table 6. Manager FAU_GEN.1 Audit Records

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs			
FAU_GE	Start-up and	None	Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions			
N.1	shut-down of the audit func- tions		Apr 4 2024 14:07:35 MSMbup sudo: admin :TTH-pts/0: PADA/feer/admin : MSSHerrott : COMPMAD-/tbs/pystemett stop rsyslog Apr 4 2024 14:07:35 MSMbup sudo:apa_multisudo:assion : session enemed for user root by admin(uid-0) Apr 4 2024 14:07:35 MSMbup sudo:apa_multisudo:assion : session closed for user root Apr 4 2024 14:07:48 MSMbup sudo:admin :TTH-pts/0; PADA-fmont/admin :USEP-root :COMPMAD-fus/systemett start rsyslog Apr 4 2024 14:07:48 MSMbup sudo:admin :TUTH-pts/0; PADA-fmont/admin :USEP-root :COMPMAD-fus/systemett start rsyslog Apr 4 2024 14:07:48 MSMbup sudo:apam_unixisudo:assion : session closed for user root by admin(uid-0) Apr 4 2024 14:07:48 MSMbup sudo:apam_unixisudo:assion): session closed for user root by			
	 Auditable events for the not specified level of audit; 		 Auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for Administrators). 			
	and Administra- tive login and logout (name of		Oct 05, 2023 11:56:06 Success User Manager Console Login User Administrator with Jogin of "online" successfully logid risk to the Manager from "10.1.4 (10.1.4.16)". Oct 05, 2023 13:04:17 Success User Manager Console Logout User Administrator "with login id "admin" logged out of the Manager from "10.1.4.16 (10.1.4.16)".			
	user account shall be logged if individual			 Changes to TSF data re d (in addition to the info 	 Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed). 	
	user accounts are required for Administrators).		Feb 21 2024 14:20:08 ISMApp sudo:pam.unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by admin(uid=0) Feb 21 2024 14:20:08 ISMApp sudo:pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root Feb 21 2024 14:20:15 ISMApp sudo: admin : TTY-epts/0 ; PMO=/home/admin ; USEReroot ; COMPAND=/bin/timeda tectt set-time 2024-01:01:01:00:08 Feb 21 2024 14:20:15 ISMApp sudo: admin : TTY-epts/0 ; PMO=/home/admin ; USEReroot ; COMPAND=/bin/timeda Feb 21 2024 14:20:15 ISMApp sudo:pam unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by admin(uid=0) Jan 1 2024 01:00:26 ISMApp sudo:pam unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root Jan 1 2024 01:00:26 ISMApp sahd[1054]:debug3: for do: Admin(uid=0) Jan 1 2024 01:00:26 ISMApp sshd[1054]:debug3: send_rexec_state: entering fd = 8 config len 1138			
	 Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in ad- 		 Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of crypto- graphic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged). 			
	dition to the in- formation that a		Sep 13, 2023 12:45:37 Success Manager Manager Inst Certificate Import establishment) was imported into the Manager for trust establishment) was imported into the Manager Certificate (seed by the Manager Inst Manager Sep 13, 2023 12:36:27 Success Manager Manager SR File Generation A CSR File Generation Sep 13, 2023 12:36:27 Success Manager Manag			
	change occur- red it shall be logged what has			•	 Resetting passwords (name of related us shall be logged). 	 Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
	been changed).		Apr 04, 2024 14:15:51 Success Manager User Account Update Updated account for user "test(ocumnesec)"; the password of the account has been changed. Apr 04, 2024 14:14:19 Success Manager User Account Creation User account created for user "test(acumnesec)".			
	 Generating/ import of, changing, or de- leting of crypto- graphic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged). Resetting pass- 					
	words (name of related user ac-					

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
	count shall be logged).		
FAU_GE N_EXT.1	None	None	-
FAU_GE N.2	None	None	-
FAU_ST G_EXT.1	None	None	-
FCS_CK M.1	None	None	-
FCS_CK M.2	None	None	-
FCS_CK M.4	None	None	-
FCS_CO P.1/ DataEn- cryption	None	None	-
FCS_CO P.1/ SigGen	None	None	-
FCS_CO P.1/ Hash	None	None	-
FCS_CO P.1/ Keyed- Hash	None	None	-
FCS_RB G_EXT.1	None	None	-
FCS_TLS C_EXT.1	Failure to establish a TLS Session	Reason for failure	Aug 29, 2023 07:13:33 Failed Admin Do Syslog connection failed with server. with server. Syslog connection failed Connection failed Connection failed with server. Syslog Audit notification failed for message: Manager Connection failed for message
FCS_TLS S_EXT.1	Failure to establish a TLS Session	Reason for failure	javax.net.sxljSEVERE[01 95 Thread-065:Top Active Botnets, 2023-11-23 11:29:26.749 UTC TransportContext.java:340 Fatal (HA

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Audit Logs
FCS_TLS S_EXT.2	Failure to establish a TLS Session	Reason for failure	Oct 18, 2023 07:07:35 Falled Manager Trust Establishment Trust Establishment Trust PS Manager has falled to established frust with sensor IP 10.1.4.16 using channel CA, Reason SSU Handshake error occured: 1 javax net s.d. SSU Handshake Exception: Unsupported signature algorithm (rsa_nd5) used in CertificateVerify handshake message.
FCO_CP C_EXT.1	 Enabling communications be- 	Identities of the end- points pairs enabled	Enabling communications:
C_LXI.I	tween a pair of components	or disabled	Feb 06, 2024 12:76:36 Success Admin Do SNMP passphrase generation success. Feb 06, 2024 12:76:10 Success Manager Trust Establishment Sensor IP NS:3200 has established trust with Manager over the CA chample, Carllette CV-10.1.3.05, OU-C, O-Acumen, C-US Feb 06, 2024 12:76:05 Success Manager Secure Sensor Sensor IP NS:3200 has stablished a secure Sensor IP NS:3200 has stabled stablished trust with Manager Sensor IP NS:3200 has stabled stablished as secure Sensor IP NS:3200 has stabled stablished a secure Sensor IP NS:3200 has stabled stablished as secure Sensor IP NS:3200 has stabled stablished as secure Sensor IP NS:3200 has stabled stablished as secure Sensor IP NS:3200 has stabled st
	 Disabling com- munications be- tween a pair of components 		Feb 06, 2024 12:26:05 Success Manager Secure Sensor Senso
FIA_AFL.	Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).	Web GUI:
'	or exceeded.	(e.g., ir address).	Oct 05, 2023 11:20:41
			Oct 05, 2023 11:20:23
			Oct 05, 2023 11:20:49
			SSH:
			3 08:00:19 NSMApp sahd[2788]:error: PAM: <u>Authentication failure for admin from 10.1.4.16</u> Aug 24 2023 08:00:19 NSMApp sahd[2788]:debug
			Aug 24 2023 08:00:19 NSMApp sshd[2788]:error: maximum awith- ntication attempts exceeded for admin from 10.1.4.16 port 34238 ssh2 [preauth]Aug 24 2023 08:00:19 NSMApp sshd[2788]:Disconnecting: Too many authentication failures [preauth]
FIA_PM G_EXT.1	None	None	-

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FIA_UIA_ EXT.1	All use of the identi- fication and authenti- cation mechanism	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address)	Console: Oct 4 2023 10:13:42 NSMApp login:pam_unix(login:session): session_opened for user_admin_by_LOGIN(uid=0) Oct 4 2023 10:13:42 NSMApp login:LOGIN_ON_tty1_BY_admin_
			Oct 4 2023 10:11:50 NSMAPp unix chapmd[2703]: <u>password check failed for user (admin)</u> Oct 4 2023 10:11:51 NSMAPp lagrarphs unix[lagrarph]: <u>authorization [siture; lagrames=0.01</u> N wide0 ewide0 <u>ttyetty!</u> ruser= rhost= user=admin oct 4 2023 10:11:52 NSMAPp lagrar <u>philic LOGIN STASION FROM TTYL FOR admin, transission debied</u>
			SSH:
			2023 12:15:04 NSMApp sshd[1801]:pam_unitx(sshd:session): <u>session opened for user admin.</u> by (uide0)Aug 24:2023
			Oct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: sch mas; send: type 7 (t 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: sch mas; send: type 7 (t 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: sch mas; send: type 7 (t 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: mr. request_send untering: type 107 (t 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. schpma; mprty: pm. grayr yetumed -1 [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. schpma; mprty: pm. grayr yetumed -1 [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. schpma; mprty: pm. grayr yetumed -1 [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. schpma; mprty: pm. grayr yetumed -1 [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. schpma; mprty: pm. grayr yetumed -1 [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_send entering: type 110 [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_receive entering [presuth] (ct 4 2023 12:06:06 NBMApp shalf 2009 [cebug3: m. request_re
			Web GUI:
			Oct 05, 2023 11:56:06 Success User Manager Console Login User "Administrator" with Jogin id "admini" successfully logged into the Manager From "10.1.4.16 (10.1.4.16)", Login USE, Thurwart/sp/module/Login.jsp , URI referer : null , protocol : HTTP/1.1.
			Oct 05, 2023 11:53:46 Falled User Manager Console Login "10.1.4.16 (10.1.4.16): Login URI: //mtruvettys/module/Login,jsp , URI referrer : null , protocol : HTTP/1.1.

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FIA_UAU	All use of the identi-	Origin of the attempt	Console:
_EXT.2	fication and authenti- cation mechanism	(e.g., IP address)	Oct 4 2823 10:13:42 NSMApp login:pam_unix(login:session): session opened for user admin by LOGIN(uid=0) Oct 4 2823 10:13:42 NSMApp login:LOGIN ON tty1 BY admin
			Oct 4 2023 10:11:50 NSMbj wis chlopd(20) inspected check failed for user (admin). Oct 4 2023 10:11:51 NSMbp logis jour unit(logiscosti): authorited too failure; logiscost/GIN uide0 euide0 ttyetty/ rusers rhosts usersadmin Oct 4 2023 10:11:52 NSMbp logis: <u>AllIO 10GIN SSSSION ROOF tty: FOR admin, Permission denied</u>
			SSH:
			2023 12:15:04 NSMApp sshd(1001):pam_umix(sshd:session): session opened for user admin by (uid=0)Aug 24 2023
			Oct 4 2023 12:00:22 DSN/pc stell [46]: pom unitstabilization [saltentication [saltent; lognames uited existed typessh rusers rhost=10.1.4.16 Oct 4 2023 12:00:22 DSN/pc stell [46]: pom unitstabilization [saltentication [sal
			Web GUI:
			Oct 05, 2023 11:56:06 Success User Manager Console Login User *Administrator* with login id *admin* successfully logged into the Manager from *10.14.16 (10.14.16)*. Login URL* /intruvert/jss/module/Login.jsp , URL referrer : null , protocol : HTTP/1.1.
			Oct 05, 2023 11:53:46
FIA_UAU .7	None	None	-
FIA_X50 9_EXT.1/ Rev	Unsuccessful at- tempt to validate a certificate	Reason for failure	Sep 05, 2023 08:31:32
FIA_X50 9_EXT.1/ ITT	Unsuccessful at- tempt to validate a certificate	Reason for failure	Oct 11, 2023 10:44:55 I Critical Invalid Device Trust Certificate Detected Device NS3200 tried to establish trust with the Manager using an invalid CA-signed certificate with a valid one. Verification Tables Rost with leaf certs, signing issue. Oct 11, 2023 10:44:55 I Critical Device Disconnected The Manager cannot communicate with he device NS3200 through its command channel. The connection between the device with leaf connection between the device status of the Manager is down. Control to the Manager cannot command channel. The connection between the device status of the Manager is down.
FIA_X50 9_EXT.2	None	None	-
FIA_X50 9_EXT.3	None	None	-
FMT_M OF.1/ Manua- IUpdate	Any attempt to ini- tiate a manual up- date	None	diświsjakobuga, sendipacket type 2Aug 25 2023 08:28:56 NOMARP sendifusijakobuga, sendipacket type 2Aug 25 2023 08:28:56 NSMARP sedo:Row-griv : user NOT in sedoers ; TYrepts/0 : PMD-/ ; USER-root ; COMYAND-mort updateAug 25 2023 08:28:00 NSMARP sind[7:7]:Gebuga: receive packet: type 80Aug 25 2023 08:23:00 NSMARP sand[7:8]:Gebuga: receive packet: type 80Aug 25 2023

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FMT_MT D.1/ CoreDa- ta	None	None	-
FMT_SM F.1	All management activities of TSF data.	None	Refer to the below table [Manager Management Functions]
FMT_SM R.2	None	None	-
FPT_AP W_EXT.1	None	None	-
FPT_ITT.	 Initiation of the trusted channel Termination of the trusted channel Failure of the trusted channel functions 	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt	Initiation of trusted channel: Feb 06, 2024 12:26:36 Success Admin Do SNMP passphrase generation success, generation success, and narly piv possphrase be generated successfully for sensor 10.13.05.00 has established trust with Manager over the CA channel, Carthicate CN-10.13.05, OU-CC, Or-Anama, CARThicate CN-10.13.05, OU-CC, OU-CC, OR-Anama, CARThicate CN-10.13.05, OU-CC, OR-Anama, CARThicate CN-10.13.05, OU-CC, OR-Anama, CARThicate CN-10.13.05, OU-CC, OR-Anama, CARThicate CN-10.13.05, OU-CC, OR-Anama, CARThicate CN
FPT_SKP _EXT.1	None	None	-
FPT_ST M_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time - either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g., IP address)	Feb 21 2024 14:20:08 NSMApp sudo:pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by admin(uid=0) Feb 21 2024 14:20:08 NSMApp sudo:pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root Feb 21 2024 14:20:18 NSMApp sudo: admin : ITYPITS/0 ; PMD=70home/admin ; USER-root; COMMAND=/bin/timeda tectl.set-tume 2024 01:00:08 tectl.set-tume 2024 01:00:08 INSMAPP sudo: admin (sudo:session): session opened for user root by admin(uid=0) Jan 1 2024 01:00:08 USMApp sudo:pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root Jan 1 2024 01:00:08 USMApp sshd 105-1 debug1 : d5 is not 0 NONBLOCK Jan 1 2024 01:00:02 NSMApp sshd 105-1 debug3: d5 is not 0 NONBLOCK Jan 1 2024 01:00:02 NSMApp sshd 105-1 debug3: send_rexec_state: entering fd = 8 config len 1138
FPT_TST _EXT.1	None	None	-

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FPT_TU D_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure)	None	2023-10-30 12:28:24,278:IMF0; main :logCommand:881: [INFO] THE EXECUTED COMMAND IS: upgrads 2023-10-30 12:29:41,022:IMF0; main :subprocess_popen:467:The command is ['scp', 'acumensac@10.1.4.16:/home/acumensec/mansper_builds/11.1.16.@_corrupted_corrupted_build_setup.bin', '/tmp/']. The Ptd is 499, The exit status is 0 2023-10-30 12:29:47,445:IMF0; main _subprocess_popen:467:The command is ['/usr/bin/sudo', 'chmod', '+x', '/tmp/corrupted_build_setup.bin']. The Ptd is 501, The exit status is 0 2023-10-30 12:30-00,297:IMF0; main _subprocess_popen.nine:475:The command is ['/usr/bin/sudo', '/bin/managerinstall', '/tmp/corrupted_build_setup.bin']. The Ptd is 509. The exit status is 256 2023-10-30 12:30:00,298:EMEMOR:_main _:install_update:441: Traceback (most recent call_lati): Traceback (most recent call_lati): Traceback (most recent call_lati): Traceback (most recent call_lati): The '/bin/:restrictshell.py', line 439, in install_update subprocess_popen.nine['/usr/bin/sudo', '/bin/managerinstall', '/tmp/" + bundle]) File '/bin/:restrictshell.py', line 479, in subprocess_popen_nine OSError
FTA_SSL _EXT.1	The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism	None	Oct 5 2023 07:54:31 NSMApp sudo: admin : TTY=ttyl ; PMD=/home/admin ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/bash Oct 5 2023 07:54:31 NSMApp sudo:pam unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by admin(uid=0) Oct 5 2023 07:55:09 NSMApp shd03:22]sdebugs! PMI: sshapm thread cleanup entering Oct 5 2023 07:56:24 NSMApp sudo:pam_unix(sudo:session); session closed for user root
FTA_SSL .3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism	None	SSH: Oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:Starting season: shell on pts/1 for admin from 10.1.4.16 port 50640 td 0 oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: shapacket_set_tos; set IP_TOS 0x10 oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: shapacket_set_tos; set IP_TOS 0x10 oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: shapacket_set_tos; set IP_TOS 0x10 oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: for 12 setting 0.00MBLOCK oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: for 12 setting 0.00MBLOCK oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: for 12 setting 0.00MBLOCK oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: for 12 setting 0.00MBLOCK oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: for 12 setting 0.00MBLOCK oct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:47;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:43;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:53;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:53;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:53;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:53;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:53;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: Copy environment: SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED= 0ct 5 2023 12:53;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: marrequest_request_end entering: type 123 0ct 5 2023 12:53;11 NSMApp sshd [665]:debug3: marrequest_request_end entering: type 123 0ct 5 2023 12:53;11 NSMApp sshd [666]:debug3: marrequest_end entering: type 123 0ct 5 2023 12:53;11 NSMApp sshd [666]:debug3: marrequest_end entering: type 123 0ct 5 2023
FTA_SSL .4	The termination of an interactive session	None	SSH: 2023 12:13:33 NSMop sahd[3341]:Beceived disconnect from 10.1.4.16 port 56744:11: disconnected by userAug 25 2623 12:13:33 NSMop sahd[3341]:Disconnected from 10.1.4.16 port 56744 NSMop sahd[3341]:Disconnected from 10.1.4.16 port 56744 User adminAug 25 2023 12:13:33 NSMop sahd[3136]:debug1: PAM: selecting credentials WebGUI: Oct 05, 2023 13:04:17 Success User Manager Console Logout User "Administrator" with login id "admin" logged out of the Manager from "10.1.4.16 (10.1.4.16)". Console: sston): session opened for user admin by LOGIN(utd=0)Aug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 86:36:48 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 80:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 80:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 80:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 80:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 80:37:31 NSMapp togin:LOGIN ON tty1 BY adminAug 28 2023 80:37:31 NSMapp togin:
FTA_TAB .1	None	None	-

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FTP_ITC.	 Initiation of the trusted channel Termination of the trusted channel 	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt	Initiation of the trusted channel: Sep 04, 2023 07-47-22 Success
	 Failure of the trusted channel functions 		Sep 05, 2023 08:07:27
			Failure of the trusted channel functions:
			Sep 05, 2023 08:31:32 Failed Admin Do Syalog connection failed with server. Syslog Settings Configuration succeeded at 2023-09-05 Syslog Sy

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents	Audit Logs
FTP_TRP .1/ Admin	 Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions. 	Identification of the claimed user identity.	Initiation of trusted channel
FAU_ST G_EXT.4	None	None	-

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FCS_HTT PS_EXT. 1	Failure to establish a HTTPS Session	Reason for failure	javax.net.ssl[FIME[0] & Ahlhtps:/jsse.nio-0.0.0.0-443-execc. 2023-11-23 14:34:25.339 UTC[ClentHello.java:678]Consum ing ClentHello handshake message (
FCS_SSH S_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session	Reason for failure	Sep 27 2023 07:17:13 8000/g chalf into hebeigh an equal populated hay \$65720000000 is not allowed. Sep 27 2023 07:17:13 8000/g chalf into hebeigh an equal population of his into for all for

Table 7. Manager Management Functions

Management Functions	Test cases
Ability to administer the TOE lo- cally and remotely	Console:
cally and remotely	Oct 4 2023 10:13:42 NSMApp login:pam_unix(login:session): session opened for user admin by LOGIN(uid=0 Oct 4 2023 10:13:42 NSMApp login:LOGIN ON tty1 BY admin
	<u>SSH:</u>
	3Aug 24 2023 12:15:04 NSMApp sshd[1081]:Accepted keyboard-interactive/pam for admin from 10.1.4.16 port 35496 ssh2Au 2023 12:15:04 NSMApp sshd[1081]:pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user admin by (uid=0)Aug 24 2023
	WebGUI:
	Oct 05, 2023 11:56:06 Success User Manager Console Login User "Administrator" with login id "admin" successfully logged into the Manager from "10.1.4.16 (10.1.4.16)". Login URI: /intruvert/jsp/module/Login.jsp , URI referrer : null , protocol : HTTP/1.1.
Ability to configure the access banner	Apr 03, 2024 13:37:36 Success IPS Policy Logon Banner Configuration updated.
Ability to configure the session in- activity time before session termi- nation or locking	Apr 03, 2024 13:43:09 Success Manager Save Session Timeout Setting

Management Functions Test cases Ability to update the TOE, and to Positive update: verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to instalsession opened for user root by admin(uid=0) session closed for user root PMD=/home/admin; USER=root; COMMAND=/bin/mar session opened for user root by admin(uid=0) ling those updates :/home/admin# cat shell.log | grep "2024-04-02 06:34" 06:34:49,898:INFO:_main_:subprocess_popen:467:The command is ['scp', 'acumensec@10.1.3.45:/home/acumensec/fmanager/setup_bin', '/tmp/'], The Pid is 3870, The exit status is 0 Negative update: 2023-10-30 12:29:41,022:INFO:__main__:subprocess_popen:467:The command is ['scp', 'acumensec@10.1.4.16:/home/acumensec/manager_builds/11.1.116.8_corrupted/corrupted_build_setup.bin', '/tmp/'], The Pid is 499, The exit status is 0 2023-10-30 12:29:47,445:INFO:__main__:subprocess_popen:467:The command is ['/usr/bin/sudo', 'chmod', '+x', '/tmp/corrupte _build_setup.bin'], The Pid is 501, The exit status is 0 2023-10-30 12:30:00,297:INFO: _main__:subprocess_popen_nine:475:The command is ['/usr/bin/sudo', '/bin/managerinstall', tmp/corrupted_build_setup.bin'], The Pid is 505, The exit status is 256 railed to verify signature of install bundle. Bundle installation failed raceback (most recent call last): File "/bin/.restrictShell.py", line 438, in install_update subprocess_popen_nine(["/usr/bin/sudo", "/bin/managerinstall", "/tmp/" + bundle]) File "/bin/.restrictShell.py", line 479, in subprocess_popen_nine raise OSError From Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA AFL.1 imum Number of Characters: 1 LOWER d: No Minimum Number of Characters: UCAL Enabled: Yes Minimum Number of ters: 1 Login Failure: Enabled Number activityPolicyVO{userInactivityCheckEnabled=fal. erDays=1} Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full); Apr 04, 2024 08:28:36 Success Protocol: TCP, Error message Syslog TLS certificate contains Leaf detail as follows subject: CN=10.1.4.16, issuedBy: CN=AcumenICA, OU=CC, O=Acumen, C=US, validhy: Apr 4, 2024 - N 31, 2024, sigAlgo: SHA256WITHRSA, Apr 04, 2024 08:28:36 Admin Domain subjectAltName:10.1.4.16, Serial #:4528004407463435150. Apr 04, 2024 08:28:34 Certificate import has been successful, Success Admin Domain Ability to modify the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to Syslog TLS certificate an external IT entity subjectAltName:10.1.4.16, Serial #:4528004407463435150. Apr 04, 2024 08:28:34

Management Functions	Test cases	
Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality	Apr 12, 2024 07:57:43 Success Manager Manager CSR File Generation A CSR file (used to generate a CA-signed ce trust establishment) was generated by the Manager CSR File (used to generate a CA-signed ce trust establishment)	rtificate for Manager.
Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store	Sep 04, 2023 07:16:06 Success Manager Manager Trust Certificate Import A CA-signed certificate (used by the Manager establishment) was imported into the Manager Certificate : CN=10.1.3.64, O=Acumen, OU=0.5T=, C=US	r.
Ability to set the time which is used for timestamps	Feb 21 2024 14:20:08 NSMApp sudo:pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by admin(ureb 21 2024 14:20:08 NSMApp sudo:pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root feb 21 2024 14:20:15 NSMApp sudo: admin: TTY=pts/0; PWD=/home/admin; USER=root; COMMAND=/btectl set-time 2024-01-01 01:00:00 Feb 21 2024 14:20:15 NSMApp sudo:pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by admin(urulanti) and 1 2024 01:00:00 NSMApp sudo:pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root Jan 1 2024 01:00:02 NSMApp sshd[1054]:debug3: fd 5 is not 0 NONBLOCK Jan 1 2024 01:00:26 NSMApp sshd[1054]:debug1: Forked child 551. Jan 1 2024 01:00:26 NSMApp sshd[1054]:debug3: send_rexec_state: entering fd = 8 config len 1138	in/timeda
Ability to re-enable an Administrator account	Oct 05, 2023 11:56:06 Success User Manager Console Login User "Administrator" with login id "admin" sur logged into the Manager from "10.1.4.16 (10. Login URI: /intruvert/jsp/module/Login.jsp , l. : null , protocol : HTTP/1.1.	ccessfully 1.4.16)". JRI referrer
Ability to manage the trusted public keys database	root@NSMApp:/home/admin# tail -f pubKeyAuth.log [Thu Apr 4 06:59:09 UTC 2024] : Validating Public Key Algorithm [Thu Apr 4 06:59:09 UTC 2024] : Resetting the permissions of the file .ssh/authorized_keys on local mach [Thu Apr 4 06:59:09 UTC 2024] : Successfully modified the permissions of .ssh/authorized_keys on remote	
Ability to configure the interaction between TOE components	Feb 06, 2024 11:38:06	Manager
	Feb 06, 2024 11:38:01 Success Manager Secure Sensor Sensor IP 10.1.3.65 has started established communication communication channel with the Manager.	a secure
	Feb 06, 2024 11:38:06 Failed Manager Secure Sensor Sensor NS3200 is unable to establish a secure Communication Com	re annot get se add it in
	Feb 06, 2024 11:38:06 Failed Manager Secure Sensor Sensor NS3200 is unable to establish a secure Sensor NS3200 is	
	Feb 06, 2024 12:26:36 Success Admin Do SNMP passphrase generation success. SNMP passphrase command channel communication on port 850 auth and priv passphrase is generated success sensor 10.1.3.65.	
	Feb 06, 2024 12:26:10 Success Manager Trust Establishment Sensor IP NS3200 has established trust with Mover the CA channel, Certificate: CN=10.1.3.6: 0=Acumen, C=US	lanager 5, OU=CC,
	Feb 06, 2024 12:26:05 Success Manager Secure Sensor Sensor IP 10.1.3.65 has started established a communication channel with the Manager.	secure

Table 8. Sensor FAU_GEN.1 Audit Records

quire- cord Contents ment	
N.1 shut-down of the audit functions Auditable events for the count s not specified required level of audit; and Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for Administrators). Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the in	ble events for the not specified level of audit; diministrative login and logout (name of user acshall be logged if individual user accounts are ed for Administrators). Senor School Senor Senor CLI actions Senor NS2007 **Oct 13 07.00.29 2023 Self 19 Self 19 Senor NS2007 **Oct 13 07.00.29 2023 Self 19 Self 19 Senor NS2007 **Oct


Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
	count shall be logged)		
FAU_GE N.1/IPS	None	None	-
FAU_GE N_EXT.1	None	None	-
FAU_GE N.2	None	None	-
FAU_ST G_EXT.5	None	None	-
FCS_CK M.1	None	None	-
FCS_CK M.2	None	None	-
FCS_CK M.4	None	None	-
FCS_CO P.1/ DataEn- cryption	None	None	-
FCS_CO P.1/ SigGen	None	None	-
FCS_CO P.1/ Hash	None	None	-
FCS_CO P.1/ Keyed- Hash	None	None	-
FCS_RB G_EXT.1	None	None	-
FCS_SSH C_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session	Reason for failure	NS7600# tall10f /mnt/config/var/log/messages 2024-02-08107:30:05.00000-00:00 localhost stunnel LOGS[cron]: Updating DH parameters 2024-02-08107:30:05.000000-00:00 localhost stunnel LOGS[main]: Log file respensed 2024-02-08107:33:05.0000000-00:00 localhost stunnel LOGS[cron]: DH parameters updated 2024-02-08107:35:11.000000-00:00 localhost stunnel LUGS[cron]: DH parameters updated 2024-02-08107:55:16.000000-00:00 localhost sind 22245 - Umbale to negopitate vith 10.14.5ip port 22: no matching host key 2024-02-08107:55:16.000000-00:00 localhost sind 22239 - /home/emb-demo/rfs/fips/Rii_1_M_YOSENITE_BRANCH/rubicon/srcroot/
FCS_SSH S_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session	Reason for failure	Feb 08, 2024 14:38:03 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor 'NS7600": "Feb 8 14:38:03 2024: SSH Failure: User admin Remote Host - 10.1.4.15 Remote Port - 40222 Patching publishey not found." Feb 08, 2024 14:38:03 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor 'NS7600": "Feb 8 14:38:03 2024: SSH Failure: User admin Remote Host - 10.1.4.15 Remote Port - 40222 admin", Remote Host - 10.1.4.15 Remote Port - 40222

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FCS_TLS C_EXT.2	Failure to establish a TLS Session	Reason for failure	2024-02-28 13:49:30,979 EMROR [PhtlogliOchamelServerPoolCA-7] [] iv.core.ControlChamel.MIO:207 - ControlChamelWorkers : runt). (//bi.id.2778500) ==== //10.14.10:49664) 10 exception occured, close the connection: jaws.to.100cception: End of socket mitted one. //bi.id.2778500] ==== //10.14.10:49664) 10 exception occured, close the connection: jaws.to.100cception: End of socket mitted one. //bi.id.2778500] ==== //10.14.10:40664) 10 exception occured, close the connection: jaws.to.100cception: End of socket mitted one. //bi.id.2764-02-28 13:49:40,315 MRMI [Thread-499] [] iv.core.ControlChamel.197 - fail reading incoming packet cold be transmit finish jaws.net.31.55Lindochamel.Exception: The Finished message cannot be verificated. Impl Error: 10.14.10 com. bitrusert.ext.controlChamel.[] iv.core.ControlChamel.09 Connection in the connection jaws.1989 - [vertrlchamel.jars.7] at com. bitrusert.ext.controlChamel.SensorInitionsection.protocolImpliCsensorInitionsection.jaws.468 - [vertrlchamel.jars.7] //bi.io.com. bitrusert.ext.controlChamel.SensorInitionsection.protocolImpliCsensorInitionsection.jaws.469 - [vertrlchamel.jars.7] //bi.io.com. bitrusert.ext.controlChamel.SensorInitionsection.protocolImpliCsensorInitionsection.jaws.469 - [vertrlchamel.jars.7] //bi.io.com.bi.io.com.discontrolChamel.1980600000000000000000000000000000000000
FCO_CP C_EXT.1	 Enabling communications between a pair of components Disabling communications between a pair of components 	Identities of the end- points pairs enabled or disabled	Enabling communications: Feb 07, 2024 09:55:01 Success Admin Domain SMMP passphrase generation success. Feb 07, 2024 09:54:48 Success Manager Trust Establishment Success Manager Trust Establishment Success Manager Trust Establishment Success Manager Secure Surcer Communication Success Manager Secure Surcer Surcer Communication Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". Feb 07, 2024 09:54:42 Success Manager Secure Surcer Surcer Communication Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". Feb 14, 2024 07:09:08 Success Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Success Manager Secure Surcer Communication dataset with the Manager Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Success Manager Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Success Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Success Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Success Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Success Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Success Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Sensor Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Sensor Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part of the Manager Sensor Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". **Part
FIA_AFL. 1	Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).	Feb 09, 2024 14:13:37 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "N57600": "Feb 9 14:13:37 2024: SSH Failure: User - acumentse: Remote Host - 10.1.4.15 Remote Port - 38/92 Authentication latine*. Feb 09, 2024 14:13:37 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "N57600": "Feb 9 14:13:37 2024: User "acumentse' is locked due to too many authentication failures." Feb 09, 2024 14:13:37 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "N57600": "Feb 9 14:13:37 2024: SSHD Password Based Login Failed: Authentication failure in the sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "N57600": "Feb 9 14:13:37 2024: SSHD Password Based Login Failed: Authentication failures." Feb 09, 2024 14:13:33 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "N57600": "Feb 14:13:32 2024: SSH failure: User - acumentsec Remote Host - 10.1.4.15 Remote Port - 38/92." Feb 09, 2024 14:13:33 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "N57600": "Feb 14:13:32 2024: User "acumentsec for locked due to too many authentication failures". Feb 09, 2024 14:13:33 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "N57600": "Feb 14:13:33 2024: SSH Desaword Based Login Failed: Authentication failures". Feb 09, 2024 14:13:33 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "N57600": "Feb 14:13:33 2024: SSH Desaword Based Login Failed: Authentication failures."
FIA_PM G_EXT.1	None	None	-

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FIA_UIA_ EXT.1		Console:	
LXI.I	cation mechanism	(e.g., IP address)	Oct 13, 2023 07:15:00 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor *NS:2200" : *Oct 13 07:15:00 2023: Console Password Based Login Failed: _User - 'trellix', Remote Host - 0 0 0 0, Remote Port - 0 *.
			Oct 13, 2023 07:11:34 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 13 07:11:34 2023: Console Password Based Login Falled: , User - 'acumensec', Remote Host - 0.0.0.0, Remote Port - 0 *.
			SSH:
			Oct 13, 2023 07:00:29 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 13 07:00:29 2023; SSHD Password Based Login Success; "User - "admin", Remote Host - 10.1.4.16, Remote Port - 54744 ".
			Oct 13, 2023 08:58:23 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 13 08:58:23 2023: SSH Failure: User - admin Remote Host - 10.1.4.16 Remote Port - 41922 Authentication failure".
FIA_UAU	All use of the identi- fication and authenti-	Origin of the attempt	Console:
_EXT.2	cation mechanism	(e.g., IP address)	Oct 13, 2023 07:15:00 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor 'NS:3200" : "Oct 13 07:15:00 2023: Console Password Based Login Falled: . User - 'trellix', Remote Host - 0.0.0.0, Remote Port - 0 *.
			Oct 13, 2023 07:11:34 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 13 07:11:34 2023: Console Password Based Login Falled: , User 'acumenteec', Remote Host - 0.0.0.0, Remote Port - 0 *.
			SSH:
			Oct 13, 2023 07:00:29 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 13 07:00:29 2023; SSHD Instruction Based Login Success: , User - "admin", Remote Host - 10.1.4.16, Remote Port - 54744 ".
			Oct 13, 2023 08:58:23 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 13 08:58:23 2023; SSH Failure: User - admin Remote Host - 10.1.4.16 Remote Port - 41922 Authentication failure".
FIA_UAU .7	None	None	-
FIA_X50 9_EXT.1/ ITT	Unsuccessful at- tempt to validate a certificate	Reason for failure	Feb 29, 2024 07:23:49 Falled Manager Sensor Trust Certificate Import
FIA_X50 9_EXT.3	None	None	-
FMT_M OF.1/ Manua- IUpdate	Any attempt to ini- tiate a manual up- date	None	Feb 19, 2024 07:55:47 Success Sensor Device Software Deployment Upload file sensorsw. 7,000_11122850_jar to device PMS760F. Manager File Upload Upload file sensorsw. 7,000_11122850_jar to Manager. File Size: 938304.216796875. Manager File Upload Uplo
FMT_MT D.1/ CoreDa- ta	None	None	-
FMT_SM F.1	All management activities of TSF data.	None	Refer to the below table [Sensor Management Functions]

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FMT_SM R.2	None	None	-
FPT_AP W_EXT.1	None	None	-
FPT_ITT.	 Initiation of the trusted channel 	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted chan-	Initiation of trusted channel: Feb 07, 2024 09:45:10 Success Manager Secure Sensor Communication Sensor Communication Communi
	 Termination of the trusted channel 	nels establishment attempt	Termination of trusted channel:
	Failure of the trusted channel		Feb 14, 2024 07:09:08 Success Sensor Sensor Deletion Successfully deleted sensor "NS7600". Failure of trusted channel functions:
	functions		Feb 07, 2024 10:10:52 I failed Manager Secure Sensor Communication communication downed with the Manager, Cemed get the PS 07, 2024 10:10:52 I failed Manager Secure Sensor Communication downed to the EMS night Tabacks and Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Tabacks and Tabacks and Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Tabacks and Tabacks and Tabacks and Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Tabacks and Tabacks and Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Tabacks and Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease add it in the EMS night Table 2020. Flease 202
FPT_SKP _EXT.1	None	None	-
FPT_ST M_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time - either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g., IP address)	Jan 01, 2024 01:00:25 Received Sensor Sensor GLI actions Sensor "NS7600": "TIME UPDATE: LocalIP-10.1.4.10 Localizet-47286, RemotaiP-10.1.4.27 RemotaiPort-8503 Old Time - 2024, New Time - 3 and 1 01:00:25 2024".
FPT_TST _EXT.1	None	None	-
FPT_TU D_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure)	None	Feb 19, 2024 07:55:47 Success Manager Manager File Upload Upload file sensorsw_7600_11122850.jar to Manager. File 19, 2024 07:55:47 Success Manager Manager File Upload Upload file sensorsw_7600_11122850.jar file type: SENSOR_SOFTWARE_Upload III.122850.jar file Manager. File Upload III.22850.jar for Manager. File Upload III.22850.jar file file Upload III.22
FTA_SSL _EXT.1	The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism	None	Feb 12, 2024 13:31-45 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor *NE7800* - *Feb 12 13:31-45 2024. Cancele Loyal Secretary User - *Indian*, Remote Host - 0.0.0.0, Remote Port - 0 .
FTA_SSL .3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism	None	Feb 12, 2024 12:39:15 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS7600", "Feb 12 12:39:15 2024: SSH Termination: User - admin Remote Host - 10.1.4.15

Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs
FTA_SSL .4	The termination of an interactive ses-	None	SSH:
	sion		Oct 19, 2023 11:35:45 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 19 11:35:45 2023: SSHD Logout Success: , User - *admin', Remote Host - 10.1.4.16, Remote Port - 34114 *.
			Console:
			Oct 13, 2023 12:11:49 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 13 12:11:49 2023; Console Logout Sucress; User - "admin", Remote Host - 0.0.0.0, Remote Port - 0 *.
FTA_TAB .1	None	None	-
FTP_TRP	Initiation of the trusted channel	Identification of the claimed user identity	Initiation of the trusted channel:
Admin	Termination of the trusted		Oct 13, 2023 13:06:26 Received Sensor CLI actions Sensor NS3200": "C0x 13 13:06:26 2023: SSI Initiation: User - admin Remote Host - 10.1.4.16 Remote Port - 44660". Oct 13, 2023 13:06:26 Received Sensor CLI actions Sensor NS3000": "Cx 13 13:06:26 2023: SSI Initiation: User - 34660". Sensor NS3000": "Cx 12 13:06:26 2023: SSI Initiation: User - 34660". Sensor NS3000": "Cx 12 13:06:26 2023: SSI Initiation: User - 34660".
	channel • Failure of the		Termination of the trusted channel:
	trusted channel functions		Oct 19, 2023 11:35-45 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor TRS2000 - 70ct 19 11:35:45 2023: SSH TRS2000 - 70ct 19 11:
			Failure of the trusted channel functions:
			Oct 19, 2023 10:48:51 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 19 10:48:51 2023: SSHD Person of Based Login Falled: Autheritication failure, User "Scurmensecy, Remote Host - 10.1.4.16, Remote Port - 30032".
FMT_SM F.1/IPS	Modification of an IPS policy element	Identifier or name of the modified IPS policy element (e.g. which signature, baseline, or known- good/known-bad list was modified)	Paults System Files Background Tasks User Activities MOR Events



Re- quire- ment	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Re- cord Contents	Audit Logs		
IPS_IPB_ EXT.1	Inspected traffic matches a list of known-good or known-bad address- es applied to an IPS policy	 Source and destination IP addresses (and, if applicable, indication of whether the source and/or destination address matched the list) TOE interface that received the packet. Network-based action by the TOE (e.g. allowed, blocked, sent reset) 	<pre><32>Sep 13 14:12:44 SyslogACLLogForwarder: Sep 13, 2023 14:12:44 : NS7500 matched Outbound ACL rule (CC_Policy/#1: Known bad) 10.1.3.15 → 10.1.3.29 on G3/1-G3/2 (icmp/N/A) = DROP <32>Sep 13 14:12:45 SyslogACLLogForwarder: Sep 13, 2023 14:12: 45 : NS7500 matched Outbound ACL rule (CC_Policy/#1: Known bad) 10.1.3.15 → 10.1 .3.29 on G3/1-G3/2 (icmp/N/A) = DROP <32>Sep 13 14:12:46 SyslogACLLogForwarder: Sep 13, 2023 14:12: 45 : NS7500 matched Outbound ACL rule (CC_Policy/#1: Known bad) 10.1.3.15 → 10.1.3.29 on G3/1-G3/2 (icmp/N/A) = DROP</pre>		
IPS_SBD _EXT.1	Inspected traffic matches a signature-based IPS rule with logging enabled	 Name or identifier of the matched signature. Source and destination IP addresses The content of the header fields that were determined to match the signature TOE interface that received the packet Network-based action by the TOE (e.g. allowed, blocked, sent reset) 	Export ▼ C Summary Details Description Event Time: Jul 21, 2023 Domain: /My Company 11:40:02 Device: N57500 Result: Attack Blocked Interface: G3/1-G3/2 Relevance: Unknown Matched Policy: Default Prevention Application: TCP 80 VLAN: Protocol: http VLAN: Detection: Signature Assigned To: Acknowledged: No Alert ID: 530961586796783 3377 Attacker / Target Attacker Target PAddress (Port): 10.1.3.15 (20) 10.1.3.29 (80)		

Table 9. Sensor Management Functions

Management Functions	Test cases
Ability to administer the TOE lo-	SSH:
cally and remotely	Oct 13, 2023 07:00:29 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200" : "Oct 13 07:00:29 2023: SSHD Password Based Login Success: , User - 'admin', Remote Host - 10.1.4.16, Remote Port - 54744 ".
	Console:
	Oct 13, 2023 10:24:22 Received Sensor Sensor CLI actions Sensor "NS3200": "Oct 13 10:24:22 2023: Console Password Based Login Success: User - 'admin', Remote Host - 0.0.0.0, Remote Port - 0 ".
Ability to configure the access banner	Apr 05, 2024 15:34:40 Success Sensor Sensor Banner Message Template Creation or Update Cr
Ability to configure the session in- activity time before session termi- nation or locking	2024-04-08T09:19:10.000000+00:00 localhost tL EMER gam checkTrustDNSProxySetting: Proxy config not available 2024-04-08T09:19:17.000000+00:00 localhost tL EMER clilog TYPED CMD: set console timeout 20 2024-04-08T09:19:17.000000+00:00 localhost tL EMER clilog EXEC CMD : set console timeout 20 user - admin 2024-04-08T09:19:17.000000+00:00 localhost tL EMER ivsnor persist vty timeout configuration : 20 2024-04-08T09:19:23.000000+00:00 localhost tL EMER ivsnor var_chassisGrp: tempId:1, temp:22.000000
Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates	Positive update: Positive update: Positive upd
	Oct 26, 2023 14:18:15

Management Functions	Test cases				
Ability to configure the authen- tication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1	Oct 19, 2023 10:56:16 Oct 19, 2023 10:56:16	Received Received	Sensor Sensor	Sensor CLI actions Sensor CLI actions	Sensor "NS3200" : "User 'acumensec' is successfully unlocked ". Sensor "NS3200" : "EXEC CMD : unlockuser acumensec ".
Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full);	Apr 08, 2024 08:58:22 Apr 08, 2024 08:58:04	Received Received	Sensor Sensor	Sensor CLI actions Sensor CLI actions	Sensor "NS3200": "EXEC CMD: Manager Audit Logging Enabled". Sensor "NS3200": "EXEC CMD: Manager Audit Logging Disabled".
Ability to modify the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity	Apr 08, 2024 08:58:22 Apr 08, 2024 08:58:04	Received Received	Sensor Sensor	Sensor CLI actions Sensor CLI actions	Sensor "NS3200": "EXEC CMD: Manager Audit Logging Enabled". Sensor "NS3200": "EXEC CMD: Manager Audit Logging Disabled".
Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality	Apr 12, 2024 08:11:45	Success	Manager	Sensor CSR File Generation	A CSR file (used to generate a CA-signed certificate for trust establishment) was generated by Sensor: Certificate Alias: NS3200.
Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store	Nov 16, 2023 09:17:04	Success	Manager	Sensor Trust Certificate Import	A CA-signed certificate (used by the Sensor for trust establishment) was imported into Sensor: Certificate Alias: NS3200, Certificate: CN=10.1.3.65, OU=CC, O=Acumen, C=US
Ability to set the time which is used for timestamps	Jul 13, 2023 23:33:07	Received	Sensor	Sensor CLI actions	Sensor "NS3200" : " TIME UPDATE : LocalIP-10.1.3.65 LocalPort-37766, RemoteIP-10.1.3.64 RemotePort-8503 Old Time - Jul 13 15:33:04 2023, New Time - Jul 13 18:03:07 2023".
Ability to re-enable an Administrator account	Oct 19, 2023 10:56:16 Oct 19, 2023 10:56:16	Received Received	Sensor Sensor	Sensor CLI actions Sensor CLI actions	Sensor "NS3200" : "User 'acumensec' is successfully unlocked ". Sensor "NS3200" : "EXEC CMD : unlockuser acumensec ".
Ability to manage the trusted public keys database	Apr 08, 2024 09:05:03	Received	Sensor	Sensor CLI actions	Sensor "NS3200" : "User 'acumensec' Public-Key imported successfully from remote machine : 10.1.4.16".
Ability to configure the interaction between TOE components	/My Company > Troubleshooting Logs Faults System Files Backg		tivities MDR Event		
	Time \$\.1 Feb 06, 2024 11:38:06		nmary ist Establishment Er	Unacknowledged Last Details Device NS3200 is attempting to establish a trust with the Manager, but the device has not been defined in the Manager.	Recommended Action Duration (minutes) Device Make sure the device you would like to add to the Manager has been defined 6.08 Manager
	Feb 06, 2024 11:38:01 Feb 06, 2024 11:38:06	Success	Manager Manager	Secure Sensor Communication Secure Sensor Communication	Sensor IP 10.1.3.65 has started established a secure communication channel with the Manager. Sensor NS3200 is unable to establish a secure communication channel with the Manager. Cannot get the shared secret for sensor "NS3200". Please add it in the EMS first. Thanks!
	Feb 06, 2024 11:38:06	!! Failed	Manager	Secure Sensor Communication	Sensor NS3200 is unable to establish a secure communication channel with the Manager. Cannot get the Shared Secret of sensor NS3200: null
	Feb 06, 2024 12:26:36	Success Success	Admin Do	SNMP passphrase generation success.	Command channel communication on port 8500 using auth and priv passphrase is generated successfully for sensor 10.1.3.65.
	Feb 06, 2024 12:26:10 Feb 06, 2024 12:26:05	✓ Success ✓ Success	Manager Manager	Trust Establishment Secure Sensor	Sensor IP NS3200 has established trust with Manager over the CA channel, Certificate: CN=10.1.3.65, OU=CC, 0=Acumen, C=US Sensor IP 10.1.3.65 has started established a secure
				Communication	communication channel with the Manager.

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